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Preface
Critical Shifts
Over the past 40 years, powerful demographic and societal shifts have irrevocably changed the
American workforce. Today, women make up nearly half of all U.S. workers. This change has had
a dramatic impact on the way families manage their responsibilities at home and at work. Our
population has aged significantly — many older Americans are working well past the traditional age
of retirement. Transformative civil rights laws empower people with disabilities, allowing them to
be productive workers. But the way our workplaces are set up to get work done has failed to keep
pace with these changes. The result is a profound “mismatch” between the needs of the modern
workforce and the structure of the modern workplace.1
This mismatch between the needs of workers and out-of-date workplace policies plays out every day
in the lives of working Americans across the country as they struggle to meet the demands of both
work and family. And as President Obama recently explained, the consequences of this mismatch
reach far beyond the needs of certain families or certain industries.

“Workplace flexibility isn’t just a women’s issue. It’s an issue
that affects the well-being of our families and the success
of our businesses. It affects the strength of our economy —
whether we’ll create the workplaces and jobs of the future we
need to compete in today’s global economy.”2
This policy platform is the fruit of a collaboration between two organizations: Workplace Flexibility
2010 at Georgetown Law (WF2010) and Berkeley Law School’s Center on Health, Economic & Family
Security (Berkeley CHEFS). Six years ago, Workplace Flexibility 2010 was founded on the simple
premise that our tremendous societal sea change has been met with an inadequate response from
both business and government, and that workplace flexibility is critical to the needs of modern
workers. Berkeley CHEFS was founded in 2008, in part on the recognition that the mismatch
between the needs of the modern workforce and the current organization of workplaces has caused
increasing economic insecurity for families. WF2010 and Berkeley CHEFS share the mission of
working to develop robust policy solutions to these linked problems of the mismatch between the
needs of workers and the structure of workplaces, the need for flexibility, and rising individual and
family economic insecurity.
The “great transformation” of the American workforce isn’t affecting only one type of family or one
type of industry.3 It’s an American story about a constellation of cultural shifts and demographic
changes that challenges us to reconsider the touchstones of our daily lives — how we live; how we
support our families; how we meet our responsibilities as parents, children, and workers; how we run
our businesses; and how we remain a healthy and globally competitive society.
One of America’s great strengths has been to treat societal change as an opportunity to be seized
rather than as a problem that merely needs to be fixed. Confronting the “mismatch” should be no
different.
4

Workplace Flexibility 2010: Building a National Response
Despite a growing consensus that workplace flexibility issues are of national concern,4 neither
federal policy nor private sector practice has fully adapted to, or adequately accounted for, this new
reality. Instead, working families largely have been left to muddle through these issues on their own,
resulting in a high degree of demand for various types of flexibility, but little consistency in the supply.
Workplace Flexibility 2010 was established to figure out how to move the ball forward on flexibility
using public policy levers.5 We view workplace flexibility — including Flexible Work Arrangements, Time
Off, and Career Flexibility6 — as a necessary response to the modern work-life dilemma. It is a set of
tools that acknowledges the diverse needs of the workforce and diverse demands of the workplace.
Our goal was to make workplace flexibility a compelling national issue in Washington, and to come up
with common-sense public policy solutions that would help make workplace flexibility the standard in
the American workplace. Our unique challenge has been to figure out what role government can play
on issues that cut to the heart of how employers do business — how they manage their workforce,
how they structure compensation and benefits, and how they achieve their bottom-line goals.
In addressing each aspect of flexibility, we started by getting a handle on the current landscape — the
existing relevant law and policy, and the data available on each issue — and then forcing ourselves to
look beyond what was in front of us, to imagine new possibilities for restructuring the workplace.
For the first several years of our project, we maintained a posture of “disciplined neutrality” — keeping
an open mind on the role of public policy and the types of policy mechanisms that could be used
to increase access to flexibility. We were truly looking to get beyond partisan politics and open the
door to a reasonable and productive policy conversation on flexibility. Many people from across the
political spectrum have engaged on our proposals, offered alternatives, and helped us hone our best
thinking on all three aspects of flexibility.7 We succeeded in creating space for open and constructive
conversation with leaders from across the political spectrum.
That effort has led to real progress. Based on these years of work, Workplace Flexibility 2010 was
able to publish a policy platform on Flexible Work Arrangements in 2009.8 This report included
a “consensus statement” from our National Advisory Commission on Workplace Flexibility (NAC),
a diverse group of experts on various aspects of flexibility, which included representatives of
employers, labor, and researchers. The platform and consensus statement helped set the stage
for the 2010 White House Forum on Workplace Flexibility, which featured numerous companies that
have made flexible work arrangements the norm rather than the exception in their workplaces.9
That same “consensus-based” process, however, including an intense series of conversations with
our National Advisory Commission, did not result in a similar agreement on time off. Everyone
acknowledged there was a problem: People need paid time off for their own health and family
caregiving and lots of people, across incomes and industries, don’t get it.
But we simply couldn’t come up with an alignment of interests between employers and employees
about the role of government and public policy in this equation. Workers’ need for time-off policies
is deep, but the concerns of employers are deep as well: How would public policy intersect with how
they do business? And how would a new law intersect with current law?
Instead of coming to consensus, we left our Advisory Commission process with a long list of
“homework” on time-off policy — tough questions that needed more research, thinking and debate.
5

The task was a bit daunting. But we also left with a flicker of an idea: There was strong interest
from employer and employee representatives in addressing the issue of how to provide income
replacement for periods of extended time off from work for health and caregiving reasons.
So, in 2009, the question for Workplace Flexibility 2010 was: How? How do we get more people,
across incomes and industries, access to paid time off for health and caregiving reasons? And
how can we do it in a way that addresses the needs of working families — as well as the needs of
employers?

Berkeley CHEFS: Bridging the Gap Between Academic Ideas and Practical
Proposals
While Workplace Flexibility 2010 was tackling the difficult question of how to develop modern
day flexibility policies, Berkeley CHEFS was launching its effort to address issues surrounding the
increasing economic insecurity of workers and families in the United States.
One of our central goals at Berkeley CHEFS is to ensure that rigorous academic thinking is applied
to practical policy solutions. The reason we chose to focus on workers’ need for paid time off for
health and caregiving was not only because it is a necessary benefit to increase security for today’s
workers, but also because, collectively, we have spent significant time and energy over the years
thinking hard about the problem. More than 20 years ago, Professor Steve Sugarman developed
an academic proposal aimed at requiring workers to save in order to be economically prepared for
a potential future need to be temporarily away from work.10 More recently, Professor Gillian Lester
made an important contribution to the work addressing this policy problem with her article defending
the need for paid leave in our country,11 and Ann O’Leary published an article providing an historical
perspective, examining why family leave laws in the United States don’t provide adequate protections
for low-income workers.12

Individual employers are all over the map in their ability to provide this type of time off, depending on
whether they believe it fits their business model and bottom line. And the government is only now
realizing that workplace flexibility issues have an impact on the nation’s “bottom line” — the American
economy.
In that context, we believe the scope of our proposal matches the depth of the problem. Our
proposal acknowledges the elephant in the room: The world has changed. American families
need help. The modern work-family dilemma means people need new kinds of support to take
care of themselves and their families. We need sustainable business, economic, and workforce
development models that allow us to reap the benefits of every American’s participation in the
workforce without burning out the most valuable commodity we have: the American people.
So as we move through the economic recession and rebuild our economy, we need to adopt policies
that move beyond societal expectations established for a workforce of the last century. We need
policies for today’s workers, to ensure they keep working. Indeed, workplace flexibility represents,
at its core, an opportunity to sustain our economy, maintain competitiveness, and, at the same time,
support our families’ financial and emotional health. The time has come to seize this opportunity
and put workplace flexibility and paid time off at the top of the list for our 21st century economy and
American way of life.
Workplace Flexibility 2010
Georgetown Law
Berkeley CHEFS
UC Berkeley School of Law

It was the thinking and research behind these articles that formed the initial basis for our research
on this project.

Combining Efforts to Construct a Plan
In this last stage of Workplace Flexibility 2010’s process, and at the beginning of Berkeley CHEFS’
work, we engaged in a wonderful collaboration aimed at finding the best way to address the thorniest
questions about time-off policies.
This report presents our answers. We looked to best practices, explored private sector insurance
markets, and ultimately landed on a policy solution whose structure, because of its similarity to
Social Security, would be familiar to every American. We also ran up against some challenges we
believe deserve further research. These include how to ease the “transition costs” for employers as
we shift the workplace to account for the “new normal” and ensure that employees feel like they can
take paid time off without risking their job, particularly during a time of recession.
Right now, individuals are struggling with these issues. They are working and have families. They are
aging, but still need to work to support themselves and may need more time off to address their own
ailing health. They have disabilities and health conditions, but could maintain employment if they had
temporary disability policies to support them. Women — working or not — continue to carry the bulk
of the burden for caregiving (both for children and for their aging relatives who are living longer than
ever) and suffer the consequences of any attendant lost family income.
6
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Executive Summary
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In this report, Workplace Flexibility 2010 at Georgetown Law and the Berkeley Center on Health,
Economic & Family Security at UC Berkeley School of Law propose a new “Family Security Insurance”
(FSI) that would reform our current social insurance system to provide for income replacement when
people take time off from work for health and caregiving reasons. This report details the benefits
provided under FSI, who would be eligible, how it would be administered, and — importantly — how to
pay for it.
The recommendations cover income replacement for the following three significant life events:

k One’s own serious illness or temporary disability that renders a worker temporarily unable to
perform his or her job;

k Arrival of a newborn, newly adopted child or newly placed foster child who needs care and
time to bond with parents; and

k The serious illness of a family member who is in need of care.
Our report is based on an extensive review of research documenting the demographic and societal
shifts over the past 40 years, the current variability in access to paid time off, the legal landscape,
and the public policy arguments in support of income replacement when workers are away from work
for health and caregiving reasons. We make the case that workplace flexibility, and specifically paid
time off from work for health and caregiving reasons, is no longer an issue for some families or some
industries, but rather a national priority with major social and economic implications. FSI is designed
to support people who are working, and to help keep them working.
FSI would be a national social insurance program paid for not by the government, but by spreading
the cost among workers and their employers to create a fair, predictable foundation of support. It
would not be a cash assistance or welfare program that would add to the national deficit.

Key Elements of Family Security Insurance (FSI)
The following summary describes the key elements of the FSI program and how it would work for
employers and employees.

Eligibility for income replacement benefits under FSI
FSI would consist of three components: Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI), Parental Care for a
New Child Insurance (PCNC), and Caregiving Insurance. Workers would qualify based on the reason
needed for time off from work:
TDI: Those eligible must have a “temporary disability,” defined as a “serious health condition”
[as that term is used in the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)], which causes an individual
to be unable to perform the usual functions of his or her job, including disability resulting from
pregnancy or childbirth.
8
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PCNC: An individual would be eligible for PCNC benefits if he or she is the parent of a
newborn, newly adopted or newly placed foster child and is providing care to that child.

Hypothetical FSI Worker Benefits
Worker

Caregiving Insurance: A worker would be eligible if he or she is “needed to care for” a “family
member” with a “serious health condition.” The terms “needed to care for” and “serious
health condition” would track the definitions used in the FMLA. The term “family member”
would be defined broadly to include, among others, grandparents, domestic partners, and
siblings, as well as spouses, parents, and children.

Maximum Benefit
Allowed
[National Average
Weekly Wage ($836)
Multiplied by
150 Percent]

Worker’s TDI and
Caregiving Insurance
Weekly Benefit
(80% of Workers Avg.
Weekly Wage up to
Max of National Avg.
Weekly Wage)

Worker’s PCNC Weekly
Benefit
(90% of Workers Avg.
Weekly Wage up to
Max of National Avg.
Weekly Wage)

All participants, regardless of the reason for time off from work, would need to meet a threshold
level of attachment to the labor force: They must have worked at least 950 hours in the previous
year. This threshold will help meet one of the key objectives of FSI: encouraging continued labor
force attachment of individuals who need to interrupt work temporarily to meet health or caregiving
demands. A worker’s eligibility would not depend on the size of his or her employer or on having
worked for one particular employer. Self-employed individuals also would be covered.

Minimum Wage Worker

$290

$1254

$232

$261

Unionized Worker

$1000

$1264

$800

$900

Professional Worker

$1500

$1254

$1200

$1254*

The amount of the benefit

Like regular wages, the benefits would be subject to federal income and payroll tax. Benefits would
be available for five consecutive business days of time off or more, but not for shorter periods of time
off.

We sought to make the wage replacement rate for each aspect of the program high enough so
people could depend on the program to provide substantial financial security when they have a
health or caregiving need requiring time off work. We also tailored the benefit — both the wage
replacement rate and the length of the time off — to the different needs of, and policy challenges
posed by, each of the three components.
TDI: An eligible recipient’s wages would be replaced at 80% of the worker’s average weekly
wage, up to a maximum amount of 150% of the national average weekly wage. Benefits
would be available for up to 26 weeks per year, although the actual duration of benefits
received would depend on a medical provider’s recommendation for the specific illness or
injury.
PCNC: An eligible recipient’s wages would be replaced at 90% of the worker’s average
weekly wage, up to a maximum amount of 150% of the national average weekly wage. Each
parent would be eligible for 12 weeks of PCNC benefits within the first year of a child’s birth,
adoption or foster placement. The benefits would accrue to each individual and would not be
transferable between parents.
Caregiving Insurance: An eligible recipient’s wages would be replaced at 80% of the worker’s
average weekly wage, up to a maximum amount of 150% of the national average weekly
wage. There would be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum
amount an individual could receive over the course of his or her working lifetime, and that
12 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual could receive in any one year.
Within those limits, actual benefit durations would depend on how long a worker had to be
away from work to provide care.
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Worker’s Average
Weekly Wage

*Note: Because 90% of $1500 is $1350, which is higher than the allowed maximum benefit ($1254), the professional worker would receive the
maximum benefit of 150% of the national average weekly wage ($1254) instead of 90% of his or her salary ($1350).

In the case of TDI and Caregiving Insurance, a five-business-day waiting period would effectively
serve as a “co-pay” into the system. This means recipients might need to use other forms of
paid time off, such as sick days or their own savings, before drawing on FSI benefits. This would
discourage using the system unnecessarily. There would be no waiting period for PCNC benefits.

Paying for FSI
FSI would be financed by an equal-contribution employer and employee payroll tax, with no cap on
the amount of earnings subject to taxation for a given year. The tax would cover the cost of benefits
as well as administration of the program. The payroll tax spreads the cost of the program across a
large risk pool, protecting against deficit spending and ensuring that the program is budget neutral
over the short and long term.

Protecting against overuse, fraud, and abuse
Each aspect of the program — TDI, PCNC, and Caregiving Insurance — includes checks and balances
to protect against overuse, fraud, and abuse. We recommend specific eligibility and benefit rules to
control cost and prevent fraud and abuse.
To control against overuse, for example, we limit the ability to receive benefits under TDI and
Caregiving Insurance to those who take time off from work because, respectively, they have a
“serious health condition” or are “needed to care for” an individual with a “serious health condition”
as defined by the FMLA. This program will not be available for routine illnesses. In addition, a
worker taking TDI has to be unable to work due to the serious health condition. In other words,
it is not enough to be sick; the illness must render the worker temporarily incapable of working.
Recipients of TDI and Caregiving Insurance must also satisfy a five-day waiting period before
receiving any benefits. Together, these rules help ensure that the program is used only for serious
illnesses and injuries.
11

Another way in which the program controls against overuse is by limiting the Caregiving Insurance
benefit to a total maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks across an individual’s working life.
In addition, we include a number of mechanisms to control against fraud and abuse. For example,
under TDI, medical certification is required to confirm the presence of a serious health condition. For
Caregiving Insurance, a benefit recipient must provide documentation that he or she is needed to
provide care and what type of care will be provided. Medical providers must certify the need for care.
For PCNC, each parent must attest that he or she is providing care to the child.

Rationale for a social insurance model
After exploring several other policy models — such as tax incentives, employer mandates, and
personal savings accounts — we became convinced that social insurance was the best policy model
for providing income replacement for health and careving needs. Historical, fairness, and economic
arguments all support a social insurance model.
Historically, our country has decided to insure its citizens against a number of unexpected
disruptions and significant life events. Social Security provides protection for retirement, death of a
loved one, and permanent disability. Unemployment Insurance protects against the risk of losing a
job without cause. Worker’s Compensation insures employees against workplace injuries. Further,
five states and one territory use Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) to protect their workers against
illness and injury outside the workplace, and two states have added family and medical caregiving
protection to that coverage.
National social insurance that provides income replacement during periods of time off for health and
caregiving purposes fits well within this system of supports. After all, few events are more disruptive
to a person’s life than the birth or adoption of a child, or the need to care for oneself or a loved one
with a serious health condition.
From a fairness perspective, national social insurance based on workforce attachment is the only
option that can guarantee a universal baseline of income replacement. Because access is based
on workforce attachment, there are no disparities based upon income, gender, occupation, industry,
and/or union membership. A laborer in Massachusetts, for example, has the same basic access to
paid time off as an attorney in Arizona. Though some beneficiaries will have access to additional
paid time off, such as benefits funded by employers for recruitment and retention purposes,
everyone will start from a common baseline.
Finally, national social insurance makes good economic sense. The rise of the two-earner family,
coupled with an aging population, has created a permanent demographic shift in the American
workforce. More people need to take time off to care for themselves or a loved one, but few are
able to afford the time away from work. This is exactly the kind of problem that social insurance was
designed to protect against.
In addition, employers — especially small employers — benefit from a social insurance model because
it allows them to provide their employees with paid time off at an affordable price. This is true
because a national social insurance program has the practical advantage of risk-pooling across firms
instead of pricing time-off benefits for each individual employer.

12

The administration of FSI
FSI would be administered by either a single federal agency or a federal-state partnership.
Regardless of which agency administers FSI, a functioning system will require its own set of
administrative processes. In the report, we outline how the administration of FSI would work,
including the application process, distribution of benefits, and review process.

Other key aspects of the report
We explored additional policy levers that would be necessary to make FSI work better for employers
and employees. First, employers should be supported during periods of time that employees are
off from work and receiving FSI benefits. Employers need to get their work done, and there are
numerous business practices that can help employers manage periods of time off effectively.
We also believe job protection for employees is a necessary prerequisite for any insurance system
or wage replacement program. Employees are afraid to take time off from work for fear of being
fired or being replaced, particularly in this economy. To ensure people take the time they need —
and to ensure we get at the societal “payoffs” of the system — we recommend that the FMLA’s job
protection requirement be extended to cover smaller employers (those with 15 or more employees
rather than the current threshold of 50 or more employees).
Finally, we provide a series of “next steps” that would further our understanding of how to build
effective public policy solutions in this arena.

Reasons to adopt FSI despite concerns about the federal deficit
and the recession
The key goals of FSI are to keep people working, healthy, and productive. Nothing could be more
relevant as America seeks to move through this recession and maintain a balanced budget. In fact,
we view the goals of FSI as a necessary part of broader economic and budget conversations.
Many factors — family income security, child development, productivity, labor force attachment, and
better health outcomes —combine to make this issue a national priority. This is particularly true
during volatile economic times when many families simply can’t afford to take unpaid time off even
for the most pressing and important health and family events.
Current access to paid time off for health and caregiving comes nowhere near to meeting the
demand. The current system runs on the luck of the draw — where some companies offer some
forms of paid time off, but others either cannot afford it or presume these issues are not part of
their bottom-line strategy. Families hope for the best and muddle through, but sometimes with dire
consequences for their job tenure and long-term financial security. Depending on the type of work
you do and what industry you’re in, there is huge variation in access to paid time off from work.
Even more important than the short-term view is the long-term payoff. Over time, the costs of failing
to deal with this issue will add up. In contrast, long-term benefits of addressing this issue include
healthier children, parents, and elders; an informal caregiving network that complements the
American healthcare system; gender equity and equal opportunity; possible savings on other public
benefits programs; sustained labor force attachment by workers who have caregiving obligations;
and family economic security.

13

Of course, spending any amount of money or political capital on this issue will never be “worth it”
unless policymakers make this issue a priority. To date, the “big ticket” conversations on the deficit
and economic recovery generally haven’t included workplace flexibility — or specifically, paid time off
for health and caregiving reasons — as a key variable, even though women’s workforce participation
and keeping people working are critical elements to our overall economic competitiveness. That’s
exactly why we believe FSI should be front and center in discussions about the deficit and economic
growth.
The issue is no longer an individual one. Instead, it has major social and economic implications that
merit a national response.

Family Security Insurance (FSI): Policy Recommendations
ELIGIBILITY

Qualifying Event

• Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI): applicant’s serious health condition (includes pregnancy).
• Parental Care for a New Child Insurance (PCNC): birth or placement of a new child.
• Caregiving Insurance (CI): serious health condition of a family member, broadly defined.

Workforce Attachment
Requirements

Minimum of 950 hours worked over a base period, which is defined as the last 4 or 5
quarters preceding an application for benefits. Hours can be served at multiple employers.
Self-employed individuals’ eligibility is determined based on earnings.

Covered Employers

All.

BENEFITS
Duration

• TDI: depends on length of an individual’s serious health condition;
maximum annual duration of 26 weeks; no total maximum duration.
• PCNC: 12 weeks per parent, must be taken within 12 months of child’s birth or
placement; no total maximum duration.
• CI: depends on length of caregiving need; maximum annual duration of 12 weeks,
total maximum duration of 26 weeks.

Wage Replacement
Rate & Maximum
Benefit Amount

• TDI and CI: 80% of worker’s average week wage up to maximum of 150% the
national average weekly wage.
• PCNC: 90% of worker’s average week wage up to maximum of 150% the
national average weekly wage.

Taxation

Benefits are treated as taxable wages for income and payroll tax purposes.

Waiting period

• TDI: 5 workdays per year, per serious health condition.
• PCNC: None.
• CI: 5 workdays per year, per serious health condition of the person being cared for.

Allowable increments
of benefits

5 days or more.

FINANCING
Method of financing

Payroll tax, contributions made on a pre-tax basis.

Proportion of payroll
tax contributions

Employees: 50%; Employers: 50%; Self-employed: 100%.

Payroll tax earnings cap

None.

Administrative vehicle

Either a single federal agency or a federal-state partnership.

Introduction
The Challenge
Over the course of our lives and careers, almost all of us will need time off from work to care for our
children, our own health needs, or those of a family member. This has always been true, but the
problem, magnified by demographic shifts, is now a nearly universal challenge.
Yet our national policy on paid time off from work for health and caregiving reasons has not caught
up with today’s reality. As a result, individuals, families, and employers are largely left to muddle
through on their own, with only a patchwork of supports that falls far short of the demand. This
inaction has consequences not only for individuals and families, but also for business and the overall
economy.
This report offers one solution to the problem of how we support ourselves, our families, our
businesses, and our economy through some of life’s most complex and challenging moments. It
offers a blueprint for a national social insurance program — which we call “Family Security Insurance”
(FSI) — to provide income replacement for workers when they are away from work due to the birth or
adoption of a child, their own serious illness, or to care for a family member with a serious illness.1
This report documents our proposal in detail and shares the depth of rigorous research that supports
our conclusions.
Over the last two years, Workplace Flexibility 2010 at Georgetown Law and the Berkeley Center on
Health, Economic & Family Security at UC Berkeley School of Law have collaborated to create this
proposal. We followed a careful and lengthy process to reach the conclusions laid out in this report.
We looked at the reasons people need paid time off from work for health and caregiving and what
happens if they don’t get it. We scrutinized how things work right now in the private sector and
under current law to understand who has access to paid time off and who doesn’t. We carefully
constructed our policy response to meet the needs of individuals across income, gender, age,
occupation, and industry, while also addressing employer concerns and remaining conscious of
financial costs to individuals, employers, and the government.
Because we looked at these issues through a research lens, we can say with confidence that each
of the elements we propose as part of FSI is firmly grounded on a foundation from the fields of law,
economics and social science. Our proposal recognizes that the 21st century requires a different
set of policies than the 20th century. In the 21st century, we need policies designating a national
priority to support people who are working— and to help keep them working. We also need policies
that spread the costs of paid time off from work for health and caregiving among employers and
employees to create a fair and predictable baseline of support.
Below, we outline the rationale for our program design— through our key research findings and our
goals and objectives.

ADMINISTRATION
JOB PROTECTION or ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISIONS
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Job protection

No. Recommends an expansion of the FMLA to cover employers with 15+ employees.

Anti-retaliation provision

Yes.
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Couples Spend More Time Working
1970

The Research Findings
Three key research findings shape the principles behind our recommendations and ultimately guide
our thinking on why a social insurance model is the appropriate policy vehicle.

52.5

2000

63.1

Profound demographic and societal shifts over the last 40 years have resulted in an increased and
acute need for various types of workplace flexibility, including paid time off for health and caregiving
reasons. For example:

combined average hours per week

Source: Jacobs and Gerson, The Time Divide
(Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 44, Table 2.1

k In most families, the family-based caregiving safety net in the form of a “stay-at-home spouse”

no longer exists. Women are now nearly half of all U.S. workers and are integral to the national
economy as primary or co-breadwinners in over two-thirds of households.2

More Parents Are in the Labor Force
1975

k We are living longer, working longer, and providing more care to aging relatives.3 In fact,

caregiving demands are hitting a critical mass. Fifty-nine percent of the 44.4 million
caregivers providing care to older individuals are employed, simultaneously juggling work and
caregiving responsibilities.4

40%

2008

66%

k Health technology has advanced in ways we could never have imagined 50 years ago. Health
conditions that previously would have resulted in death or an inability to work now often can
be treated through medication, short-term therapies, and surgery, allowing individuals to get
back to work within a matter of weeks.

% of families with children under 18yrs
in which all parents work

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release,
Table 4: “Families with Own Children, 2007-2008 Annual Averages”;
National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Ed., “Indicator
18: Parents’ Employment, 1975 to 1993.”

More Older Adults Are in the Labor Force
1985

2005

Men

46%

Women

34%
24%

and are expected to support themselves through work. In fact, with the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, these individuals are empowered to work and contribute to
the economy.5

k The above changes have led to increased levels of reported work-family conflict.6 Americans
want more workplace flexibility. Seventy six percent of likely voters say they favor extending
the current law to provide paid leave.7 Both men and women experience this tug, and the
need for flexibility and paid time off goes beyond one type of family or one type of industry.8

Despite the on-the-ground reality facing most Americans, neither the private sector nor public policy
has met the demand for paid time off for health and caregiving reasons.

40%
29%

24%
14%

ages 65-69

ages 62-64

Source: Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics,
“Older Americans Update 2006: Key Indicators of Well-Being,” Table 11.
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k People with serious illnesses and temporary disabilities now are able to stay in the workforce

Finding #2: We haven’t caught up to the changes in how we work and live.

53%

ages 62-64

Finding #1: The world of work and family has changed.

ages 65-69

k Working families need paid time off for parental care for a new child, temporary disability,

and caregiving reasons, but current access is extremely variable and depends on employer,
occupation, income, industry, gender, union membership, and number of hours worked.9
What’s more, there is huge variation in how employers provide paid time-off benefits,
including formal insurance, self-insured benefits, informal policies, and PTO (paid time off)
banks.10

k Disparity continues to exist between women and men regarding who takes time off for

caregiving reasons and for bonding with a new child, driven in part by the fact that men
continue to earn more than their wives.11
17

k

The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides critical
protections, but has two key failings: Its protections reach
only about half the workforce, and because the leave is
unpaid, many simply cannot afford to take it.12

k No federal programs exist to provide paid time off for health and caregiving reasons, and

there are only a few state programs that provide income replacement for these reasons.13

k Many, many working Americans lack access to paid time off all together — most frequently
those who are low-wage and part-time workers.14

Finding #3: Income replacement for health and caregiving reasons is good for
public health, family economic security, and business productivity.
Beyond the sheer need for more work-family support, there are many reasons why income
replacement for personal and family health events is good — even critical — for society. In Chapters
2 through 4 of this report, we detail the reasons: better outcomes for children, greater gender equity,
more secure family incomes, and positive business outcomes. Here we provide a few highlights:
Improved Health and Well-Being for Children and Their Caregivers:15 Income replacement for new
parents has tremendous benefits for the health and well-being of children and their caregivers.
Parental leave of 12 weeks or more is correlated with many positive health outcomes for children.
Further, parental workplace flexibility during the first year of a child’s life, including a significant
amount of time off and/or flexibility in scheduling, can have positive developmental and cognitive
effects for children.
Parents also benefit from time off to care for newborn, newly adopted, or newly placed foster
children. For women, returning early to work, particularly if earlier than preferred, is associated with
greater amounts of stress and higher rates of depression. Fathers and non-biological parents (e.g.,
adoptive or foster parents) also benefit from having time to bond with their children. Although men in
the United States rarely take much time off following the birth or adoption of a new child, those who
do are more involved in the care of their children later, resulting in stronger long-term, father-child
relationships. Time off for foster or adoptive parents is also important because these parents may
not have had the same amount of time to prepare psychologically and emotionally for the arrival of
the child and are often not present at the birth of the child.
By contrast, returning to work very soon after birth, (i.e., six weeks or less) is associated with a
variety of negative outcomes for both parents and children. These include higher rates of infant
mortality, lower rates of breastfeeding, lower rates of immunizations and well-baby care, and a higher
incidence of maternal physical and mental health concerns.
Greater Income Security: FSI provides greater income security for workers and their families who
need time off for a health or caregiving reason. The case for increased income security is especially
strong for those events that are unplanned, such as one’s own serious illness or the need to provide
care for a suddenly seriously ill family member. It is well documented that working caregivers often
suffer significant financial hardship.16
18

Better Business Outcomes: Employers stand to gain from the provision of wage replacement
for their temporarily disabled workers or for those needing time off to provide care. A worker’s
faster and more complete recovery, associated with paid time off, reduces the cost of foregone
productivity.17 Employers may also benefit from reduced health care costs since employees will have
time off to recover from an illness or injury instead of developing a chronic problem. Providing
workers with wage replacement during time off for caregiving is also advantageous to business.
Recent research shows that people who receive wage replacement while taking care-related time off
are more likely to return to their job following the event and to be more productive overall.18
Improved Gender Equity: Women have historically been, and continue to be, primary caregivers in
their families, despite the fact that most are now employed outside the home.19 Women are nearly
always the ones who leave the labor force if it is deemed necessary or more cost effective for one
parent to do so.20 Data from other countries that have adopted social insurance programs for paid
family leave suggest that providing women with the means to take temporary time off keeps them
working and also increases their lifetime wages.21 Many men would also like to be more involved
in caregiving; this is particularly the case among younger generations of workers, who highly value
a balance between work and family life.22 Recent experiments in OECD countries, such as Sweden
and Finland, have demonstrated that when governments put policies in place to encourage men to
take leave, they do it.23

Our Goals and Objectives
Based on the above research findings, we set out goals and objectives that our ideal program had to
meet. Our proposal had to:

k Focus on the primary sources of workplace/workforce conflict regarding the need for time

off: personal illness, care for an ill family member, and time off to care for a newborn or newly
placed adopted or foster child.

k Provide universal access to paid time off for medical and caregiving reasons. Universal

access means equal access across gender, income, life stage, and industry/occupation.

k Seek to support people who are working and keep them working. Labor force attachment
drives many aspects of our program design.

k Ensure efficient delivery of the benefit so that people would get the income replacement
simply and when they needed it, not weeks or months later.

k Be budget neutral, spreading the costs among employers and employees rather than
increasing the federal deficit.

k Account for employer interests in predictability and administrative ease.
We believe FSI meets all these goals.

A Call for Action
In this report, we make the case for why we need a national social insurance system to support
workers who must be away from work because of their own illnesses, to care for a new child, or to
care for an ill family member. We argue that FSI is in the best interest of families, businesses, and
19

our national economy, and we provide detailed recommendations regarding how FSI would work in
practice. Government inaction is no longer acceptable. The time to act is now.

Note that our proposal focuses on paid leave for temporary periods away from work of more than a week and in some cases
up to as much as six months. We believe other policy levers are needed to address very short periods of time off work.
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What is needed?
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Chapter

1

Universal Recommendations

Some of our recommendations apply to all three types of paid time off: Temporary Disability
Insurance, Parental Care for a New Child Insurance, and Caregiving Insurance. Other
recommendations differ, depending on the underlying reason for the time off.
All recommendations build on a number of existing laws and programs:
k The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which provides unpaid, job-protected time off for
one’s own serious health condition, to care for a new child, or to care for a seriously ill family
member; 1
k Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs in California, Hawaii, New York, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico, which provide wage replacement for time off from work due
to an individual’s temporary illness or injury that renders the person unable to work; and
k Paid Family Leave (PFL) programs in California and New Jersey, which provide wage
replacement benefits for time off from work to bond with and care for a new child, or to care
for a family member.
These laws are explained in detail below.2
We start by laying out the recommendations that are universal across all three categories of time off.
These include the following:

Eligibility.
k A worker’s eligibility for FSI benefits should be tied to a critical level of labor force

attachment. We recommend a minimum of 950 hours worked over a one-year period.

k A worker’s eligibility should not depend on the size of his or her employer or on working, or
having worked, for one particular employer.

k Self-employed individuals should be covered by FSI, but eligibility for the self-employed
should be based on earnings, not hours (as it is for traditional employees).

Benefits.
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k FSI benefits should be based on a percentage of the worker’s average wages over a one-year
period. The wage replacement rate will differ depending on the reason for the time off: 80%
for temporary disability and caregiving, and 90% for parental care of a new child.

k There should be a maximum benefit amount that is the same for all three categories of time
off. We recommend a maximum weekly benefit amount that replaces wages up to 150% of
the national average weekly wage.

k FSI benefits should be subject to federal income and payroll tax, but contributions to the
program should be made on a pre-tax basis.

k FSI benefits should only be available for time off that lasts five consecutive business days or
longer.

k No individual should be discharged or discriminated against because he or she has filed a
claim for FSI benefits.

Financing.
k FSI should be financed by an equal-contribution employer and employee payroll tax, with no

cap on the amount of wages subject to taxation for a given year. The tax should be sufficient
to cover the cost of benefits as well as administration of the program.

k Contributions to the program should not be experience-rated.
Below we describe our rationale for each of our universal recommendations:

Eligibility.
A worker’s eligibility for FSI benefits should be tied to a critical level of labor force attachment. We
recommend a minimum of 950 hours worked over a one-year period.
A significant rationale for this proposal is to support the continued labor force attachment of
individuals who need to interrupt work temporarily to meet health or caregiving demands. Requiring
a specified number of hours worked as a condition of eligibility is the best way to ensure the
program achieves this objective. Requiring little or no prior workforce participation would mean the
benefit could be used as a form of cash assistance for non-workers. Setting the requirement too
high, however, could exclude workers whose labor market participation is less than full time but
nevertheless significant.
We propose a reasonable minimum workforce attachment requirement of 950 work hours during
a one-year period. The one-year period would generally be calculated by taking the first four of the
five most recent quarters preceding an individual’s application for benefits. However, if an applicant
would be deemed ineligible using the traditional base period, an alternative base period should be
used instead — that is, using the last four completed quarters.3
A requirement of 950 hours would allow individuals who work part time to qualify for the program.
An employee who works an average of 20 hours per week during the year would qualify for the
program even if that person took up to 4 1/2 ½ weeks off work for vacation, sick days, or other reasons
23

(including being between jobs). This hours threshold is significantly lower than requirements of
the FMLA and recent congressional proposals for paid family and medical leave insurance.4 We
recommend this lower threshold precisely to address the exclusion of part-time workers we have
seen with FMLA coverage.5 We are motivated in part by the fact that in the current economic climate,
many who work part time do so involuntarily because full-time positions are not available.6
While our recommended hours requirement is lower than the FMLA, we recognize it is higher than
most Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) parental leave programs
and some state TDI or PFL programs.7 The reason we recommend a higher threshold is because
this program is explicitly aimed at supporting and incentivizing strong labor force attachment.
With regard to parental care and caregiving leave, research suggests higher levels of workforce
attachment prior to leave have a direct correlation to higher levels of attachment by mothers
after returning from the leave.8 We believe a moderately high threshold is also appropriate for
the TDI portion of the program to reduce the likelihood of moral hazard and to reinforce the idea
that the program is designed to give benefit entitlements only to those who have a demonstrated
commitment to the workforce.9
We believe an hours requirement is more appropriate than an earnings test. Hours worked is a more
direct measure of workforce attachment than earnings and avoids the skewing of eligibility towards
high earners. Many OECD countries condition eligibility for parental leave social insurance programs
on a minimum level of hours worked rather than earnings.10 Furthermore, the historical use of
earnings as a proxy for attachment — the criterion used by most state Unemployment Insurance (UI),
TDI, and PFL programs — has led to arbitrary exclusions of low-wage and part-time workers, which we
seek to avoid.11 The UI programs in Washington and Oregon provide good models for establishing a
mechanism to track hours data for salaried and hourly employees.12
A worker’s eligibility should not depend on the size of his or her employer or on working, or having
worked, for one particular employer.
All workers who pay into the system should have access to benefits, regardless of whether such
individuals work for a small or large employer. This is consistent with most social insurance
programs in the United States, including Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Workers’
Compensation, and state TDI and PFL programs.13 The OECD countries we studied also allow
individuals at both small and large employers to qualify for parental leave benefits.14 Extending
coverage to all workers, regardless of business size, is also particularly important for low-wage
workers, who are more likely to work for small employers and less likely to receive time-off benefits.15
Low-wage workers are also more likely to report needing leave from work to care for a family member
or to recover from their own serious illness or health condition.16
We also believe there should be no requirement that the hours worked be for the same employer.
While job protection must be tied to a particular employer because it requires employers to restore
a job, there is no similar need in a national wage replacement insurance system. None of the social
insurance programs we studied in the United States requires that the hours worked or earnings
must be tied to a particular employer to trigger eligibility for benefits, including UI and state TDI/PFL
programs.17 It is unfair to disqualify workers who have paid into the program at a previous place of
employment simply because they have changed jobs. It is equally unfair to disqualify workers who
have paid into the program simply because they work part time, but simultaneously, at two or three
different jobs.
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We recognize that employers, particularly small businesses, might be rightfully concerned about
how to cope with an increased number of employees who take time off. To account for these
concerns, this

proposal incorporates eligibility and benefits rules that
create clear expectations about how the program will be used by
employees, and includes safeguards against fraud and abuse.
Self-employed individuals should be covered by FSI, but eligibility for the self-employed should be
based on earnings, not hours (as it is for traditional employees).
We believe that self-employed individuals should be covered by FSI and required to contribute
both the employer and employee portions of the payroll tax. Self-employed individuals are also
required to maintain coverage under similar social insurance programs such as Social Security
and Medicare.18 Self-employed workers represent 7 percent of the workforce; these individuals are
often entrepreneurial risk-takers who are particularly subject to the uncertainties of the market, and
therefore arguably even more in need of protection.19 We considered recommending such coverage
on a voluntary basis, but we were concerned that optional coverage for the self-employed could
lead to adverse selection and place the fiscal stability of the program at risk. In other words, we
were worried that if participation were optional, only individuals with serious health conditions or
significant caregiving responsibilities would opt in to the program, thus driving up the costs.
We believe that eligibility for self-employed individuals should be based on earnings, not hours,
because, unlike for other workers, there is no feasible mechanism to verify self-employed hours data.
Social Security and California’s TDI/PFL program both present models for determining an appropriate
earnings test for self-employed individuals. 20

Benefits.
As explained in subsequent chapters, we recommend that an individual receive 80% wage
replacement (up to a cap) for time off for Temporary Disability and Caregiving, and 90% wage
replacement (up to the same cap) for Parental Care for a New Child. The following recommendations
regarding benefits, however, are universal across all three programs and thus are discussed here.
FSI benefits should be based on a percentage of the worker’s average weekly wage over a one-year
period.
We believe the program should provide a level of benefits that represents a realistic assessment
of workers’ past average weekly wages. Thus, we recommend that the benefit amount be based
on a worker’s average wages across a base period, which should be the last four or five quarters
immediately preceding an application.21
There should be a maximum benefit amount that is the same for all three categories of time off. We
recommend a maximum weekly benefit amount that replaces wages up to 150% of the national
average weekly wage.
A national social insurance program should include a maximum benefit amount. All individuals
should receive a basic wage replacement benefit through FSI and the maximum benefit must be
higher than the average weekly wage to ensure families across the income spectrum — in particular,
middle-class families — can effectively take advantage of the benefit. Individuals whose incomes fall
above the maximum at which wages are replaced and wish to maintain a significantly higher wage
replacement during their time off should be encouraged to save private funds for that goal.
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We recommend a maximum weekly benefit amount that replaces wages up to 150% of the
national average weekly wage. In today’s dollars, the maximum weekly wage at which a worker
would receive wage replacement corresponding to their income level is approximately $1,254 per
week.22 Setting the maximum benefit at this level ensures that a substantial majority of American
households — more than 75 percent — will receive benefits that correspond to their income levels.23
There is precedent in analogous social insurance programs for setting maximum benefits at a
moderately high level. California’s TDI and PFL program sets maximum benefits at 150% of the
state average weekly wage, and some state workers’ compensation programs are set at 150% of
their state average weekly wages as well.24 In addition, the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation program, which provides wage replacement to longshore and harbor workers who
have work-related injuries or disabilities, sets maximum benefits at 200% the national average
weekly wage.25
Our primary reason for setting the maximum benefit at a moderately high level is to enable primary
household earners, who are disproportionately men, to take parental or caregiving leave. Our review
of statistics from paid parental leave programs in countries with low maximum benefit amounts and
wage replacement rates showed very low take-up rates among men; high benefit amounts were
associated with increased male take-up.26 Additionally, usage data from California and New Jersey’s
PFL programs show that California’s PFL program, which has maximum benefits similar to our
proposal, has much higher take-up rates of PFL among men than New Jersey’s PFL program, which
has a low maximum benefit amount.27 In short, we believe that an effective national social insurance
program for addressing temporary disabilities, care for a new child, and caregiving should provide
benefits that allow each working family member to affordably take time off work when needed.
To account for changes in wages and cost of living over time, the maximum benefits should be
indexed to the national average weekly wage. Several state-level social insurance programs index
benefits to their state’s average weekly wage.28 For national programs like our proposal, national
average weekly wage data is appropriate because workers in every state will be contributing the
same percentage of their wages to fund the program.29 Social Security also uses national average
weekly wage data as part of its benefit formula.30

Second, we wanted to ensure equity between FSI benefits and similar benefits that are currently
available through other social insurance programs. We were particularly concerned with achieving
equity between workers’ compensation benefits and our proposed temporary disability benefits.
Workers’ compensation benefits are not subject to taxation; income is usually replaced at 66%.
Temporary disability benefits under FSI are offered at 80% wage replacement. By taxing the
temporary disability benefits proposed under our program we would achieve rough equivalence in
effective wage replacement rates with workers’ compensation.34
Finally, we sought to simplify tax rules so that someone receiving benefits under our program could
expect nearly the same tax treatment as if they were receiving regular wages.
FSI benefits should only be available for time off that lasts five consecutive business days or longer.
FSI is a wage replacement system for individuals who need to take extended periods of time off —
i.e., more than one week — from work. It is designed to supplement, but not supplant, other sources
of wage replacement available for shorter periods of time off, such as paid sick days, paid vacation
days, and PTO banks. As such, we recommend that FSI benefits be available only for periods of time
off that last one business week (five days) or longer. Such a requirement makes the benefits easier
to administer, provides scheduling predictability to employers, and provides flexibility to employees
who need wage replacement for varying needs and for varying periods of time.

FSI benefits should be subject to federal income and payroll tax, but contributions to the program
should be made on a pre-tax basis.

Some individuals, however, will need episodic periods of time off for the same underlying reason. For
example, a woman with breast cancer may need to undergo a number of surgeries — a few months
apart from each other — if she undergoes a mastectomy and reconstruction. As such, we believe
that benefits for the same underlying reason should be available for non-continuous periods of time
off —so long as the periods of time off each last at least one week.

We arrived at our recommendation on taxation after researching how similar short -term wage
replacement benefits (workers’ compensation, state TDI/PFL, and unemployment compensation)
are currently treated under federal income and payroll tax rules.31 Our research found different
tax rules for each type of benefit; in particular, there are complicated rules on taxation of state TDI
benefits that depend on how a program is funded.32 We also looked at how other countries treat
similar benefits for tax purposes. Many of them treat parental leave and maternity leave benefits as
taxable income, particularly if the benefits are offered as wage replacement and not flat-rate public
assistance benefits.33

That said, we recognize there are individuals who may need to take episodic periods of time off,
for the same underlying reason, in increments shorter than one week. For example, the woman
with breast cancer may need to attend weekly chemotherapy or radiation appointments. Other
individuals who have taken an extended period of time off may want to “phase back in” to work by
working a part-time or reduced-hours schedule. Using the same example, a woman who took four
weeks off from work for a mastectomy may want to phase back into work by working three or four
days per week for a few weeks prior to returning to work full time. Or a new mother may want to work
a reduced-hours schedule for a few months prior to returning to a full-time schedule.

There are several reasons we chose to treat FSI benefits as taxable wages for income and payroll tax
purposes:

As noted above, we believe that individuals who need wage replacement for these shorter periods of
time should be able to receive wage replacement from other sources, such as paid sick days or PTO
banks. Unfortunately, however, as discussed below, some individuals — especially low-wage workers
— do not have access to any paid time off. Many others have access to some paid time off, but not
a sufficient amount to address their needs. As a result, and as explained further in Chapter 7, we
believe additional research needs to be done regarding whether and how a national social insurance
program such as FSI can feasibly provide benefits for episodic periods of time off, or reduced-hours

First, because FSI is explicitly linked to paid employment and the benefits are based on one’s wages,
we believe it is appropriate to treat the benefits as taxable wages. Treating the benefits as wages
for payroll tax purposes means that a person receiving FSI benefits will still be contributing to Social
Security and Medicare while away from work. We believe it is important that an FSI recipient’s future
26

Social Security benefits not be affected by taking the benefit. Nonetheless, the payroll tax used to
fund FSI should be deducted from an employee’s pre-tax earnings to avoid double taxation when
that employee receives benefits. Further, we recommend that benefits be treated as earned income
for purposes of qualifying for the EITC. Because income is required to be eligible for the EITC, it is
important that the benefit be treated as earned income in order to assist low-income workers who
might otherwise fall out of EITC eligibility.
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schedules, in durations of less than one week.
No individual should be discharged or discriminated against because he or she has filed a claim for
FSI benefits.
A number of state workers’ compensation laws provide that an individual should not be discharged
or discriminated against for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.35 New York TDI, which
is operated out of the state workers’ compensation agency, follows the New York non-discrimination
provision.36 We believe the same should apply to FSI claimants — namely, an individual should not be
discharged or discriminated against because he or she has filed a claim for FSI benefits.

Financing.
FSI should be financed by an equal contribution employer and employee payroll tax, with no cap on
the amount of earnings subject to taxation for a given year. The tax should be sufficient to cover
the cost of benefits as well as administration of the program.

Both employers and employees benefit from FSI. As such,
employers and employees should share the costs through a joint
payroll tax.
Employers — especially small employers — benefit because FSI allows them to provide their
employees with paid time off at an affordable price. This is true because a national social insurance
program has the practical advantage of risk pooling across firms instead of pricing time-off benefits
for each individual employer. In addition, low-wage and middle-income workers will find it easier to
maintain their attachment to the workplace, helping with retention and reducing turnover costs for
employers.
Employees also benefit from the establishment of a social insurance program for caregiving,
temporary disability, and parental care for a new child. Obviously, not all employees will use each of
the available benefits. But almost everyone will use at least some FSI benefit over the course of his
or her lifetime. Also, all employees will gain peace of mind from knowing these life-altering events
are covered and that they will have economic security for themselves and their families.

The new payroll tax would have no limit on the amount of earnings subject to taxation (like Medicare).
This model helps ensure the solvency of the new program and maintains progressivity in its financing.
As we noted above, we do recommend a maximum benefit amount. However, the maximum benefit
amount we impose is intentionally high, so most workers, including most middle-income workers,
receive benefits commensurate with their income levels.38
We also recommend the payroll tax cover the cost of benefits as well as administration of the
program, so the program does not need to rely on general revenue financing. Several other social
insurance programs we studied finance the administrative costs through a payroll tax.39
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Contributions to the program should not be experience-rated because employers have no control
over the triggering events.
In general, social insurance programs that experience-rate employer contributions have features
giving employers some control over the cost of their premiums through their own behavior, and
penalize those who have higher usage rates.
For instance, workers’ compensation is experience-rated on the assumption that employers can take
measures to provide safer workplaces, which will reduce their premiums through fewer work-related
injuries and illnesses. Unemployment Insurance is experience-rated to discourage frequent layoffs
and fairly allocate the costs imposed on society at large by unemployment.44
But employers do not have any control over whether their employees will need time off or will utilize
benefits for temporary disability, parental care, or caregiving. Hence, employers should not be
penalized for their employees’ use of benefits. Furthermore, if employers were experience-rated
based on how often employees utilized time-off programs, they might actively discourage leavetaking, or discriminate against those employees perceived to be at “high risk” of leave-taking, such
as women of childbearing age or employees with disabilities or young children.
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Both employers and employees benefit because of the positive societal effects described in
subsequent chapters — including increased labor force participation, the potential for lower health
care costs, and better physical and emotional health outcomes for children, leading to future
economic growth and productivity.

As discussed in Chapter 7, we specifically chose not to cost out the FSI program at this time because
we wanted to focus solely on the substantive policy issues and spark debate. That said, we did study
the costs of similar programs, particularly the five state TDI programs and the two PFL programs
(California and New Jersey).40 Each of these programs is financed either through employee-only
payroll taxes or joint employee-employer payroll taxes. The tax rates and the amount of earnings
subject to taxation vary, but are generally quite low. For example, as of 2010, non-self-employed
workers covered by California’s TDI/PFL program pay a 1.1 percent tax on the first $93,916 of their
earnings to finance the program.41 This means that the maximum worker contribution per year is
currently $1,026.42 In New Jersey, both employers and employees contribute to the state’s TDI
program, but only employees contribute to the state’s PFL program. As of 2010, the basic TDI tax
rate for New Jersey employers is .5% on the first $29,700 of employee wages; employees pay .5
percent to finance the TDI program and .12 percent to finance the PFL program.43 Thus, assuming
an employer is paying the basic tax rate of .5 percent, an employer’s maximum yearly contribution
per worker for the TDI plan is $148.50. An employee’s maximum yearly contribution for both the TDI
and PFL programs is $184.14 ($148.50 for TDI and $35.64 for PFL).

The universal rules described above apply regardless of the reason for claiming FSI benefits. In
Chapters 2 through 4 we describe the eligibility and benefit rules that vary depending on the reason
for time off: temporary disability, parental care for a child, or caregiving.
Here we provide one final point of clarification. As we explain in Chapter 6, we believe access to job
protection while receiving FSI benefits is critical. (Indeed, in that chapter, we recommend the FMLA’s
job protection requirement be extended to cover smaller employers.) FSI benefits, however, do not
in and of themselves provide a worker with an independent right to take a leave of absence from
his or her current job. That right must be granted by the employer, either voluntarily or as a result of
their obligations under the FMLA and any other relevant federal or state laws governing time off from
work.45
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low work hours in the first of five quarters is excluded, while another worker with identical total hours over the five quarters
but whose fifth quarter was low will be eligible. State incentives in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and concern
about arbitrary exclusion of workers with irregular workforce attachment, has led a majority of the states in recent years to
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Workforce Development, Employer Handbook: New Jersey’s Unemployment & Disability Insurance Programs, at 32-33, available at http://
lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/ui/b426.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (describing experience rating in NJ TDI system);
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Laws: Temporary Disability Insurance (2009), at 8-3, available at http://www.
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/disability.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (summarizing New Jersey
TDI financing); See also Appendix B (Financing).
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26 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (2010). The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) encourages the practice of experience rating by
offering additional credits against the federal UI tax to employers with low state experience ratings. As with the other credit
provisions of the FUTA, if a state fails to experience-rate its system, its companies lose the potential offsets.
45
Under the FMLA, employers with 50 or more employees are required to provide job-protected leave for eligible employees
for up to 12 weeks per year. In this report, we recommend an expansion of the FMLA to cover all employers with 15 or more
employees, recognizing there are many questions that would first need to be addressed regarding how to make the FMLA work
for small employers. We also recommend that further research be conducted to examine the access to benefits issue that may
be created due to the discrepancy in job protection offered under the FMLA, even if it is expanded at some point to lower the
employer threshold and the benefits available under FSI.
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Chapter

2

Temporary Disability Insurance

The first component of FSI provides wage replacement for time off taken because of a non workrelated temporary disability.
In the United States, we have some social insurance programs that provide wage replacement when
a worker is out of work due to a permanent disability or a work-related disability or injury. However,
no form of national public insurance exists to support workers who need temporary time off from
work to recover from non-work-related illnesses or injuries of moderate duration, or to give birth and
recover from childbirth.
State-level workers’ compensation programs cover workers who become temporarily or permanently
disabled through a work-related illness or injury.1 The Social Security Disability Insurance program
covers people who become permanently disabled.2 Additionally, there is current legislative interest
focused around national guaranteed paid sick days to cover mild, short-term illnesses or injuries,
such as brief ailments that require a week or less away from work.3
In this chapter we discuss the policy arguments in favor of providing wage replacement during time
off from work because of a temporary disability, and current access to wage replacement during
periods of temporary disability — both those related to illness or injury not suffered on the job, as well
as those related to pregnancy, childbirth, and recovery from childbirth. We then describe our policy
recommendations to address this need.

A. Temporary Disability Related to Illness or Injury
1. Policy Arguments
Most individuals will face a temporary disability, illness, or injury in their lifetime — whether it is
a condition requiring intensive recovery, like a heart attack or an injury from a car accident, or a
chronic illness that may need recurring treatment, like multiple sclerosis or rheumatoid arthritis.
These illnesses or injuries are usually out of the control of individuals, most of whom want and need
to work, and who want to return to their job following time away from work.
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Such individuals need time off to receive medical treatment and recover. Unless they are fortunate
enough to have significant savings, they will need some form of wage replacement during their
time off—to pay for their groceries, their health care, their rent or mortgage, their utilities, and other
regular expenses.

Without paid time off, individuals who are ill or injured may return to work before being fully
recovered, thus making them susceptible to a relapse or recurrence, and potentially placing
additional burdens on our health care system. When a job requires physical stamina or ability,
individuals who return to work too early may put themselves or others in jeopardy.
Employers stand to gain from the provision of wage replacement for their temporarily disabled
workers. Faster and more complete recovery associated with paid time off reduces the cost of
foregone productivity.4 Employers may also benefit from reduced health care costs since employees
will have time off to recover from an illness or injury instead of developing a long-term chronic
problem. Many employers have recognized the cost-effectiveness of providing paid, temporary
disability benefits to their professional employees.5 While most employers do not currently provide
such benefits to their low-wage workers, research shows providing them with workplace flexibility,
including paid time off, is equally cost effective, both in terms of increased productivity and
decreased turnover.6

2. Current Access to Wage Replacement
There is neither a national system nor a nationally encouraged state system for wage replacement
during periods of non-work-related, temporary disability. This does not necessarily mean, however,
that workers in this country have no access to wage replacement when they are ill or injured. Indeed,
employers have developed various types of paid time-off policies as part of employee compensation
packages. And five states and one territory have Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs,
funded by employer and/or employee payroll taxes.7
To fully understand the current landscape regarding access to wage replacement during time away
from work because of temporary disability, we must look at the full range of private and public
benefits currently offered in the United States.8

a. Voluntary Employer Practices
Employer-provided wage replacement for periods of illness or injury is usually provided through a
combination of paid sick days and, for longer periods of disability, short-term disability insurance
plans. Paid sick days generally provide 100 percent wage replacement, whereas short-term disability
plans generally replace between one-half and two-thirds of a worker’s pre-disability gross weekly
wages.9 In general, paid sick days provide wage replacement for short periods of time off (less than
one week), whereas short-term disability benefits provide wage replacement for illnesses or injuries
that last longer than one week. Workers who have access only to paid sick days, however, will often
use those days for longer-term illnesses, to the extent they can. Short-term disability payments and
paid sick days are both subject to taxation to the extent the employer pays for them.10
Paid sick days are available to an employee to use immediately upon accrual. After one year on the
job, full-time, private-sector workers who receive paid sick days receive, on average, seven paid sick
days per year.11 Part-time workers who receive paid sick leave, as well as workers in firms with fewer
than 100 employees, receive, on average, six paid sick days per year.12
Under most short-term disability plans, there is a waiting period of at least one week during which the
disabled employee receives no wage replacement benefits under the plan (although they may use
their accrued paid sick days, if they have any, to replace wages during this time).13 This waiting period
functions similarly to a “co-pay” and helps control plan costs and simplify administration.14
The typical short term disability plan pays benefits for up to 26 weeks after the waiting period has
been satisfied.15 In practice, however, many illnesses and injuries that workers experience do not
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Access to Paid Sick Leave (Private Sector)
Income
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The following factors affect whether an individual has access to paid short-term disability benefits or
paid sick days:
The employee’s income is the greatest predictor. The greater a worker’s wages, the more likely the
worker will have access to these benefits. For example, in 2010, only 18 percent of low-wage private
sector workers had access to short-term disability benefits, compared to 59 percent of high-wage
workers.21 Similarly, only 32 percent of low-wage workers in the private sector had access to some
form of paid sick-days benefit, while 84 percent of high-wage private sector workers had access to
such benefits.22
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According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 2010 National Compensation Survey, 39 percent
of private-sector workers had access to employer-provided short term disability insurance policies.18
Of those workers who had access to such plans, 97 percent of the workers participated in them.19
The data from 2010 indicate that 80 percent of employees participated in plans funded entirely by
their employers, while 20 percent of employers required employees to contribute to their short-term
disability plans.20

Part-Time/
Full-Time

le

require them to be out of work for a full 26 weeks.16 For example, a worker recovering from surgery
might only be out of work for four weeks, and therefore would only receive four weeks of short term
disability benefits. Companies often use case-management tools and procedures, such as the
Official Disability Guidelines and the Medical Disability Advisor, to determine the number of weeks a
particular disability will render an employee unable to work.17
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Income

Whether the worker works full time or part time is also significant. For full-time private sector
workers, 47 percent had access to short-term disability insurance, compared to just 15 percent
of part-time private sector workers.23 Seventy-four percent of full-time private sector workers had
access to some form of paid sick-days benefit, as compared to just 26 percent of part-time private
sector workers.24
Size of employer also has an impact. For employees working in establishments with fewer than
100 employees, just 27 percent had access to short-term disability benefits. Forty-six percent of
employees working in establishments with 100-499 employees, and 63 percent of employees
working for employees with more than 500 employees, had access to short-term disability benefits.25
As for paid sick days, 53 percent of employees working in establishments with fewer than 100
employees had access to some paid sick days. Sixty-seven percent of employees working in
establishments with 100-499 employees had access to this benefit, as did 81 percent of employees
working for employers with more than 500 employees.26
Both type of work and union membership make a difference. Sixty percent of management,
business, and financial workers had access to short-term disability benefits, compared with just
30 percent of workers in sales and related occupations, and only 23 percent of service workers.27
Sixty-four percent of union workers had access to short-term disability benefits, compared with 36
percent of non-union workers.28 As for paid sick days, 91 percent of management, business, and
financial workers had access to some paid sick days, compared to just 55 percent in sales and
related occupations, and only 42 percent of service workers. Seventy-one percent of union workers,
compared with 61 percent of nonunion workers, had access to paid sick days.29
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It should be noted that, according to BLS, 16 percent of short-term disability plans provided by
employers are legally required under state laws discussed below.30 While the BLS data provide
breakdowns of access to short-term disability plans by geographic area,31 it does not provide a
comparable breakdown by state. Thus, it is unclear whether the already-limited access that lowincome workers have to such plans is due to the fact that an employer has voluntarily provided such
access or merely because the employer is required to provide such access by state law. The same
is true for part-time workers, employees working for small employers, employees working in nonunionized shops, and employees working in industries that provide short-term disability benefits to a
low percentage of workers.
Finally, the fact that a worker does not have access to paid sick days or short-term disability
insurance does not necessarily mean the worker will go without any wage replacement during
periods of time off because of illness or injury.
For example, after one year on the job, private-sector workers receiving paid vacation receive, on
average, nine vacation days. In other words, more private sector workers have access to paid
vacation time (77 percent) than have access to paid sick days (62 percent) or short term disability
plans (39 percent).32 And many workers now receive a generic bank of Paid Time Off (PTO) instead of
sick days and vacation days.33 Employers that provide PTO generally provide between 15 and 25 PTO
days per year.34 If an employee has unused vacation or PTO time that can be taken during an illness
or injury, the employee will presumably use those paid days off during periods of temporary disability.
The data on access to vacation leave and PTO is not, however, particularly helpful in determining how
much access actually exists for any specific employee’s illness or injury. First, we have no way of
knowing whether those days are still available at the time an unexpected illness or injury occurs, or
whether those days were already used for other purposes. Indeed, the amount of time set aside by
employers for PTO or vacation is usually designed for what an average employee might need for sick
leave, vacation, and personal days — and not what an employee who has suffered a more serious
illness or injury might require.35 In addition, the requirements for using vacation leave may preclude
its use for an unexpected illness or injury, because employees generally are required to provide
advance notice of their need for that type of time off.36
In sum:

k Many more workers have access to paid sick days than they do to short-term disability

benefits. The number of paid sick days a worker receives, however, will often be insufficient
when a worker suffers an illness or injury that lasts more than one or two weeks.

k There are substantial disparities in access to both paid sick days and short-term disability

benefits. Access is strongly skewed toward higher-income, professional, full-time, and/or
unionized workers. Lower-income workers, part-time workers, and workers in the service
and retail industries have particularly low access to these benefits, especially to short-term
disability benefits.

k Some employees also have access to paid vacation leave and PTO days, which may

sometimes be used for temporary illness or injury. Again, however, access skews toward
higher-income, professional, and full-time workers. In addition, access to paid vacation leave
and PTO days does not guarantee this paid time off will be available when a worker needs it
because of temporary illness or injury.

38

b. State and Local Laws
A handful of state and local laws require the provision of wage replacement when a worker takes
time off from work because of a non-work-related illness or injury. Currently, only two cities —
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco — require that employers provide a certain number of paid sick
days to their employees.37 The number of days required depends on the size of the employer and
whether the employee works full time or part time.
Five states and one territory — California, Hawaii, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Puerto
Rico — have statewide TDI programs. These programs provide temporary disability insurance
benefits to private and public sector employees who are unable to work because of their own nonwork-related illnesses or injuries that last longer than five to seven days.38 As discussed in Chapter 1,
some state TDI programs are funded exclusively by employee payroll tax contributions, while others
are jointly financed between employers and employees.39 Programs that are based on a social
insurance model, such as California and New Jersey’s TDI programs, generally allow employers to opt
out of the state-run program if an employer offers an approved, voluntary plan.40

“I was the victim of domestic violence. I had been
severely beaten and was unable to work for over six
months. Without [California’s Short Term Disability (SDI)
Program], I don’t know how I would have taken care of
my 11-year-old son or kept a roof over our heads. [SDI]
allowed us to barely survive until I was able to return to
work. [SDI] allowed me to provide for both of my sons
without facing eviction or hunger.”
Testimonial from California employee, Labor Project for Working Families

Employees qualify for benefits if they work for a covered employer and meet a set of eligibility
requirements, including satisfying a waiting period (generally 5-7 days). 41 While standards vary from
state to state, most workers are covered, including both full- and part-time employees.42
Benefit recipients are entitled to a weekly benefit based on their past wages, usually up to a specified
cap.43 The benefit duration usually allows up to 26 weeks of benefits per year, but Rhode Island
and California are more generous, offering up to 30 weeks or 52 weeks per year, respectively.44 As
with private, short-term disability benefits, however, TDI benefits are only provided for the actual
number of weeks that a worker is unable to work because of a disability. For example, the average
claim under California’s State Disability Insurance program lasted only 15.23 weeks in FY 2009, even
though the total allowable annual duration is 52 weeks.45
The following chart provides the weekly wage replacement rate, the current maximum benefit
amount, and benefit duration for each state program.46
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B. Temporary Disability Related to Pregnancy, Childbirth, and
Recovery from Childbirth
Weekly Wage
Replacement Rate

Maximum Benefit
Amount (per week)

Maximum
Benefit Duration

California

55%

$987

52 weeks

Hawaii

58%

$510

30 weeks

New Jersey

66%

$561

26 weeks

New York

50%

$170

26 weeks

Puerto Rico

65%

$113

26 weeks

Rhode Island

4.26% of total high
base period quarter
wages (translating into
a weekly wage
replacement rate of
~51%)

$700

30 weeks

1. Policy Arguments
Women who are unable to work due to pregnancy-related complications, giving birth, and/or
recovering from childbirth are often treated as having a pregnancy-related disability.47 Time off for
these pregnancy-related reasons serves several critical purposes, including better outcomes for both
mothers and infants.
Approximately 13 percent of women will have a complication from pregnancy requiring them to be
hospitalized before delivery, likely requiring at least some time off from work.48 These complications
may range from gestational diabetes to pre-eclampsia49 to pre-term labor. Pregnant women with
medical complications often have to go on partial or full bed rest prior to childbirth; 20 percent of
pregnant women spend a minimum of one week on bed rest during the course of their pregnancy.50
Even women with uncomplicated pregnancies experience health benefits when taking time off prior
to labor and delivery. 51 This time off is known as “antenatal leave,” and it is taken by nearly 30
percent of employed women in the United States.52 In the postnatal period, the minimum period
of physical recovery from a normal pregnancy and delivery is six weeks (eight weeks for Cesarean
deliveries).53 Of course, the required length of pregnancy disability leave will vary depending on
specific maternal health needs.54
Finally, providing wage replacement for pregnancy-related disabilities may lessen reliance on public
assistance benefits, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).55 The Department of
Labor found that 9 percent of women on unpaid FMLA leave used public assistance to supplement
family income while out on maternity leave, including 20 percent of women from low-income
families.56
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2. Current Access to Wage Replacement
a. Voluntary Employer Practices
If women receive wage replacement for pregnancy-related reasons, they receive it through a
dedicated “paid maternity leave” plan and/or from other sources of employer-provided paid time off,
such as vacation and sick days. Of those employers who provide dedicated, paid maternity leave
plans, most offer them as part of their short-term disability plans, although some offer self-insured,
paid, maternity leave benefits.57 As noted above, certain classes of workers — including part-time
and low-wage workers and those who work for small employers — have limited access to short term
disability plans, paid vacation days, and paid sick days.
Based on the Medical Disability Advisor recommendation,58 the majority of private, short-term
disability plans provide six weeks of wage replacement for a normal delivery. 59 If there are
complications from the pregnancy or childbirth, or if the woman has a Cesarean section, a doctor will
certify a longer period of recovery, and wage replacement will be provided for that period.60
Employers who do not provide wage replacement through a short-term disability plan will sometimes
provide specific maternity-leave benefits paid through their general assets. For example, according
to a study conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) of its members, 14
percent of respondents stated that they offered paid maternity leave other than what was covered
by their short-term disability plans.61 Other employers, who do not specifically provide paid maternityleave benefits, allow their workers to use their paid sick days and other sources of paid time off
(vacation leave, holidays, PTO days, etc.) for pregnancy and recovery from childbirth.62
According to data from the 2004 U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), which surveyed employed women who delivered their first child between 2001 and 2003,
nearly 50 percent used some form of paid leave for pregnancy-related reasons or recovery from
childbirth.63 Many of these women combined several types of paid leave to fund their time off.
Nearly 39 percent of the women surveyed used maternity leave, 9.1 percent used vacation leave, 8.7
percent used sick leave, 8.5 percent used disability leave, and 2.8 percent used other paid leave.64

b. State Laws
All state TDI programs are required to provide wage replacement for pregnancy-related disabilities
as a result of the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 65 As a result, women who reside in
California, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico and who take time off due
to pregnancy-related complications, childbirth, and/or recovery from childbirth, may receive TDI
benefits for the amount of time they are unable to work due to their pregnancy disability. Eligibility
requirements, weekly wage replacement rates, the maximum benefit amount, and benefit duration
are the same as those for non-pregnancy-related disabilities.

C. Recommendations
Given the significant disparities in access to wage replacement during periods of temporary disability
(including pregnancy-related disability), as well as the pressing need for income during such periods,
we recommend that FSI provide a minimum level of wage replacement for individuals who take time
off from work because of a serious health condition that lasts longer than one week, or because of a
pregnancy-related disability.
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“I am currently having complications with my pregnancy.
I have been put off work two months early on bed rest. If
the SDI programs weren’t there for me now, and for my
maternity leave afterward, my family would not be able to
make ends meet. My husband also works. However, his
income alone is not enough to pay all the bills. The twoincome family has become necessary these days.”
Testimonial from California employee, Labor Project for Working Families

Our specific recommendations are as follows:

Eligibility.
k “Temporary disability” should be defined as a “serious health condition” (as that term is used
in the FMLA) that causes an individual to be unable to perform the usual functions of his or
her job, including disability resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.

k Benefits should not be available to those who are receiving workers’ compensation benefits
for their condition.

Benefits.
k An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average
weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.

k Benefits should be available for up to 26 weeks per year. The actual duration of benefits
should depend on the specific illness or injury.

k There should be a five-day waiting period, per qualifying serious health condition, before
benefits can be collected. If an individual needs to take time off for the same qualifying
condition at a later point in the same year, a waiting period should not apply.

k The time off from work may be taken only while the recipient is suffering from a serious
health condition.

Below we describe our rationale for each recommendation:

Eligibility.
“Temporary disability” should be defined as a “serious health condition” (as that term is used in
the FMLA) that causes an individual to be unable to perform the usual functions of his or her job,
including disability resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.
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In deriving a definition of “temporary disability” we looked to the FMLA and several state TDI
programs.66 We settled on using the FMLA definition because we believe a different definition of
“temporary disability” would create confusion between the FMLA and a national program of wage
replacement for the same type of time off from work. Specifically, we wanted to avoid confusion
regarding whether a person who is entitled to FMLA job protection is also entitled to FSI TDI benefits,
and vice-versa.
We recognize that some members of the business community argue the FMLA’s definition of “serious
health condition” is overly broad and difficult to administer.67 However, as discussed above, under
our proposal, wage replacement is only available to recipients who take at least five days off work.
We believe this requirement will help minimize disputes over whether a particular illness or injury
satisfies the FMLA’s definition of “serious health condition” and thus warrants FSI wage replacement
benefits.
Benefits should not be available to those who are receiving workers’ compensation benefits for
their condition.
Our proposal is intended to fill the gap in wage replacement benefits for workers who experience
illnesses or injuries not already handled through the workers’ compensation system. Because
workers’ compensation laws in all 50 states provide wage replacement for individuals who suffer
work-related disabilities (both temporary and permanent), benefits under our TDI proposal would
not be available to those currently receiving workers’ compensation benefits. This recommendation
reflects similar policies in the New York, New Jersey, California, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico
state TDI programs.68

Benefits.
An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly
wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.
Our recommended wage replacement rate of 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage for
temporary disability benefits is based on three principles. First, we believe that wage replacement
levels for a temporary disability program must be sufficiently high to provide financial support to
promote individual health and well-being. The program must provide enough income to allow
workers to recover from their illness or injury while they are unable to work and not to return to work
prematurely.
In determining a proposed benefit amount under this TDI component, we looked first at the five
states and one territory that currently have temporary disability insurance laws. As noted above, the
weekly wage replacement rate in these programs ranges from lows of 50 percent in New York and
55 percent in California to highs of 65 percent in Puerto Rico and 66 percent in New Jersey.69 The
maximum benefits amounts also vary, from lows of $113/week in Puerto Rico and $170/week in
New York, to highs of $700/week in Rhode Island and $987/week in California.70 We also looked at
private-sector, short-term disability insurance plans, which generally provide a more generous 60-70
percent wage replacement rate without any maximum cap.71
Second, the wage replacement levels should not be so high that recipients take more time off than
is necessary to recover, or are discouraged from taking the steps necessary to recover and return to
work as quickly as possible. To the extent that moral hazard exists, or is perceived to exist in a TDI
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program, having less than full wage replacement can counter that problem, or perceptions of that
problem.
Finally, benefits programs for both work- and non-work-related injuries and illnesses should be
generally equivalent from the perspective of the employee. All 50 states’ workers’ compensation
programs provide wage replacement for individuals who cannot work because of a work-related
illness or injury. The wage replacement rate in most states is approximately 66 percent of average
weekly earnings, up to a cap usually set at 100 percent of the state average weekly wage, with
maximum benefits even higher in some states.72 As discussed above, workers’ compensation
benefits are not taxable. Because we propose taxation of all of the benefits proposed, the effective
wage replacement rates between our proposed TDI benefits (80 percent, subject to taxation) and
state workers’ compensation benefits (66 percent, not subject to taxation) are largely equivalent.

A waiting period is also appropriate because, as a practical matter, the temporary disability
component of this program should supplement, not supplant, shorter-term, voluntary employer
policies such as paid sick days or “paid time off” banks. Thus, those workers who have access
to such employer benefits will ordinarily receive wage replacement during their one-week waiting
period.75
The time off from work may be taken only while the recipient is suffering from a serious health
condition.
Benefits should only be available for time off taken from work while the recipient is experiencing a
serious health condition. As discussed in Chapter 5 below, a health care provider must certify that a
claimant has an illness or injury that renders the individual unable to work.

Benefits should be available for up to 26 weeks per year. The actual duration of benefits should
depend on the specific illness or injury.
This recommendation is based on a review of existing state TDI programs and private-sector, shortterm disability programs. As set forth in the chart above, benefit durations in most of the state TDI
programs run up to 26 weeks, although Rhode Island provides up to 30 weeks and California up to
52 weeks. Private sector plans generally provide benefits for up to 26 weeks.73
Women who are unable to work because they are recovering from childbirth, as well as women who
are unable to work because they are experiencing medical complications during their pregnancy,
(i.e., “pregnancy-related disabilities”) should receive temporary disability benefits for the time they
are unable to work. Benefits should be commensurate with the time needed for physical recovery.
For example, birth mothers who have medical complications during childbirth will need more time off
than those who have a normal delivery. As discussed in Chapter 3 below, under our proposal, women
using TDI for pregnancy disability will be able to transition seamlessly from TDI to Parental Care for
a New Child Insurance. Both California and New Jersey also allow women to transition directly from
temporary disability to paid baby-bonding leave benefits after they are no longer disabled because of
pregnancy.74
There should be a five-day waiting period, per qualifying serious health condition, before benefits
can be collected. If an individual needs to take time off for the same qualifying condition at a later
point in the same year, a waiting period should not apply.
A five-day waiting period per qualifying condition is appropriate before an individual receives
temporary disability benefits. The waiting period underscores the fact that the program is intended
to provide wage replacement only when an individual has an illness or injury that makes the
individual unable to work for an extended period of time. A waiting period operates as a co-pay for
accessing the benefit and helps avoid problems of moral hazard and overutilization.
Instead of requiring a waiting period for each claim for benefits, however, our proposal only requires
one waiting period per year for the same qualifying serious health condition. Thus, if a claimant
has a serious illness, returns to work, and then must leave work again, he or she would not need to
satisfy a new waiting period for wage-replacement benefits, provided he or she had already received
benefits earlier that year for the same serious health condition. As discussed in Chapter 1, however,
that individual would only be eligible for benefits for the second (or third or fourth) time if she again
was off from work for at least five days. The only difference is that the individual would be eligible for
benefits on the first day of absence, rather than having to first exhaust a five-day waiting period.
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3

Parental Care for a New Child Insurance
The second component of FSI provides wage replacement for “parental care for a new child” (PCNC).
We define time off for PCNC as time off from work that parents — both women and men — take after
a child’s birth, adoption, or foster placement to care for and bond with their child.
In this chapter we discuss the policy arguments in favor of providing wage replacement for parental
care, and current access to wage replacement during periods of time off for parental care. We then
describe our policy recommendations to address this need.

A. Policy Arguments

Both parents and their children benefit when parents have time off
to care for and bond with their newborn, newly adopted, or newly
placed foster child.
A child’s overall physical, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes are better when his or her parents have
sufficient time off work after birth, adoption, or foster placement.1 Parental bonding, which takes
place immediately following birth, adoption, or foster placement, is critical for a child’s physical and
emotional well-being.2 It is during this time that primary attachment relationships form and children
develop a sense of safety, stability, and trust.3 Children adopted after infancy particularly have
attachment needs that require a period of adjustment.4
Public health research shows that parental leave of 12 weeks or more is correlated with many
positive health outcomes for children.5 Further, parental workplace flexibility during the first year of a
child’s life, including a significant amount of time off and/or flexibility in scheduling, can have positive
developmental effects for children.6
By contrast, returning to work very soon after birth, (i.e., six weeks or less) can be associated
with a variety of negative outcomes for both parents and children compared to families in which
working parents take more time off (i.e. 12 weeks or more) before returning to work. These negative
outcomes include higher rates of infant mortality, lower rates of breastfeeding, lower rates of
immunizations and well-baby care, a higher incidence of maternal physical and mental health
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concerns,7 and increases in externalizing behavior problems in young children (such as ADHD,
behavioral problems, or aggression).8
Significantly, while public-health research supports a reasonable period of time off to bond with a
new child (i.e., 12 weeks or more), research also suggests that parents — specifically, mothers —
who return to work within the first year of a child’s life do not negatively affect children’s physical or
emotional development. 9 In fact, limited research suggests that mothers who spend some time at
work during their child’s early life might create a slightly higher-quality home environment than those
who do not work at all, an effect attributed to the various economic and social benefits of working.10
Parents also benefit from time off to care for newborn or newly placed adopted or foster children.
Unfortunately, most research focuses on the benefits to biological mothers, not fathers or nonbiological parents. We discuss here what we currently know about the health and economic benefits
to parents who have time off work to care for children, but we believe more research needs to be
done in this area.
For women, returning early to work, particularly if earlier than preferred, is associated with greater
amounts of stress and higher rates of depression.11 By contrast, taking 12 weeks of leave is
associated with a significant decline in depressive symptoms among mothers.12 Women who return to
work after fewer than six weeks of leave are also four times more likely than women who take more
than 12 weeks of leave to fail to establish consistent breastfeeding patterns, and are more likely to
breastfeed for shorter periods of time.13 Some of the positive health benefits of breastfeeding for
childbearing mothers include fewer incidences of postpartum depression, decreased postpartum
bleeding, earlier return to pre-pregnancy weight, and protection against breast and ovarian cancer. 14
With regard to economic security, it is well documented that significant family care obligations, which
tend to fall more heavily on women, often lead to reduced labor force attachment among women,
which in turn leads to lower lifetime income potential.15 Evidence suggests paid parental leave is an
important way to help women meet these family-care obligations, while also helping women remain
attached to the workforce. Specifically, women who receive paid time off to care for and bond with
their new children are more likely to return to work after taking leave, have a higher lifetime income,
and have stronger labor force participation compared with women with no access to parental leave.16
This strengthening of workforce attachment associated with paid parental leave is not as strong for
unpaid parental leave.17

“I am not unemployed, and I am not a stay-at-home dad.
I’ve got a ‘real’ job; I just haven’t gone to the office since
last December. In total, I’ve spent 18 of the past 36 months
on paternity leave here in Sweden, my adopted country, ‘off’
work to care for my two kids. And, yes, I still get paid.”
Nathan Hegedus, “Snack Bags and a Regular Paycheck: The Happy Life of a Swedish
Dad,” Slate Magazine, August 31, 2010
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Fathers and non-biological parents (e.g., adoptive or foster parents) also benefit from having time to
bond with their children. Although men in the United States rarely take much time off following the
birth or adoption of a new child, evidence shows that those who take time off work of at least two
weeks or more are more involved in the care of their children later, resulting in stronger, long-term
father-child relationships.18 Time off for foster or adoptive parents is also important because these
parents may not have had the same amount of time to prepare psychologically and emotionally for
the arrival of the child, and are often not present at the birth of the child.19
Finally, paid time off from work to care for newborn or newly placed children can also help families
manage the significant logistical and financial challenges to finding suitable childcare arrangements,
especially for infants. First, there are often very long waiting lists for infant childcare.20 Paid time off
for parents while they are out of work waiting for a suitable childcare arrangement may help relieve
significant stress. In addition, infant childcare is generally the most expensive type of childcare and
is often unaffordable for low- and middle-class families.21 If parents receive paid time off during the
first several months of a child’s life, they may offset some of the high costs of infant childcare, and
parents will be able to return to work under less financial strain.
In sum, while more research should be done on the positive health and economic effects associated
with paid time off for parental care of a new child, the current body of literature suggests that paid
time off for a moderate duration — that is, between 12 and 26 weeks — is beneficial for children and
their families.
As with Temporary Disability Insurance and Caregiving Insurance, there are several reasons why
Parental Care for a New Child Insurance would also be beneficial for businesses. First, those
employers who offer paid parental care benefits experience increased morale and decreased stress
among their employees.22 Employee satisfaction, in turn, is associated with increased revenue
growth and greater customer satisfaction.23 Second, paid parental-care benefits are associated with
increased employee retention, particularly among female workers.24 This reduced turnover helps
businesses avoid the significant costs of replacing a lost worker.25 In addition to being more likely
to return to the workforce in general, evidence shows women receiving paid parental leave are also
more likely to return to the employer they worked at before taking time off, optimizes the human
capital investment a particular employer has made.26
Finally, taking a longer-term view, caring for children in their critical, early years represents a frontline
investment in human capital, playing a key role in the development of the cognitive and social
capacities that are crucial for later productive contributions in the workforce.

B. Current Access to Wage Replacement
1. Voluntary Employer Practices
As noted in the previous chapter, women who receive maternity leave through employer-provided,
short-term disability plans receive wage replacement based on their inability to work during that
time period. Women also use that paid time off, however, to care for and bond with their newborn
children.
Women also use other forms of employer-provided, paid maternity leave, paid vacation, and paid sick
days to bond with their newborns — either in conjunction with short- term disability plans (if they have
access to such a plan) or as their sole source(s) of wage replacement.27
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However, for biological fathers and non-biological parents (e.g., adoptive parents, foster parents,
and/or same-sex partners), generally neither employer-provided, paid sick days nor short-term
disability benefits can be used as sources of wage replacement for time off to care for and bond with
their new children. This is because fathers and non-birth mothers are not temporarily disabled by the
arrival of a new child.

of workers with management and professional positions had access to paid family leave, but only 6
percent of workers in the service industry and 7 percent in sales and related industries did.31 Twelve
percent of full-time workers had access, but only 5 percent of part-time workers did. Interestingly,
union membership did not appear to have an impact: 10 percent of both union and non-union
members had access to paid family leave.32

Some employers provide wage replacement for parental care through paid paternity leave, paid
parental leave, paid family leave, and/or paid adoption leave policies. Definitions of these policies
vary from employer to employer.

There is also limited data from surveys of employers. While such surveys give us information
regarding the percentage of employers who are providing parental-care benefits, they offer little
information regarding employee access to these benefits, because employers may provide the
benefits to some employees, but not others. Even with these limitations, the data still provide insight
into employer practices regarding voluntary paid parental leave benefits.

The data is very limited on workers’ access to these various types of wage replacement. In general,
however, access to parental care is much less than that provided to birth mothers for pregnancy
disability, leaving fathers and non-biological parents with less time to care for and bond with their
new children.
There is only one nationally representative survey on employee access to parental care: the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ National Compensation Survey. The survey defines “paid family leave” as
including paid leave to care for a newborn or newly adopted child.28 That survey found that in 2010,
only 10 percent of private sector employees had access to paid family leave.

Access to Paid Family Leave* (Private Sector)
Part-Time/
Full-Time

Income

20%

16%

15%

9%

10%

3%

5%

Size of Employer

18%

Type of Work

18%

17%

12%

12%

7%

5%

4%

Union/
Non-Union

9% 10%
6%

10% 10%

7%
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Not surprisingly, even among the small number of employees who had access to paid family leave,
access varied depending on income, type of job, full-time versus part-time status, and industry.29
While only 3 percent of workers in the lowest 10th percentile of wages had access to paid family
leave, and only 4 percent of workers in the lowest 25th percentile of wages had such access, 18
percent in the highest 10th percentile of wages had access to paid family leave.30 Eighteen percent
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Further, in a 2009 survey of members of the Society for Human Resource Management, 25 percent
of the roughly 500 human resource professionals who responded to the survey indicated that their
workplace provided paid family leave, 15 percent indicated that their workplace provided paid
paternity leave, 15 percent indicated that their workplace provided paid adoption leave, and 14
percent indicated that their workplace provided paid maternity leave (other than what is covered by
short-term disability).34 Again, however, the study did not provide any information regarding which
workers received these benefits.
Finally, employees who do not have access to any of the forms of wage replacement described
above, but who do have access to vacation days or to some other source of paid time off (such as
PTO), can presumably use those paid days off to care for and bond with their new child. However,
as noted above, employer-provided vacation days average nine days per year, while employers that
provide PTO generally provide 15-25 days per year. Neither of these types of paid time off provide
a significant amount of wage replacement for parental care for a new child, particularly because
employees must use their PTO days when they are sick or when a family member (including their new
child) is sick, as well as for holidays, vacations, and other time-off needs.
		

2. State Laws
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* Includes care for a newborn child, an adopted child,
a sick child, or a sick adult relative.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “National
Compensation Survey” (2010), Table 32.
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For example, the Families and Work Institute’s 2008 National Survey of Employers found that 52
percent of surveyed employers provided at least some wage replacement for maternity leave, and 16
percent provided at least some wage replacement for paternity leave.33 The survey did not, however,
ask whether paid maternity and paternity leave was provided to all employees, or only to those in
certain positions (e.g., management or professional) or those who worked full time.

Two of the states with TDI programs — California and New Jersey — have expanded their TDI
programs to include a Paid Family Leave (PFL) component.35 The coverage and qualification
standards are identical to those used in the states’ TDI systems, except that applicants do not have
to prove that they have a disability. Rather, applicants must show that they qualify either for parental
leave (recent birth or adoption of a new child) or that they are needed to care for a covered family
member.36 For purposes of this section, we focus on the provisions regarding parental care for a
new child.
Like TDI, benefits under these two PFL programs are correlated to the employee’s income and
delivered through a state plan or a state-approved private plan. Benefit duration is capped at six
weeks in both programs.37
In New Jersey, employers using a private plan must ensure the plan provides benefits equal to the
state plan.38 In California, employers who wish to use a private plan must demonstrate that the
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private coverage exceeds the state plan in at least one respect.39

Below we describe our rationales for each recommendation.

The state PFL programs in California and New Jersey are funded exclusively through employee
contributions; employers have the option of paying the employees’ premiums or “topping up” state
PFL benefits through their own benefit plans.40 Whereas California’s PFL financing scheme mirrors
its TDI program (100% employee financed), New Jersey’s PFL program departs from the financing
scheme for its TDI program, which requires at least 50 percent contributions from employers.41

Eligibility.

In addition, two states — Hawaii and Wisconsin — have laws that require that if an employer provides
paid sick days to its employees, the employer must provide its employees the option of using a
certain percentage of their paid sick days for time off for the birth or adoption of a child.42

C. Recommendations
Given the lack of access by most workers to wage replacement during periods of time off for parental
care, the pressing need for income during such periods, and the current inequity in male and female
take-up, we recommend that FSI provide a robust level of wage replacement to individuals who take
time off from work to care for and bond with a newborn or newly placed adopted or foster child. A
national insurance program would provide wage replacement for all individuals who take time off for
parental care and would provide a strong signal that both women and men need, and are expected
to take, time off after the birth, adoption, or foster placement of a child.
Our specific recommendations are as follows:

Eligibility.
k An individual should be entitled to PCNC benefits if he or she is the parent of a newborn,
newly adopted or newly placed foster child (or is acting in loco parentis to a newborn or
newly placed child) and is providing care to that child. Each parent must attest that he
or she is providing care for the child during any time period in which PCNC benefits are
received by that parent.

Benefits.
k For time off taken from work for PCNC purposes, an eligible recipient’s wages should be
replaced at 90 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150
percent the national average weekly wage.

k Each parent should be eligible for 12 weeks of PCNC benefits. The benefits are an

individual entitlement to each parent and not transferable between parents. In
households with two parents, the benefits can be taken simultaneously or consecutively.

k There should be no waiting period for PCNC benefits.
k The 12 weeks of PCNC benefits need to be taken for periods of at least five days or
more within the first year of a child’s birth or adoption, but they need not be taken
consecutively.
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An individual should be entitled to PCNC benefits if he or she is the parent of a newborn, newly
adopted or newly placed foster child (or is acting in loco parentis to a newborn or newly placed
child) and is providing care to that child. Each parent must attest that he or she is providing care for
the child during any time period in which PCNC benefits are received by that parent.
All parents, including those acting in loco parentis, should have access to PCNC benefits as long as
they are providing care to their child.43 Requiring an attestation that parents are providing care to
their child while receiving wage replacement benefits is standard in state PFL programs and in the
programs in OECD countries that we researched.44 This requirement ensures that the program is
being used for its intended purpose.

Benefits.
For time off taken from work for PCNC purposes, an eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced
at 90 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent the national
average weekly wage.
The PCNC benefit must be sufficiently robust so that a single parent or both parents in a two-parent
family have a strong incentive to take the benefit and to use the time to bond with a newborn or
new adoptive or foster child.45 The percentage at which an individual’s wage is replaced must be
sufficiently high so that both a primary and a secondary breadwinner can take time off without
leaving the family financially constrained. In addition, a high-wage replacement rate appropriately
signals that society views the time off as worthy of support because of the long-term benefits that
children, families, and society experience.
A national program of robust wage replacement would encourage more men to take extended time
away from work to care for and bond with a new child. Evidence from paid parental schemes in other
countries shows that greater take-up by fathers of parental leave is directly associated with robust
benefit levels and extended leave duration.46 Increased take-up by fathers of parental care for a
new child would create new cultural expectations and norms around caregiving. It would also provide
significant benefits to the children receiving care from their fathers.

“What would happen if we passed policies that gave strong
incentives for men to take parental leave? Don’t laugh, the
Swedes have tried it. And now you see hunky blond Swedish
men pushing strollers down the streets while Mom is at
work. It’s an intriguing idea and it could decrease gender
discrimination.”
Dwyer Gunn, “Freakonomics: Betsey Stevenson Answers Your Questions,” New
York Times, October 13, 2010, 2:30 PM, at http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/10/13/betsey-stevenson-answers-your-questions/
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A wage replacement level of 90 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage subject to the universal
maximum benefit across all programs — 150 percent of the national average weekly wage — would be
sufficiently high so that both primary and secondary breadwinners in middle-income families could
take time off during this period, without leaving the family financially constrained. This high wage
replacement rate and high maximum weekly benefit is also essential for single parents who do not
have a partner to contribute to the household’s income.
Each parent should be eligible for 12 weeks of PCNC benefits. The benefits are an individual
entitlement to each parent and not transferable between parents. In households with two parents,
the benefits can be taken simultaneously or consecutively.
The duration of benefits should be long enough to support parental and child health and economic
security, but not so long that the program discourages workforce attachment after taking time off
from work. Research suggests that paid parental leaves of moderate duration (around six months,
or 26 weeks) are correlated with the best outcomes in both areas.47 Our proposal would provide
benefits for a combined leave period of 24 weeks of leave for children with two parents, if parents
decide to take time off consecutively. Because every family’s situation is different, however, we
also believe parents should be able to take PCNC benefits simultaneously, as long as they are both
providing care to the child.
As a result, under our proposal, mothers who have an uncomplicated childbirth would be entitled to
18 weeks of benefits in total: six weeks of TDI benefits (at 80% wage replacement with a one-week
waiting period) to recover from pregnancy, and an additional 12 weeks of PCNC benefits (at 90%
wage replacement with no waiting period) to care for and bond with the new child. This aligns with
the recommendations discussed above, both with respect to maternal and child health and female
labor force attachment. Of course, this assumes that the birth mother is able to take 18 weeks of
leave from work. If a woman is able to take only 12 weeks of leave or fewer, she might choose to file
a claim for PCNC benefits alone rather than for TDI benefits, because the PCNC wage replacement
level is higher and there is no waiting period.
We believe the benefits should be non-transferable between parents in two-parent families, just
as the FMLA is an individual entitlement. Evidence suggests that children do best when both
parents take a leave of absence from work after birth or adoption.48 Also, making the time off
non-transferable promotes gender equity. Parental leave programs in other countries that allow
transferable entitlements between parents have very little take-up by fathers in heterosexual
households, resulting in a caregiving burden that disproportionately falls on women.49
There should be no waiting period for PCNC benefits.
Having no waiting period for PCNC benefits helps provide families with immediate income support.
The lack of a waiting period also encourages leave-taking by avoiding a wage gap after the birth or
adoption of a child. Also, PCNC recipients should not be penalized if they do not apply for benefits
in advance of childbirth or the date of adoption, because individuals cannot predict the exact time a
child might be born or placed with a family.
In addition, if a recipient has not applied in advance for benefits, the program should provide
retroactive benefits from the date of childbirth or adoption as long as a claimant attests that he or
she has not worked since the birth or adoption of the child.
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The 12 weeks of PCNC benefits need to be taken for periods of at least five days at a time or more
within the first year of a child’s birth, but they need not be taken consecutively.
The public health literature shows the most critical time for parents to have some time off to be
with new children is within the first year of a child’s life.50 While most parents will likely take most of
the time off in consecutive segments, we believe the program should allow flexibility within the first
year of a child’s life for some segmented periods of leave. We believe this segmentation will allow
two-parent households to better manage shared-caregiving responsibilities and will help parents
transition back into the workforce earlier by allowing them to return to work, but with the option to
receive benefits for additional segments of time off when they may need it (such as when a child care
arrangement does not work out). New Jersey’s PFL program has a similar rule for time off taken to
care for a new child.51
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Chapter

4

Caregiving Insurance

The third component of FSI provides wage replacement for time off from work to care for a family
member with a serious health condition.
In this chapter we discuss the policy arguments in favor of providing wage replacement for
caregiving, and current access to wage replacement during periods of time off for caregiving. We
then describe our policy recommendations to address this need.

A. Policy Arguments
Caregiving covers a wide variety of situations in which an individual provides care to a family
member, broadly defined, with an illness or disability. Most people who temporarily leave the
workforce to provide care to someone do so in order to care for their children, their elderly parents,
or their spouse or partner. But there are times when workers need to provide care to someone
else — for example, a sibling, a grandparent or grandchild, or another person who is like a family
member.1 The type of care provided may vary greatly — from physical care to psychological support to
logistical help. While caregiving primarily involves helping family members recover from a moderateduration illness or injury, caregivers also provide occasional care for those with long-term diseases or
disabilities; support elders when they must be moved to a more intensive care setting; or stay with a
person who is dying. Nearly everyone will substantially benefit from being able to take paid time off
during their working lives to address these situations.
Working caregivers are a rapidly growing segment of the population. An aging population, the
deinstitutionalization of elder care, and the rise of dual-earner families are all trends that have
contributed to this growth.2 In any given 12-month period, about one-third of households have
someone (most often woman) who is providing care to someone else, typically an older relative.3
Of these caregivers, nearly 60 percent are employed, the majority of them full time.4 Nearly half of
working individuals have provided elder care in the past five years, many of whom are part of the
“sandwich generation,” providing elder care while simultaneously taking care of minor children at
home.5
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Two-thirds of caregivers who are employed report significant effects
on their job — either going in late, leaving early, or taking time off.6
One in five report taking leaves of absence from work, and almost
one in 10 gives up working all together.7 On average, caregivers devote more

than 20 hours per week to providing care, and 13 percent of caregivers spend more than 40 hours
per week providing care.8 While both men and women are providing care for seriously ill family
members, one study found that women were twice as likely to take unpaid leave to provide elder
care and twice as likely to report that they considered quitting their jobs as a result of elder care
responsibilities.9 The fact that women disproportionately provide care — and, as suggested by this
study, are more likely to take leave and potentially quit their jobs when caregiving conflicts with work —
gives us concern that caregiving responsibilities have negative effects on women’s labor market
attachment and outcomes.

Balancing work with the need to care for others takes a toll on the well-being of workers.10 Those who
provide caregiving to others have higher rates of absenteeism, worse health outcomes, and higher
rates of stress than other workers.11 Research shows that having workplace flexibility, including paid
time off to provide caregiving, would help alleviate these outcomes.12
The care provided by family members also has significant positive health benefits for care recipients.
Sick children who stay home generally need their parents to administer medicines, take them to
the doctor, and monitor their health in case their conditions worsen.13 And hospitalized children are
able to go home more quickly and suffer fewer complications when a parent is present during the
hospital stay than when a parent is absent.14 The American Academy of Pediatrics credits “familycentered care” — care that includes the presence and participation of family members — for various
improvements in health outcomes and more efficient allocation of medical resources.15 In addition,
although moderate illnesses or injuries generally cause family stress, there is less familial stress
when family members can stay home to care for individuals who are in need.16
Working caregivers often suffer financial hardship as well. In one study, women who cared for their
parents cut back their work hours by an average of 41 percent, resulting in significant wage loss.17
Caregivers who reduce their work hours also may experience reduced Social Security benefits due to
lower earnings, more limited access and contributions to employer-sponsored pensions and 401(k)
plans due to working part time, and reduced personal savings due to less time in the workforce. 18
Providing workers with wage replacement during time off for caregiving is advantageous to
businesses as well. Recent research shows that people who receive wage replacement while
taking care-related time off are more likely to return to their job following the event and to be more
productive overall.19
Businesses benefit from reduced turnover (saving on the high costs of recruiting and training new
workers) and lower rates of absenteeism (and thus superior ability to engage in medium-term
scheduling and planning). In addition, workers who are unable to take leave when they need it may
be preoccupied with their family member’s care needs and thus less productive than they would
otherwise be.20
Finally, caring for people at home is significantly less expensive than other, formal forms of care,
such as skilled nursing facilities.21 Elderly, disabled and medically frail individuals are less likely
to spend time in a nursing home, hospital or assisted living facility if they have family members to
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care for them.22 Although temporary time off cannot replace the role of full-time caregiving, it often
is sufficient for less serious needs, can lower health care costs, and can reduce reliance on public
assistance.23

B. Current Access to Wage Replacement
In the United States, there are only two sources of direct wage replacement when a worker needs to
take time off for caregiving: wage replacement provided voluntarily by an employer or, for residents
of California and New Jersey, wage replacement provided through the state Paid Family Leave
(PFL) programs. There is currently almost no private insurance market for individuals to protect
themselves against the risk that they may need to take a leave of absence, and forgo wages, to
provide care for a family member. In some instances, however, family members may be able to get
paid for the family care they provide through the ill family member’s long-term care insurance or
through a Medicaid-funded, in-home support services program, but as we detail below these policies
are a poor substitute for direct wage replacement insurance for workers needing to take leave to
provide care.

1. Volunteer Employer Practices
First, an employer might provide wage replacement for caregiving, either by offering a specific type of
paid time off for caregiving or by allowing employees to use other types of time off for caregiving.
Employer policies that give wage replacement to employees specifically for time off for caregiving are
rare. As noted in Chapter 3, the nationally representative BLS Compensation Study found that only
10 percent of employees in the private sector have access to formal paid family leave — a term that
BLS defines as including leave to care for and bond with a newborn or adopted child, care for a sick
child, and care for a sick relative.24 While we have no confirmation, we assume that this data point
would drop if it excluded leave to care for and bond with a new child and instead was limited to the
population that has access to paid leave to care for a sick child or other family member.
Of course, as with time off for parental care for a new child, this statistic does not reflect the full
scope of employee access. Rather than instituting formal paid family leave policies, many employers
allow employees to use paid time off (PTO) and/or vacation days to cover these types of situations.25
Some employers also voluntarily allow employees to use accumulated sick leave to take care of a
sick family member, although many do not. As discussed below, some states have recently enacted
laws requiring employers to allow their employees to use a certain percentage of their paid sick days
to care for an ill family member.26

“The medical infrastructure for elder care in America is
good, very good. But the cultural infrastructure is all but
nonexistent. How can it be that so many people like me are
so completely unprepared for what is, after all, one of life’s
near certainties?”
Jonathan Rauch, “Letting Go of My Father,” The Atlantic, April 2010
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Again, however, there are significant disparities in access to such paid time off depending on the
employee’s income, job position, industry, and full-or part-time status. Moreover, even workers who
have access to generous vacation time, sick leave, and/or PTO policies may find they do not have
sufficient paid time off to provide the caregiving their family members need.
The BLS study was the only study we could find regarding employee access to formal paid time off
policies for caregiving purposes. Self-reported data from employers, however, corroborate the fact
that access to these formal policies is low. The Society for Human Resource Management’s study
of its members found that only 25 percent of the employers surveyed provide paid family leave.27
According to a study on working couples caring for children and aging parents, only 15 percent of
companies with more than 500 employees provided “elder care leave.”28 And again, just because
an employer provides caregiving benefits to some employees does not mean that all individuals who
work for that employer have access to such benefits.

2. State Laws
The two states with paid family leave insurance programs—New Jersey and California—provide
wage replacement to employees who take time off for caregiving purposes. These programs define
caregiving quite broadly—providing wage replacement to individuals who take time off from work
to provide physical and emotional support to their family members with serious health conditions,
including time to care for a dying relative and time to provide logistical support, such as helping
someone move to a nursing home.29 The wage replacement benefits provided for caregiving are
equivalent to those for parental leave to bond with a new child.30

“My mother had Stage IV breast cancer and Paid Family Leave
(PFL) allowed me to take time off work to travel to Texas and
take care of her during her final months. There is absolutely
no way I could have managed to keep my apartment (and life)
here in California while taking unpaid leave from work. The
application process was relatively easy, the benefits arrived
quickly, and the people I talked to when I needed help were
courteous and helpful. The huge relief all this provided while
dealing with the extremely stressful situation of caring for
and saying goodbye to my mother cannot be fully explained in
words. I am very grateful that I live in one of the few states that
offer this benefit.”
Melissa Stern, paidfamilyleave.org
In addition, eight states have “kin care” laws that require that if an employer provides paid sick days
to its employees, the employer must provide its employees the option of using a certain percentage
of their paid sick days to care for ill family members. 31
64

3. Private Insurance Policies
Unlike time off for a temporary disability —which individuals can insure against through short-term
disability insurance (most often offered through an employer) — there is no real private market for
caregiving insurance. Indeed, we were only able to find private insurance policies for caregiving in
New Jersey, a state that already possesses a public, paid, family leave insurance program. New
Jersey law allows companies to opt-out of the public TDI and PFL programs and either self-insure or
purchase private insurance (subject to the standards set for private plans by the state.) A handful
of private insurers that already provide TDI insurance to companies have applied to provide PFL
as well.32 The presence of these policies proves that a private market may develop once a state or
national program is put in place. However, the impact of these existing private insurance policies
should not be overstated as they remain a very small part of the overall market (both private and
public) for caregiving insurance and are not available to the vast majority of the country.
While individuals cannot purchase insurance to protect against lost wages during leaves of absence
to provide family care, it may be that the person for whom they are caring can pay them for their
services.
Under some long-term care insurance plans, reimbursement to pay a family member who is providing
care is allowed.33 In addition, all but six states allow Medicaid reimbursement for in-home health
support that is provided by a family member.34 Finally, a new social insurance program for long-term
care, the Community Living Assistance Services and Support (CLASS) program, was recently enacted
as part of the federal health care reform law.35 Starting in January 2011 this program will be funded
by payroll tax contributions from all workers, except those who choose to opt out of the program.36
While it is too early to know if funds received through the CLASS program will be able to be used to
support a family member who is providing caregiving services, it is another future potential source of
payment to family caregivers.
There are two limitations with long-term care insurance as a form of paid time off for family
caregivers. First, the funds received through the policies are not “wage replacement” per se because
pay is based on a set amount allowed under the insurance policy, not on the family caregiver’s wages
at their place of employment. Second, these policies are directed at individuals with long-term
disabilities or seriously ill elders and, as a result, the care needed is often extensive and may not
easily accommodate short-term exit from and reentry into the labor market.

C. Recommendations
Given the minimal availability of wage replacement during periods of time off for caregiving,
the pressing need for income during such periods, and the current inequity in male and female
caregiving, we recommend that FSI provide meaningful wage replacement to all individuals who take
time off from work to provide caregiving to their family members. The program would also provide
meaningful wage replacement for all individuals who take time off for caregiving and would provide
a strong signal that both women and men need, and have the necessary support to take, time off to
care for a family member.
Our specific recommendations are as follows:

Eligibility.
k An employee is eligible for caregiving benefits if he or she is “needed to care for” a “family
member” with a “serious health condition.”
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k The terms “needed to care for” and “serious health condition” should track the definitions in
the FMLA.

k The term “family member” should be defined broadly and should track the definition used
by the federal government to allow its employees to use their own sick leave to care for a
family member.

k An eligible recipient must attest that he or she is acting as a caregiver for a family member
during any time period in which benefits are received.

Benefits.
k An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average
weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.

k There should be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum

amount an individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12
weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year.
Within those limits, actual benefit durations should depend on how long a worker must be
out of work to provide care.

k There should be a five-day waiting period for each of the care recipient’s qualifying serious
health conditions before benefits can be claimed.

Below we describe our rationale for each section:

Eligibility.
An employee is eligible for caregiving benefits if he or she is “needed to care for” a “family member”
with a “serious health condition.” The terms “needed to care for” and “serious health condition”
should track the definitions in the FMLA.
The terms “needed to care for” and “serious health condition” have been part of federal law for a
number of years under the FMLA.37 We believe the definitions of those terms are substantively in line
with the purposes of our proposal and will provide consistency for the administrative agency when
determining eligibility for FSI Caregiving benefits.38
The FMLA regulations provide that a person is “needed to care” for a covered family member with a
serious health condition if he or she is needed to provide physical and/or psychological care, such
as assisting with the basic health care needs of a family member, providing emotional support to
a dying family member, or helping an elderly relative transition to an assisted living facility.39 As
discussed in Chapter 5, the administrative agency implementing FSI should require certification from
a health care provider documenting the need for care.
The term “family member” should be defined broadly and should track the definition used by the
federal government to allow its employees to use their own sick leave to care for a family member.
We believe that eligibility to take leave for caregiving purposes must be broad enough to recognize
the full range of caregiving relationships in our society — e.g., grandparents who are the primary
caregivers for their grandchildren; siblings; or non-relatives who are like a family member. Data on
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caregiving in the United States shows that non-immediate family members make significant sacrifices
to care for extended family and friends — whether it be a grandparent, an uncle, or a close friend who
is like a family member. One study found that more than 14 percent of caregivers are caring for a
non-relative.40 Another study found that more than 40 percent of caregivers for Alzheimer’s patients
are not covered under the FMLA’s narrow definition of family, and yet another found that nearly 20
percent of primary caregivers for chronically disabled individuals are neither the spouse nor the
child of the person receiving care.41 Non-immediate family care is likely to become more prevalent as
workers become increasingly mobile and, as a result, cease to live near immediate family members.
Furthermore, because our proposal is a social insurance program financed by contributions from
all workers, there is merit to allowing workers to provide care to those individuals who most need
it, whether or not the care recipient is part of the individual’s immediate family. Allowing a worker
to use benefits earned through his or her contributions to care for any person who falls within the
proposed definition of family member will make the program useful to a broader cross-section of
workers. We also believe that, as a matter of social policy, government should encourage caregiving,
and allowing benefits to be used to provide care for all those who qualify as family members under
this definition increases the number of potential caregivers in the population. Some people who
need temporary care from others for a serious health condition may not have an immediate family
member available to provide it for them. Allowing care from another individual is more economical
for the government than paying for professional nursing care.
Because of these concerns, we concluded that the FMLA’s definition of “family member” — children,
a spouse, and parents — is too narrow and does not recognize the current constellations of families
and caregiving relationships. As a result, we recommend that the term “family member” track the
federal regulations allowing federal employees to use their sick leave to care for a seriously ill family
member. That regulatory definition of a “family member” is broader than the FMLA, and includes an
individual with any of the following relationships to the employee:
(1) Spouse, and parents of a spouse, i.e., fathers and mothers in-law;
(2) Sons and daughters, and spouses of a son or daughter, i.e., daughters or sons in-law;
(3) Parents, and spouses of a parent, i.e., stepparents;
(4) Brothers and sisters, and spouses of a brother or sister, i.e., brothers or sisters in-law;
(5) Grandparents and grandchildren, and spouses thereof;
(6) Domestic partner and a domestic partner’s parents; and
(7) Any individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the
equivalent of a family relationship.42
An eligible recipient must attest that he or she is acting as a caregiver for a family member during
any time period in which benefits are received.
Like the eligibility rules for parental care, we recommend adopting language modeled after state
paid family leave programs. Those programs require eligible recipients to attest that they are acting
as a caregiver while benefits are received to ensure that the program is being used for its intended
purpose.43

Benefits.
An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly
wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.
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We chose to set wage replacement levels for caregiving at the same level as temporary disability.
Caring for one’s own disability and caring for another’s disability both rest on the same “qualifying
event”: a serious health condition. As with temporary disability, wage-replacement levels for
individuals who take time off from work to care for others must be high enough to provide meaningful
income support during such individuals’ time away from work. Otherwise, the societal rationale of
supporting those who provide important caregiving services for those in need will not be achieved. At
the same time, wage replacement levels for supportive caregiving cannot be so high as to encourage
over-use of the program. Setting wage replacement levels at the same level for caregiving and
disability also avoids the inequitable situation where a care recipient could receive higher wage
replacement than the person for whom he or she is caring, assuming that person happens to be
accessing the temporary disability portion of the program.
There should be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum amount an
individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12 weeks of caregiving
benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year. Within those limits, actual
benefit durations should depend on how long a worker must be out of work to provide care.
As explained above, we believe caregiving benefits should be available when an employee takes time
off to care for a family member, broadly defined, in order to recognize and support the wide range of
familial caregiving relationships that exist today.
That said, there are four reasons why we believe it is appropriate to set a maximum number of weeks
an individual could receive benefits for caregiving over the course of his or her working life.
First, we are concerned about overuse. A program that allows unlimited wage replacement benefits
to care for family members, broadly defined, could result in overuse and unsustainable costs. One
way to limit use is to more narrowly define the class of persons to whom one can provide care. But
we believe setting a maximum number of weeks an employee can take off for caregiving during his/
her working lifetime is a more equitable solution. Specifically, we believe it would be unfair to exclude
a worker who has been contributing to the program and is otherwise eligible simply because the
worker’s relationship to the person in need of care does not meet a narrow definition of “family.”
We are also concerned that unlimited benefits for caregiving might lead to fraud and abuse. As will
be discussed in Chapter 5, administering caregiving benefit claims is inherently complex, especially
when claims are allowed for a broader array of caregiving relationships. Limiting an individual’s total
benefit allotment will discourage abuse of the system and encourage individuals only to use the
program when the caregiving need is serious.
Third, we are motivated by concerns that imposing no limit on Caregiving benefits will perpetuate
disparities in caregiving obligations between men and women. If caregiving benefits are limited,
there will be stronger incentives for males to take caregiving leaves; once a female caregiver has
exhausted her benefits, the only way for a family to receive additional insured leave may be for a
male family member to take the leave.
Finally, we believe that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits for temporary time off from work is just
one part of a larger public policy response to a growing caregiving crisis. Longer-term caregiving
is addressed by long-term care insurance and government programs such as the recently enacted
CLASS Act and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for home health care providers.44
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As a result, we recommend there be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the
maximum amount an individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12
weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year. Within those
limits, actual benefit durations should depend on how long a worker must be out of work to provide
care.
The 26-week total benefit maximum would allow an individual to receive up to half a year’s worth of
wage replacement over the course of the individual’s working life when taking time off from work to
provide care to various family members.
The 12-week annual benefit maximum would ensure that caregivers have access to enough benefits
to provide wage replacement for a variety of caregiving needs. The 12-week annual benefit duration
tracks the FMLA, which provides up to 12 weeks per year of unpaid leave for, among other things,
caregiving purposes.45 It recognizes that some illnesses and disabilities last longer than others,
and that some caregivers have caregiving responsibilities for more than one person. In addition, it
compels caregivers to exercise prudence in order to save some benefits for the future — for example,
when they might need to take time off from work to provide care in their later years.
Under our proposal, an individual, over the course of her career, could claim benefits for one month
to care for her mother recovering from surgery, three weeks to help a sibling recovering from an
injury, two weeks to assist her father as he moves into a nursing home, six weeks to care for a dying
spouse, and still have 11 weeks’ worth of benefits if unforeseen caregiving needs arise in the future.
However, the individual could receive only up to 12 weeks of caregiving benefits per year. [Note that
the Caregiving benefit is available in addition to the maximum of 26 weeks per year of Temporary
Disability benefits, and 12 weeks per year of PCNC benefits.]
We recognize that the 12-week annual caregiving limit is shorter than the 26-week annual TDI limit.
However, while the duration of wage replacement benefits must be long enough to allow individuals
to take the time off that they need to provide care, it need not be as long as benefits provided for
one’s own temporary illness or injury. First, some individuals who are recovering from a disability
will not need someone to take time off work to care for them (especially in increments of a week or
more), either because they can recover on their own or because they have a professional caregiver
(e.g., in-home health aide, hospital staff, etc.). Second, when an individual is unable to work because
of illness or injury, there is no one else who can recover for the individual. By contrast, when an
individual’s family member is seriously ill or injured, there will often be more than one person who
can provide care to that family member, especially when the term “family member” is broadly
defined.
There is no way to predict the number of weeks an individual will need to take time off from work in
his or her lifetime to provide caregiving. Some individuals will have large, extended families, where
a number of relatives might need care, but also where a number of relatives might be available to
share the caregiving burden. Other individuals will have small families, where fewer relatives might
require care, but where the caregiving burden might fall on only one or two family members. While
26 weeks of wage replacement for caregiving purposes may not be sufficient for all, we believe half a
year of wage replacement constitutes a reasonable amount of benefits that can be used to address
a variety of caregiving needs. Further, because we have recommended a broad definition of “family
member,” we anticipate a broader pool of caregivers will be eligible under the program and able to
provide care if another person has exhausted their total allowable benefits.
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As explained in Chapter 7, however, while we recommend a 26-week total benefit duration and 12week annual benefit duration, we also recommend that there be further research on whether there
are other ways to mitigate concerns about overuse, program sustainability, and fraud and abuse.
There should be a five-day waiting period per qualifying serious health condition of the care
recipient before benefits can be collected.
We believe there should be a five-day waiting period before an individual can seek wage replacement
for caring for others. As with the waiting period for temporary disability benefits, a waiting period
for caregiving benefits helps avoid problems of moral hazard and overuse. It underscores the fact
that the program is intended to provide wage replacement only when time off is taken to care for
an individual with a serious illness or injury. In addition, we believe this program should supplement
shorter-term policies such as paid sick days that can be used to care for sick family members and
PTO days.
As with TDI, our proposal only requires a Caregiving benefit recipient to serve one five-day waiting
period per qualifying serious health condition. If an individual has to take additional time off to care
for the same individual with the same condition, the individual can claim benefits without another
five-day waiting period.
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Chapter

5

Administration

Previously, we discussed our recommendations on eligibility, benefits, and financing for a national
social insurance system for time off for temporary disability, parental care for a new child, and
caregiving. This section discusses how the program can be administered.

A. Background
While we are proposing the first national social insurance system for temporary disability, parental
care for a new child, and caregiving benefits, a number of lessons can be learned from experiences
in the states. Rhode Island established our first social insurance system for temporary disability
more than 68 years ago, in 1942. California, our largest state, has been operating its temporary
disability insurance program since 1946 and its parental care and caregiving insurance programs
since 2003. These programs, and similar laws in New Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico,
have operated, for the most part, without undue cost or complaint.1 Their continued existence
alone suggests strongly that our proposed FSI program is both workable and affordable from an
administrative standpoint.

many ways fundamentally different from the missions of each of the major national social insurance
systems. For instance, Social Security operates a disability insurance program, but that system is
designed to cover disabilities that prevent most gainful employment and are expected to last for a
year or longer, not temporary conditions that keep a person from performing his or her current job.
As one would expect, the eligibility standards and application screening processes associated with
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) are more intensive and lengthy than those needed for a
temporary disability system. Likewise, the retirement and survivor’s insurance programs are capable
of providing benefits based solely on relation. Yet, benefits are predicated on a concrete event, the
death of a parent or spouse, as opposed to the more subjective standard of “needed to care” for that
person.
Similarly, while Unemployment Insurance provides wage replacement for short-term, involuntary
absences from the labor force, it is not equipped to handle claims that are medical in nature.
Indeed, as the Commissioner of the SSA said in the Social Security Amendment Act hearings of 1949,
“[E]xperience has shown that the two programs of temporary disability and unemployment insurance
are so different as to require almost separate administration, with separate policies, separate
procedures, and separate administrative staffs.”6
As a result, we had to start from the premise that regardless

of which agency
administers the FSI program, a temporary disability, caregiving,
and parental care system would require its own set of
administrative processes. In the sections that follow, we describe our initial thoughts

about how those processes might work and how we would address some of the unique challenges
associated with this kind of system. We then turn to our recommendations on the most appropriate
administrative delivery vehicle for these benefits.

B. Basic Process and Claim Evaluation
1. Key Elements of the System

Our goal was to build from the states’ experiences and put forward recommendations regarding how
a TDI, PCNC, and Caregiving Insurance system should work and where it can best fit in our national
social insurance structures.

While the purposes of our program diverge from those found in our major national social insurance
programs, the basic processes would look very similar to what is currently done in state UI, TDI, and
PFL systems:

To that end, we conducted an in-depth examination of the existing social insurance structures in
the United States — Social Security, Rail Road Retirement and Sickness Insurance, Unemployment
Insurance (UI), state Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI), and state Paid Family Leave (PFL) systems
— to see what is and is not working in the distribution of social benefits and whether there is an ideal
administrative vehicle for the FSI program. 2

Application: For each FSI component, an applicant will be required to submit a formal application to
the agency in charge of distributing benefits (see section C for our discussion on the agencies best
suited to handle these benefits). For TDI, that application will need to be accompanied by medical
certification of an illness or injury that renders the individual unable to work.7 For Parental Care,
the applicant will need to provide some proof of the relationship with the new child and attest that
they are providing care to the child.8 For Caregiving, there will need to be proof of relationship and
a medical certification showing that the care recipient has a serious health condition and requires
care.9

We also explored the leading national social insurance proposals — a proposal to amend the Social
Security Act to provide Social Security benefits for FMLA-covered reasons;3 a proposal to provide
wage replacement to individuals who take FMLA leave with the benefit financed by a payroll tax
and administered by employers;4 and a proposal for a family-leave insurance program financed by a
payroll tax and administered by a federal-state partnership5 — to learn about different administrative
approaches.
Providing wage replacement for temporary disability, caregiving, and parental care, however, is in
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Review by the Agency: Once an application is submitted, there will need to be some form of review
and verification by the agency in charge of the program. This will include a review of wage and hour
records provided to the agency by employers to determine an applicant’s eligibility and benefit level.10
In addition, agency staff will need to review and approve medical certifications. We discuss some of
the unique challenges associated with this kind of review below.
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Appeals: If an applicant is dissatisfied with either the eligibility or benefit determination made by
the agency, the applicant should be able to appeal that decision — both within the agency and to an
independent administrative tribunal.11
Distribution: There will need to be some system in place to distribute program benefits. Most of the
programs we studied offer applicants the choice of receiving benefits by check or by direct deposit.
For example, the Rhode Island TDI program, Wisconsin’s UI program, New Jersey’s UI program, and
all of the Social Security programs offer direct deposit as a payment option.12 Some states even
use electronic debit cards that are distributed through partnering banks.13 We believe a range of
alternatives will be needed to meet both the financial needs of applicants and the administrative
capabilities of each system.14

		

As one would expect, of the four steps summarized above, claim evaluation presents the greatest
challenge. Ensuring smooth distribution of applications and benefits is mostly a question of
sufficient resources and staff. Claim evaluation, on the other hand, consists of both hiring the
right personnel and establishing the right processes. In the sections below, we outline some of our
findings regarding the challenges presented by each segment of our program.

Caregiving claims are intrinsically difficult to evaluate. Applications depend on the relationship
between the care recipient and claimant, the medical status of the care recipient, and the recipient’s
need for care from the claimant. Proof of relationship is generally simple to provide, although proving
relationships outside of the core family will be more complicated. In addition, establishing that the
recipient requires care and assistance from the claimant will sometimes be difficult to prove.

2. Specific Claim Evaluation Challenges
		

a. Temporary Disability

The largest challenge in the administration of temporary disability benefits is the evaluation
of medical certifications. As noted above, our program will rely on certifications from medical
professionals to determine whether a person is suffering from a qualifying illness or injury. These
certifications will, of course, need to be verified by agency staff.
There are essentially two methods for handling verification. First, an agency can hire claim
administrators with medical training or medical backgrounds to review certifications. Second, the
agency can adopt a set of medical guidelines, like the Medical Disability Advisor (MDA), to assist
administrators in making initial determinations — an approach currently employed by TDI programs in
Rhode Island and California.15
The most efficient method is to craft medical guidelines and train administrative staff in how to
implement them. Medical guidelines, such as the MDA, enable staff without medical training to
effectively review applications by providing accessible descriptions of common ailments, their typical
duration, and the factors that can speed or slow recovery from them. As a result, highly trained
medical experts, such as Registered Nurses, would be needed only for the review of suspicious cases
and testimony in support of agency determinations.16 This approach is much less expensive than
employing experts to review all applications or requiring extensive training for all administrators, and
it will be much faster than having experts complete an extensive review of all applications.
		

b. Parental Care for a New Child

Of the three types of time off we discuss in this proposal, PCNC presents the fewest challenges in
terms of claims evaluation.
The proof and analysis required to prove a parental care claim is generally straightforward. A birth
certificate, adoption or foster placement records, parentage judgment, or other official record that
demonstrates the claimant’s relationship to the child will generally serve as adequate proof for a
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claim.17 In order to approve the claim, the benefits administrator will simply need to verify that the
proof presented is authentic. The training required to review the authenticity of these documents is
not as intensive as the training needed to review medical claims.18 As a result, there will be less need
to worry about processing speed and appeals procedures.
Claims involving parental relationships where no official recognition exists (e.g., an individual acting
in loco parentis) are naturally more complex. In these situations, a claims administrator will not be
able to rely on state-sanctioned records to prove a relationship exists. A signed attestation by the
claimant confirming the relationship is, probably, the best substitute available.19

c. Caregiving

These complications naturally lead to concerns about potential fraud. However, an agency should
be able to safely rely on practices similar to those used in the New Jersey and California family leave
insurance systems. In those programs, the primary evidence in support of a caregiving claim consists
of a statement from a physician or other healthcare provider stating that the care recipient has a
serious health condition and requires care.20 Because our proposal adopts a broader definition of
family, the agency charged with reviewing claims might also request a signed statement from the
care recipient (when possible) that verifies the nature of the care being provided as an extra check
against fraud. It should be noted that neither California nor New Jersey requires this, however.
As in the parental care context, if a government-issued document verifying the relationship between
the care provider and care recipient is not available, we would recommend the agency accept a
signed attestation from the care provider confirming the relationship.
Finally, since this is a new program, we would also recommend occasional spot audits to ensure that
the program is working as intended and that only legitimate claims are approved.

C. Federal or Federal-State Approach
As noted above, the unique requirements of a temporary disability, caregiving, and parental care
system ensure that, regardless of the administrative vehicle, our program will largely stand apart
from the processes currently in place. However, we also recognize that there are efficiencies to be
gained from aligning it with an existing system.
From our perspective, there are two plausible forms this alignment could take:

k A national-state program directed by a federal agency, but administered by
state agencies; OR

k A national program directed and administered by a federal agency.
Regardless of administrative vehicle, an FSI program will be a part of the broader social safety net
in the United States. As such, it is likely that any legislation establishing an FSI program would be
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an amendment to the Social Security Act — which established, among other things, Old Age and
Survivors’ Insurance (OASI), Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), and Unemployment Insurance
(UI). The question here is whether it makes more sense to align the administrative aspects of the FSI
program more closely with UI (which is administered by the Department of Labor and state agencies)
or OASI and SSDI (administered by the Social Security Administration).
In the sections below, we discuss how the FSI program would be administered under each approach,
and where the challenges lie.

1. A Federal-State Partnership
One option would be for the FSI program to be administered by a federal-state partnership.
A similar administrative structure is proposed under the “Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009,” which
was introduced by Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.). The Stark bill would create a national family leave
insurance program that is funded by the federal government, but run through state agencies.21 The
program would be funded through an increase in the employee FICA payroll tax by 0.1 or 0.2 percent
(depending on whether the person works for a large or small employer).22 The money collected would
then be used to provide wage replacement, on a sliding scale, for employees who take time off for
FMLA-qualifying reasons.23
The primary vehicle for administering the benefit in Stark’s bill is a federal-state partnership. Under
these partnerships, the Department of Labor would provide the state with funding for a family
leave and temporary disability insurance program in exchange for having a state agency administer
the program.24 In order to qualify, states would be required to administer the program through an
existing system, such as Unemployment Insurance or Workers’ Compensation.25
We recommend a similar approach, where the federal agency would be responsible for collecting
funds for wage replacement and program administration through a federal payroll tax, and
would set national standards for benefit levels, duration, and eligibility. State agencies would
be responsible for the processing of claims and distribution of benefits. Funding for program
administration and benefits would come entirely from the proceeds of the payroll tax collected
by the federal government.
Under this approach, the lead federal agency would, most likely, be the Department of Labor, and
the lead state agency would, most likely, be the state workforce agency currently responsible for
administering Unemployment Insurance. The state Unemployment Insurance agencies would
be responsible for processing applications, handling appeals, and distributing payments. The
Department of Labor would allot funds for program administration and benefits, set national
standards, and ensure that state agencies are administering the program effectively. Unlike the
initiative undertaken during the Clinton Administration, in which states were permitted to use UI
funds to provide wage replacement during times of parental leave for newborns or newly adopted
children, 26 this approach would simply build off of the administrative structures of the state UI
agencies — their payment, processing, and appeals systems — and would not use funds slated for UI
administration or benefits.27
This approach would mirror what is currently done in the two states with functioning Paid Family
Leave Insurance (PFL) programs, California and New Jersey. Both states chose to build their PFL
administrative systems off of their existing Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs.28 Those
TDI programs, in turn, were built on top of the state UI infrastructures. The programs — UI, TDI, and
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PFL29 — have distinct policies, procedures, and funding sources, yet all three work out of the same
department and share some of the same administrative resources.30
Indeed, the connection between these systems reflects a long-standing tie between UI and TDI
programs at the national level. Since 1946, the federal laws governing the certification of state
unemployment compensation programs — namely the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and Title
III of the Social Security Act — have specifically permitted the use of funds derived from state UI taxes
on employees for TDI benefits.31
The states will, of course, need to affirmatively grant the relevant state agencies the authority to
administer the program and work cooperatively with the federal government. The role of the federal
government, then, is to incentivize the granting of authority. States that refuse to partner with the
federal government will forfeit funds set aside for program operation and benefits, even though state
residents have contributed to the program. If that turns out to be an insufficient motivator, however,
other incentives, such as a tax credits similar to those used to promote UI, could be added.32
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program provides a good illustration of the agreement/
incentive approach. The TAA provides partial wage replacement and other employment services to
individuals who are unemployed or underemployed due to a free trade agreement or other structural
change in the United States economy. The program is fully funded by the federal government and is
administered through state UI offices. To encourage participation, businesses in states that fail to
enter into agreements with the federal government to administer the TAA program lose part of their
federal unemployment tax credit.33
Even though we recognize that TDI, PCNC, and Caregiving will require largely separate programs,
there are still a number of efficiencies one would expect to flow from building on top of the UI
infrastructure. These include use of wage records, payment systems, and appeals networks. As
noted above though, certain aspects of our program will require distinct or expanded infrastructure.
As the current unemployment crisis has underscored, our UI infrastructure, particularly the computer
systems used for claim processing and data storage, is woefully outdated.34 Without a sufficient
influx of resources, the wage records, payment, and appeal systems of the state UI programs will be
unable to absorb these added responsibilities.
Another issue is that our program, unlike most UI systems, uses hours worked instead of wages
earned as a measure of eligibility. Only two states, Washington and Oregon, currently require
employers to track and submit hours worked by employees.35 The Washington experience shows that
tracking hours is viable from an administrative standpoint, but the addition of hours worked to the
information tracked by state agencies will constitute a new practice for 48 state systems.
A third issue is that our program will be governed by national standards on eligibility and benefits.36
The UI system, on the other hand, gives state agencies greater flexibility in establishing eligibility
and benefits requirements. In this way, our proposal more closely matches the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). SNAP, more commonly know as the Food Stamp program, is
a national benefit administered by the Department of Agriculture but operated by state and local
organizations.37 The federal law establishes uniform eligibility, benefit, and distribution standards.38
The state or local agency in charge of administration simply verifies eligibility and distributes
benefits.39
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2. A New Federal Program
Another option would be that a federal agency, most likely the Social Security Administration or the
Department of Labor, administer FSI.
A similar recommendation, based in part on earlier work by Workplace Flexibility 2010 and other
proposals, has been put forward by Heather Boushey, an economist at the Center for American
Progress. Under the Boushey proposal, entitled “Social Security Cares,” the program would operate
either as a traditional social insurance program, funded through an increase in the Social Security
payroll tax and/or an increase in the wage cap, or alternatively, it would be financed through a unique
“time-lending” system that would allow Social Security recipients to trade future benefits for familyand medical-leave benefits.41
40

As discussed in our universal recommendations in chapter 1, however, our proposal would
be limited to using a payroll tax to fund the benefit, which would be administered by the
federal agency. Employees would submit their applications for benefits to the agency, agency
employees would handle the processing and approval of these applications, and benefits would
be distributed by the agency.
Unlike the federal-state partnership, FSI operated by a federal agency could be enacted through
federal legislation alone. There would be no need for individual state legislation or federal incentives
to create state programs.
As with the federal-state partnership proposal, we expect there would be a number of efficiencies
associated with operating FSI at the federal level. However, there are also a number of aspects of our
program that will require distinct or additional infrastructure.
For instance, if we were to operate FSI alongside Social Security programs such as OASI, we would be
able to tap into existing employment records, wage data, payment systems, and appeals networks.
Not all of these mechanisms, however, are well suited for an FSI program.
To start with, the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) employment and wage data only covers
employment history and wages earned. It does not contain any information about hours worked.
In addition, the SSA only collects this data once a year. Furthermore, each program in the Social
Security system uses a complicated benefit formula that differs substantially from our rather
straightforward method of replacing a certain percentage of wages up to a national cap. 42 Finally,
the Social Security payment system currently can only process checks on a monthly basis.43 Benefits
under our proposed program would need to be processed and delivered quickly, so individuals would
have wage replacement during the periods they were not working — not weeks or months afterward.
44

Similarly, if we were to place FSI within the Department of Labor there would be gains in terms of
area expertise and national reach. The DOL already operates four national workers’ compensation
programs45 and employs a cadre of experts on short-term benefit programs and employment law.46
However, despite its expertise on the subject, the Department has little experience in actually
operating a program like FSI. The existing workers’ compensation systems would provide a base to
build from, but those systems are fairly meager when compared to the social insurance programs
operated by the SSA and the state unemployment agencies.47 Most of the system would need to be
newly built.
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That being said, we believe that FSI could work in either setting. The question is whether the
advantages associated with a federal approach outweigh the advantages inherent in the partnership
model.

D. Conclusion
There are clearly challenges associated with administering a temporary disability, parental care for a
new child, and caregiving benefit, regardless of the administrative structure that is ultimately chosen.
The broader point, however, as first made in a 1949 report of the Federal Security Agency, is that our
national experience shows “basic family protection for all workers through compulsory contributory
social insurance is in harmony with the American way of life and . . . a firm and successful
administrative foundation exists upon which to build [this] new benefit program.”48 The only question
is which foundation we want to build upon.
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Making it Work for Employers and Employees
Wage replacement, alone, will not guarantee that a national social insurance system will work — for
employers or employees. In this section, we discuss those additional supports and guarantees that
employees and employers will need to make FSI fully functional.

A. For Employers: Getting the Work Done
Many employers understand and support employees’ need for paid time off to care for a family
member or recover from an illness or injury. At the same time, employers are faced with the reality
that a job needs to get done. As we developed our proposal, we were quite aware of this tension and
spent time trying to understand and recognize the employer perspective on these issues. Paid time
off in and of itself may not carry significant costs. Indeed, as discussed above, there is evidence that
time off — particularly in combination with flexible work arrangements — can enhance productivity
and have positive bottom-line results.1 But from the perspective of many employers, the need for
employees to take time off creates some short-term challenges, particularly around continuity
of operations and ease of administration. These challenges, however, are not new, and many
employers have developed effective policies, tools, and management strategies to assist them with
executing time off effectively at their worksites.
An exhaustive analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this report. But we provide here a brief
introduction to key employer interests identified in our research and some promising management
tools and strategies. We also identify a sampling of public policy ideas that build on the programs
and policies that the private sector has already developed. While we are under no illusion that the
potential responses identified below will meet every employer concern or ameliorate all potential
administrative burdens associated with FSI, we strongly recommend that employer interests and
supports to address employer concerns be considered in any broader policy discussions on FSI.

1. The Current Landscape
Our research shows that employers consistently identify two major challenges in providing periods of
time off to employees: continuity of operations and administration of time-off policies.
Continuity of operations — that is, how to get the work done — appears to be the primary challenge
faced by employers. Employers place a high premium on predictability and stability. Time off that
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is taken with little or no notice is often experienced as a disruption to business operations. On the
other hand, companies report that time off taken with adequate notice is generally easier to plan
around and can have positive benefits for their business. 2
Absences can also lead to reductions in capacity and productivity. Some employers find when an
employee is out they end up spending scarce resources on expensive temporary labor, and valuable
time developing a plan for managing and reallocating the missed work.4 Customer service and other
performance indicators may also suffer.5 Additionally, employers report that absences can lead to
reductions in workforce morale if employees have to increase their hours to cover for lost work or
feel that the absent worker is receiving special treatment.6
3

The second major challenge expressed by employers is the potential administrative burden imposed
by a paid time-off program.7 Employers are naturally concerned about new laws and programs that
impose administrative burdens such as additional paperwork, reports, or compliance monitoring.
These indirect costs can be especially difficult for small employers to bear.8
Of course, the reality of today’s workforce is that employers must be prepared for all contingencies:
planned absences (e.g., for the birth of a new child or to care for a spouse after surgery) as well as
unplanned ones (e.g., a heart attack, a child injured in a car accident); absences of known duration
as well as those that continue longer than originally predicted.
Many employers, large and small, have developed strategies and tools to more effectively and
efficiently manage periods of employee time off in order to ensure smooth continuation of
operations. Below we describe a few of these management strategies in greater detail:

k “Cross training” refers to the practice of training employees for multiple jobs within an

organization.9 If there is an unplanned absence or unexpected surge in work in a certain
area, a company with cross-trained employees can simply move existing workers around to
cover the problem. This technique is especially useful in industrial settings, both large and
small, where the unexpected loss of a single employee could severely delay the production of
a good or service.

k A “team approach” emphasizes reliance on a group of employees, as opposed to individuals

given discrete tasks, for the production of a product or service.10 Unlike a traditional topdown management system, a company or division of a larger organization built around teams
gives the employees tasked with performing a service control over the process by which the
work is completed. This often results in both gains in productivity and flexibility since teams
tend to apportion work in a manner that allows all workers to gain some knowledge of the
tasks needed to produce the ultimate service or product. As in cross training, that shared
knowledge can allow the team, and therefore the company, to more easily adapt to extended
absences. In addition, the team approach can be easily integrated into companies of all
sizes. Larger organizations can break operations down into multiple teams while smaller
companies may find that the entire business can operate as one team. The same principles,
and gains, apply in either setting.

k “Mass Career Customization” (MCC) is an approach pioneered by Deloitte Consulting.11 The

MCC approach operates on the assumption that a workplace should offer every employee the
opportunity to customize his or her career to include periods of change along four dimensions
of work: pace, workload, location and schedule, and role. By shaping the workplace around
flexibility, companies that adopt the MCC model work from the assumption that extended
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absences are likely and, as a result, are better able to respond to those situations when they
occur.

k “Return to work” programs assist employees re-entering their job after a prolonged absence

from work.12 They usually take a broad view, considering legal obligations, the individual job
design, and the design of the overall insurance package to help get an employee back on the
job.

Of course, none of these policies offers perfect solutions to the challenges associated with time
off. The potential impact of each is limited and new ideas and thinking will certainly be needed if
employers are going to deal effectively with the realities of the modern workplace. However, they
serve as evidence that employers are searching for ways to handle these problems.
Ultimately, we believe any technique that enhances flexibility for business operations and accepts
the reality that extended time off is a part of modern working life will reduce the burdens experienced
by companies. And, as we discuss below, we think government can play a role in promoting,
disseminating, and furthering the development and adaptation of these kinds of policies to ease the
transition to FSI. However, we understand that government assistance will never be the only — or
even the best — answer to the challenges that FSI may create. Instead, it will require a combination
of public policy supports and creative management strategies.

2. Policy Recommendations
Public policy can make implementation of FSI easier on employers. We have tried to tailor our
proposal with that goal in mind.

		

a. Supporting Continuity of Operations

FSI is designed to provide some predictability regarding the length of leave and timing of
return. Minimum and maximum durations of leave, along with the requirement that health care
professionals provide estimated dates of return for temporary disability and caregiving claimants,
ensure that there will be some measure of certainty for employers. In addition, FSI is specifically
designed to discourage overutilization and has a number of checks and balances in place to
minimize the potential for fraud and abuse.
That being said, challenges associated with continuity of operations will remain for most employers.
We believe the government can play a role in easing those challenges by serving as a source of
training and technical assistance in promising management strategies — such as the ones described
above — both to further the spread of these ideas and cultivate new approaches.
For instance, using strategies similar to those laid out in Workplace Flexibility 2010’s Public Policy
Platform on Flexible Work Arrangements, the government could build on existing business models
and disseminate information on how best to plan for and manage when one or more employees are
out for an extended period of time. This could be done through various media including websites,
printed materials, webinars, conferences, and on-site trainings. The government could also provide
direct technical assistance support, available via 1-800 numbers, e-mail, and social media sites. It
could also be done through a grant program to incentivize non-governmental entities to develop
model policies, provide training and technical assistance in those areas to further the spread of
these ideas, eliminate piecemeal approaches when possible, and cultivate new approaches.
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In fact, a program focusing on the options mentioned above would easily fit into current efforts to
start a national dialogue on workplace flexibility and build from programs already in place.13
A number of countries with existing paid time-off programs already provide similar types of training
and assistance. Unlike the technical assistance programs currently in place for the paid family leave
insurance laws in California and New Jersey, these international programs are designed specifically
to help employers cope with the impacts of paid time off as opposed to helping them comply with the
legal requirements imposed by the law. The Government of New Zealand, for example, maintains
a comprehensive guide on work-life balance policies for employers.14 The guide includes a brief
introduction to the concept of workplace flexibility, suggestions for making the individual components
of flexibility (including maternity and paternity leave) work, and lessons learned from employers who
have implemented flexibility programs.15 The guide also places a heavy emphasis on knowing what
to expect when an employee is out for extended periods and the need to plan in advance for these
kinds of absences. Similarly, both the Government of the United Kingdom’s “Business Link” website
and Singapore’s private Employer Alliance provide practical guidance to employers regarding tools
for managing employee absences.16

Technical Assistance Websites

Technical assistance websites are an important, cost-effective way to get valuable
information to employers about the implementation of paid family-leave policies.
Several countries have helpful websites for employers to understand and better
effectuate such policies.

k New Zealand’s Department of Labor has a website detailing ways to

k Singapore’s Employer Alliance has a website explaining the different types of

leave benefits an organization can offer and testimonials on how they can work.
http://www.employeralliance.sg/toolkit/index.html

k The United Kingdom’s Business Link has a website with sections on managing

maternity, paternity, adoption, and parental leave. http://www.businesslink.gov.
uk/bdotg/action/layer?topicId=1073858787&r.s=tl&tc=000SYDG00101

k Australia Fair Work Ombudsman’s websites detail how employers can comply

with Australia’s parental, personal, carer’s, and compassionate leave laws.
http://www.fairwork.gov.au/leave/personal-carers-and-compassionate-leave/
pages/default.aspx

k http://www.fairwork.gov.au/leave/parental-leave/pages/default.aspx

Service Canada has a website on how to manage compassionate care leave.
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/ei/types/compassionate_care.shtml
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b. Easing Administrative Burdens

FSI strives to impose minimal administrative burdens on employers. Claim evaluation, monitoring,
and payment would all be handled by the agency charged with administration of FSI. The only direct
administrative requirements placed on employers would be limited to those related to withholding
the FSI payroll tax, tracking hours worked by employees, and responding to requests for information.
While these administrative duties are not insubstantial, we feel they represent the lightest burden we
could impose under a comprehensive program like FSI.
Employer experience with the California paid family-leave insurance program reinforces the fact that
employer administrative burdens associated with family leave insurance schemes can be relatively
light. While there may be room for debate regarding the overall impact of the law on businesses,17
one thing that is clear is the administrative requirements associated with PFL have been minimal.
The EDD produces applications, reviews claims and certification forms, processes benefits, and even
provides employees with the appropriate tax forms.18 Employers are only required to post a notice
in their workplaces and provide a brochure created by the EDD to new employees and those taking
qualified leave.19 New Jersey’s program has not operated long enough to make similar claims about
administrative ease, but, with a few exceptions relating to the role employers are expected to play in
verifying wages and employment, we believe it will also prove to be less onerous than anticipated.20
As noted above, we have tried to follow California’s lead and minimize the administrative burdens
imposed upon employers by FSI wherever possible. To assist employers with any administrative
burdens that may remain, we would recommend a vigorous employer outreach and education
program. Lessons could be drawn from the efforts undertaken by New Jersey and California. Both
states have developed fairly comprehensive employer guides to the programs, and California even
offers regular webinars and in-person trainings.21 These programs help employers to understand
their administrative obligations and can serve as tools for spreading best practices.

m

“make flexibility work” for employers, including how to manage parental leave.
http://www.dol.govt.nz/worklife/resources/making-it-work.asp#3

		

FSI implementation will have impacts on business operations, and it is important they be analyzed
and taken seriously. The transition may not always be easy. We believe the above discussion serves
as a starting point — both regarding the challenges businesses may face and the role public policy
can play in helping to address those challenges. But it is only a starting point. As policy discussions
around FSI continue, we believe these issues merit further attention and exploration.

B. For Employees: Job Protection
The primary purpose of this Policy Platform is to provide a blueprint for a national wage replacement
program for time off from work for medical or caregiving reasons. Job protection — the right to one’s
former job (or an equivalent job) upon return from a period of time off — is, in a theoretical sense,
separate and apart from the issue of wage replacement. In reality, however, it is difficult to speak
about either issue separately.
Without wage replacement, individuals entitled to job-protected time off may be unable or reluctant
to take the time off because they cannot afford to do so. Indeed, two leading studies on the FMLA
show that of individuals who needed to take leave but did not, the number one reason was that
they could not afford the loss of wages.22 Conversely, the absence of job protection may prevent
individuals with access to wage replacement from taking time off from work. Workers understandably
will be disinclined to leave their job for an extended period if there is a chance that the position will
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not be there when they are ready to return.
Of course, this is only true for some workers. If a worker has a temporary disability, he or she will
have to take the time off regardless of job protection. And for many workers, it will make good
business sense for the employer to keep the job open until the worker can return — in order to keep
a good employee, avoid turnover costs, and assist in overall recruitment and retention. However,
some employers may decline to provide job protection based on their belief that it does not make
good business sense for them to do so. And there are other workers who, in better economic times,
might have taken time off, but who now are scared to do so out of fear of being viewed as “lazy,” or
“not committed to the job.”23 For these latter categories of workers, job protection is essential.

1. The Current Landscape
The principal federal source of job protection for people who take time off from work for medical or
caregiving reasons is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).24 The FMLA provides up to 12 weeks
of job-protected time off per year for one’s own health condition, to care for a new child, or to care for
a seriously ill family member.25 However, the statute only applies to persons who work for employers
with 50 or more employees, and only those who have worked 1,250 hours in the past year.26 About
40 percent of workers are employed by institutions that do not meet the FMLA employer threshold,
and, among the approximately 60 percent who do work for covered employers, another 20 percent
are excluded from FMLA coverage by the hours requirement.27 Some state family and medical leave
laws are broader in coverage and scope, providing job-protected time off to employees who work
for smaller employers or who work part time.28 Nevertheless, this still leaves approximately half
of private sector workers without job protection if they need to take time off for medical or family
caregiving reasons.29

FMLA Coverage: Who’s Left Out?
all workers

42%

low-wage workers*

56%

From its inception, PFL has experienced lower than expected take-up rates. A 2002 study by
economists at the University of Chicago and the University of California at Berkeley estimated that
the total number of leaves taken under the program would range between 300,000 and 600,000
per year.32 A 2000 study by the state EDD, which assumed the program would only be available to
employees covered by the FMLA or the state equivalent to the FMLA, the California Family Rights Act
(CFRA),33 — a universe much smaller than that actually covered by PFL — estimated at least 211,000
people would use the program annually.34 Actual program usage, however, has ranged from a low of
139,593 in 2004-05 to a high of 187,889 in 2008-2009.35
There are several major studies underway that seek to understand why the take-up rates are low, but
one strong working hypothesis is that a lack of job protection prevents many workers from using the
program.36
A 2007 study by the California Senate Research Office, for instance, found that more than half of
early PFL claims came from employees working for large employers (with 1,000 or more employees).
That percentage was surprising since employees working for employers with 1,000-plus employees
only constituted 14 percent of the overall California workforce.37 The study also found a similar,
but less pronounced, pattern in employees working for firms with 250 to 499 and 500 to 999
employees.38 Since most employees working for larger employers are protected by the FMLA and the
CFRA, whereas employees working for smaller employers are not,39 one explanation for this disparity
is the fact that individuals working for small employers do not have job protection.
The 2007 study also found that only two-thirds of mothers receiving state short term disability
benefits (SDI) for pregnancy opted to continue on to the state PFL program.40 One reasonable
explanation for this disparity is that the employees could no longer afford to live on the reduced
wages offered by SDI and PFL. Another explanation, however, is the loss of job protection forced
these employees to return to the workforce. Most women receiving SDI payments for pregnancy are
entitled to job protection under the California Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL).41 However,
PDLL protections do not apply to persons taking PFL leave to bond with their newborn children.42
Unless a worker is covered under the FMLA or CFRA, PFL bonding leave is taken at the risk of losing
employment.

2. Policy Recommendations
employed by establishments
not covered by FMLA

*family incomes below 200% of federal poverty level
Source: Ross Philips, “Working for All Families?” In The Economics of
Work and Family (2002), pp. 164; 170

Low-wage workers are particularly vulnerable.30 Fifty-six percent of workers with a family income of up
to twice the poverty line (as compared to 42 percent of higher wage workers) work for employers with
fewer than 50 employees (i.e., for employers not covered by the FMLA).31
Preliminary data from the California Paid Family Leave (PFL) program suggests a connection between
wage replacement and job protection. As discussed above, California PFL was the first family-leave
program established in the nation. PFL became law in September of 2002, and the California
Employment Development Department (EDD) started dispensing benefits to eligible recipients in July
of 2004.
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While the dynamic between the lack of job protection and the utilization rate for California family
leave is still being studied, we believe there is a strong likelihood that employees who need time off
may not elect to take it — even if it is paid — if it is not connected to some form of job protection.43
Empirics aside, our intuition boils down to common sense: Why take the benefit of a limited-time
insurance subsidy at the risk of losing your job (i.e., primary income)? As a result, we believe in order
to achieve the goals of FSI, all persons eligible for this program should be given some form of job
protection.
On the other hand, as discussed above, we are mindful of the very real challenges that employers
— especially small employers — face when an employee is out of work for a week or more. The
question is how we can reconcile these competing interests and provide meaningful protection.
We believe the simplest and most effective means for creating job protection for people who take
time off under FSI is to amend the FMLA so it covers more individuals.
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As a result, we recommend that the FMLA’s job protection requirement be extended to cover
all employers with at least 15 employees. It should be noted, however, that in recommending
expansion of the FMLA, we are not recommending that the FMLA conform to FSI standards. For
instance, even if the FMLA employer coverage threshold was expanded, an employee would still
have to work for a single-covered employer for 12 months and have 1,250 hours of service before
becoming eligible for FMLA job protected leave.
This expansion of the FMLA employer threshold would mean 85 percent of private sector employees
would work in covered establishments.44 This would track the majority of employment discrimination
laws, which prohibit discrimination by all employers with 15 or more employees.45 This would also
track a number of state family- and medical-leave laws that cover employers with fewer than 50
employees.46 Compliance with these state laws demonstrates that lowering the employer threshold
is not unprecedented, and that smaller employers can comply with job protection requirements
similar to the FMLA’s.
That said, the FMLA, in its entirety, currently covers medium and large employers, and smaller
employers might have unique difficulties complying with the law as currently drafted. Thus, if the
employer threshold is expanded, we recommend further discussion and exploration regarding
whether the FMLA’s substantive requirements should be modified to address the concerns of small
businesses.
Such analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this report. For purposes of this report, we wanted to
make the strong recommendation that the FMLA employer threshold be lowered in order to provide
job protection for more individuals who take time off and receive wage replacement under the FSI
program.
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Chapter

Part

III
Where Do We Go From Here?

7

Recommendations for Further Research
The recommendations in this report are based on an exhaustive study of decades’ worth of
research on the problems surrounding paid time off for temporary disabilities, parental care and
other caregiving needs. After conducting this review, we have identified a number of gaps in the
research that, if filled, might result in additional recommendations or modifications to our existing
recommendations. Below we outline some of these research gaps.

A. Increments of Time Off
We recommend that benefits be available for a minimum of one business week (five days) per
episode of time off. As a result, individuals who have a serious health condition (or who care for an
individual with a serious health condition) that requires short periods of time off would not be able
to receive wage replacement benefits under this proposal. Nor would an individual who chooses to
phase back into work on a reduced-hours schedule after being out for several weeks.
We believe the need for wage replacement in these situations is quite significant, and we struggled
with how to incorporate them into FSI. Ultimately, we believe more research would help address
concerns regarding: a) whether our one-week increments might cause moral hazard by either
encouraging leave takers to take an entire week off when they only need one or two days of leave,
or providing a disincentive to transition back into work on a reduced hours or part-time schedule;
b) how wage replacement for shorter periods of time off fits with a program whose primary purpose
is wage replacement for longer periods of time off from work, c) how employers currently manage
short periods of intermittent leave, both under the FMLA and as a general practice, recognizing that
intermittent leave as allowed under the FMLA has caused concerns and management challenges for
some employers,1 and d) whether it is administratively feasible to distribute benefits for short periods
of time off through a national social insurance program.
We note that most developed OECD countries account for short-term time-off needs for disability and
caregiving through mandates requiring employers to provide sick and vacation days.2 By contrast,
maternity, paternity, and parental leave benefits are generally offered through a governmentadministered social insurance program.3 Although some countries provide benefits for very short
increments of time off or for reduced schedules, many others only provide benefits for recipients
who are fully out of the workforce and taking time off in one long increment, e.g., three months or six
months.4
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We also note that New Jersey and California — the only two states with social insurance programs for
paid family leave — each have different rules with regard to wage replacement for short increments
of leave. California Paid Family Leave provides benefits for claimants who take any form of PFL in
hourly, daily, or weekly increments.5 New Jersey Family Leave Insurance, on the other hand, only
provides intermittent caregiving benefits in one-day increments.6 Intermittent parental care benefits
are not available under the New Jersey program unless an employer agrees to the intermittent leave
schedule.7 Even then, in order to receive intermittent parental care benefits, the claimant must take
time off in minimum increments of one week.8
There is very little research or data collection about how California and New Jersey’s rules on
intermittent leave are working in practice. We believe further research is needed regarding:

k the extent to which, and reasons why, individuals are currently seeking benefits under these
intermittent caregiving provisions;
k how the benefits are being administered, and whether administration of these short-term
benefits is creating any difficulties for the administering agency; and
k whether these provisions have created any undue burdens on employers.

We believe that similar research should be conducted in OECD countries that provide short-term
benefits for disability and/or caregiving. This research would allow policymakers to better evaluate
arguments regarding the best way to provide benefits for shorter periods of time off, including
arguments regarding administrative ease and burdens on employers.

B. Total and Annual Caregiving Benefit Durations
To ensure that the program is sustainable and to protect against overuse and potential fraud and
abuse, we recommend there be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum
amount an individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12 weeks of
caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year.
We recognize that the California and New Jersey paid family leave laws do not have a total benefit
duration for any of the benefits offered under the programs. However, these laws only provide up to 6
weeks of benefits per year, and the six weeks include benefits taken for both caregiving and parental
care purposes. Under FSI, in addition to 26 weeks of caregiving benefits, individuals are entitled to
12 weeks PCNC benefits per child. Moreover, the wage replacement rates — 55 percent of a worker’s
average weekly wage, up to a maximum of $959 per week in California, and 66 percent of a worker’s
average weekly wage, up to a maximum of $543 per week in New Jersey — are significantly lower
than those proposed for FSI Caregiving benefits (80 percent of a worker’s average weekly wage, up
to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage, which translates to $1,254 per
week). Finally, California and New Jersey paid family leave laws have restrictive definitions of family
that naturally limit the number of individuals who qualify for benefits. FSI contains a much broader
definition of family.
We believe additional research is needed regarding how the caregiving components of California and
New Jersey’s paid family leave programs are working in practice. Issues that should be addressed
include:

k The purposes for which care is being provided;
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k The relationship between care providers and care recipients, including how many applicants
are rejected for benefits because they do not meet the definition of “family”;
k The average number of caregiving claims per individual;
k The mechanisms in place for detecting fraud and abuse; and
k The amount of fraud and abuse that has been detected.

In addition, we believe more research is needed regarding whether the FSI 26-week maximum
total benefit duration is the appropriate duration, and whether there are alternate ways to mitigate
concerns about overuse, program sustainability, and fraud and abuse.
Finally, we believe there should be additional research regarding whether the maximum benefit
duration for caregivers of servicemembers should be extended, so as to more closely track the FMLA,
which provides up to 26 weeks of unpaid leave for servicemember care.

C. Interaction between Job Protection and Program Utilization
We recommend the FMLA be extended to cover all employers with 15 or more employees. While this
would provide job protection to a number of employees not currently protected by the FMLA, it still
leaves a number of individuals without protection, including those who have not met the FMLA’s year
in service and hours requirement, those who need to care for a family member not covered by the
FMLA, and those who work for very small businesses.
We are concerned this may result in a situation where workers will be required to make contributions
to a social insurance program for time-off benefits that they are unable to effectively access because
they fear losing their jobs.
We note, however, that workers without job protection in California and New Jersey are still required
to make contributions to those paid family leave programs. We believe further research is needed
regarding the dynamic between the lack of job protection and the utilization rate for California and
New Jersey paid family leave in order to determine whether there should be additional extensions
of the FMLA, opt-out provisions for workers who lack job protection, or other modifications to our
proposal.9

D. Data Collection
As evidenced by the above sections, we believe there needs to be more research done on the
implementation of California and New Jersey’s paid family leave insurance laws. In particular, there
needs to be more quantitative research regarding program usage, and more qualitative research
regarding the impact of the laws’ provisions on employees, employers, and the administering
agencies.
In addition, we believe there needs to be new research on FMLA implementation. The last national
study was conducted in 2000, and there are many concerns regarding the study’s scope and the
lack of subsequent studies.10 The Secretary of Labor has announced that DOL is planning to conduct
a new nationwide study in 2011, which we believe will help ensure the design of a national social
insurance system rests on the most current and accurate data regarding how the FMLA is working in
practice.11
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E. Cost/Benefit Analyses
It is difficult to quantify the costs and benefits of a federal social insurance program for temporary
disability, parental care, and caregiving. What might be a benefit for employees might be a cost for
employers, and vice versa. On top of that, there are costs and benefits to society as a whole. While
some cost-benefit analyses were conducted prior to the enactment of California’s paid family leave
law, we are not aware of any post-enactment studies of California or New Jersey’s PFL programs.12
We also are not aware of cost-benefit analyses of the existing five-state TDI programs. We believe
there needs to be sophisticated cost/benefit analyses of these programs, and similar programs in
the OECD countries, at both the firm level and the macroeconomic level. There have been many
important contributions to the field, particularly related to maternity and parental leave,13 but
research is not as comprehensive as similar work in the health care and retirement security contexts.
We believe there needs to be further analysis of the California and New Jersey PFL programs, and the
state TDI programs, in an effort to address a number of critical issues around cost. We believe the
answers to questions such as the following will help guide a more sophisticated analysis of the costs
and benefits of FSI, as well as any other similar social insurance program:

k Has implementation of the California and New Jersey PFL laws placed significant burdens on

Given this complexity, we do not make any recommendations in this document regarding
preemption. Instead, we recommend that additional research be conducted on these issues.

G. Better Understanding of the Costs of Different Design Elements
We specifically chose not to cost out the FSI program at this time, since we wanted to focus solely
on the substantive policy issues and spark debate. That said, it would be helpful to know the costs
of different program design elements, and how changing them would raise or lower the costs of the
program. For example, how does the cost of the program change if the wage-replacement rate is
set at 60 percent or 70 percent of a worker’s average weekly wage, or if the benefits are not taxed?
What if PCNC benefits are only available for 6 weeks, or if TDI benefits are only available for 20
weeks? What actuarial data are available to estimate how many individuals will claim caregiving
benefits? Such information will be tremendously helpful in ultimately designing a budget-neutral,
self-funding, sustainable program.

m

employers, and if so, in what ways?

Another option would be that FSI preempt—or supplant—the state programs, since FSI would address
the same needs and, as currently proposed, would provide greater wage replacements benefits.
However, this would undercut current state systems that are up and running and would limit states’
ability to improve on the federal system.

k How much have employers saved as a result of not having to bear the full cost of maternity
leave, paternity leave, and short-term disability benefits?

k Is FMLA utilization for time off to care for one’s own serious health condition any greater in
TDI states than in non-TDI states?

k How can one quantify the benefits to employees, and society as a whole?
k What are the costs of not providing wage replacement for temporary disability, parental care

In sum, as the debate continues regarding how best to provide paid time off for temporary disability,
parental care, and caregiving, we hope there will be additional research to inform the debate. The
above discussion lays out some of the primary issues we believe merit further exploration.

for a new child, and caregiving for a family member?

In addition, we believe there needs to be more research into the relationship between TDI and
SSDI. A very basic look at rates of SSDI usage in states with public TDI programs compared to those
without shows that TDI states tend to have fewer SSDI claimants per capita than non-TDI states.14
This deviation could, of course, be explained by any number of factors other than TDI—including
unemployment rates, average income, climate, the “health culture” of the state, etc. However, given
the costs to society associated with SSDI claims — the estimated lifetime savings of just 1 percent of
SSI/SSDI recipients returning to work is $3 billion15 — we think the link is worth exploring in greater
detail.

F. Preemption
The FSI program builds on existing social insurance programs at the state level — namely, the five
state (and one territory) TDI programs, and the two state paid family leave programs. This naturally
raises questions about how FSI would interact with these state programs, as well as any state social
insurance program enacted in the next few years.
One option would be to frame FSI as a “floor” and have the federal government certify whether state
programs provide similar, or better, wage replacement benefits than FSI. If so, then states could
apply for a waiver from FSI, and state residents would no longer have to contribute to the FSI system.
Of course, determining whether a state program is as good as or better than FSI would be quite
challenging. In addition, employers might argue against having to deal with a system that varies from
state to state, making their leave programs more difficult to administer.
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When Workplace Flexibility 2010 and the Berkeley Center on Health, Economic & Family Security
began our collaboration in 2009, we set out to answer some critical questions:

k How do we create national policy solutions that explicitly account for the facts on the ground?
Given the realities of what families look like today — dual-earner families, single heads of
households, and an aging population — people of all ages and across incomes will need
financial security when they take time off from their jobs to care for themselves, their aging
parents and their kids. What can the government do to support these families’ needs?

k How do we create policy solutions that reflect the modern reality where having a health

condition or disability is no longer a barrier to working? And how do we confront the fact that
society generally expects people to work regardless of health status? Right now our federal
policy forces a choice between being considered permanently disabled or not at all. How do
we shift the system so it reflects the continuum of ability created by modern medicine and
equal opportunity?

This report provides a blueprint for a program that would fundamentally reform our social policy to
address workers’ critical needs — and at the same time, spread the cost fairly, protect the deficit, and
keep people working.
We view this report as the beginning of what we hope is a much longer conversation that engages
a wide range of stakeholders from both the private and public sectors. Critical decisions are being
made about the deficit in the current economic climate, making it especially important to factor this
type of social insurance policy into overall discussions about how we make our economy globally
competitive, while increasing financial security for American families. This report paves a path to
progress on both counts.

k As we develop these policies, how do we account for the needs of employers in a competitive

global economy, taking into account that employers need to get their work done, regardless
of what is happening in their employees’ lives? And how do we build a system that works well
and does not add to the national debt?

Heather Boushey, It’s Time for Policies to Match Family Needs: New Polling Data Shows Widespread Support for an Agenda to Address WorkFamily Conflict (Center for American Progress 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/pdf/work_survey.pdf.
2
Id.
1

A year and a half later, after a great deal of research, writing, discussion, and debate, we arrived at
Family Security Insurance (FSI). As we articulate clearly in this report, FSI would fill a critical gap in
our national social insurance system.
We recognize that this proposal requires some tough choices about priorities and demands a
commitment from many stakeholders inside and outside government to make it a reality. But we
are convinced that a comprehensive national social insurance program is the best way to meet the
growing health and caregiving needs of American workers.
Seventy-seven percent of Americans believe that businesses should be required to provide paid
family and medical leave to every worker who needs it.1 An even stronger majority — 85 percent
— believes that businesses are at risk of losing good workers if they fail to adapt to modern family
needs.2 These statistics are not in spite of the current economy — they are because of it. American
workers are struggling, the private sector hasn’t adequately responded, and there has been a lack of
comprehensive national policy on these issues since the FMLA was passed in 1993.

“Staying home to care for a sick child or taking an
elderly parent to a doctor’s appointment shouldn’t
mean risking one’s job . …Things like paid family leave
and sick days and affordable child care should be the
norm, not the exception.”
Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady during visit to the Department of
Labor, January 14, 2010
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Appendix A

Current Social Insurance Programs in the United States
The United States has a robust social insurance network at the state and federal level. This appendix
provides a brief overview of the major state and federal social insurance programs with a special
emphasis on eligibility standards, benefits, and administration.

I. Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a federal-state program created by the original Social Security Act
of 1935. The system’s primary mission is to provide wage replacement to workers who become
unemployed through no fault of their own.1
Each state operates its own UI program. While the establishment of a state UI program is technically
voluntary, the tax and incentive structure established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
and the Social Security Act (SSA) effectively mandates the creation of one. 2 Currently, all 50 states
and the District of Columbia operate within the federal system.3

Appendices

A. Eligibility
Individuals qualify for UI benefits if they work for a covered employer and meet state eligibility
requirements at the time of unemployment. Covered employers include those that paid out at
least $1,500 in wages in the current or previous calendar year or employed one or more persons
at least one day a week for 20 weeks in the current or previous calendar year.4 Agriculture and
domestic services industries have special coverage thresholds,5 though each state may set its own
rules.6 About half of the states use a definition of “employer” that is even broader than the federal
minimum.7
Working for a covered employer that pays UI tax does not guarantee that an individual is covered
under the state UI program. An applicant can perform services for a covered employer but still be
deemed ineligible for UI coverage if she is found to be a non-covered “independent contractor”8 or if
she fails to meet additional monetary and non-monetary requirements.
Applicants must have earned wages beyond a threshold amount in a specified period to demonstrate
sufficient workforce attachment. Federal guidelines ensure the threshold wage in each state is
similar, though states use different formulae to implement these guidelines.9
In addition to meeting the monetary requirement, an applicant must 1) have been involuntarily
separated from the job without fault, 2) be available and willing to accept suitable work, and 3) be
currently looking for work.10 Some states have “good cause” exceptions that relax the involuntary
separation requirement in certain situations. These can include sexual harassment and “compelling
family reasons” such as domestic violence, a relocating spouse, or the illness or disability of an
immediate family member.11 New federal funding incentives created under the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 have prompted many states to enact good cause exceptions: 31
states now have domestic violence exceptions (up from 20), 22 states have spousal relocation
exceptions (up from 10), and 20 states have worker illness and disability exceptions (up from nine).12
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B. Benefits
Under the UI system, states set the benefit levels. Each state has a system for determining a
recipient’s “weekly benefit amount” (WBA), though these calculations are subject to a state statutory
minimums and maximums. As of July 2009, the lowest and highest WBA maximums were enforced
by Mississippi ($235) and Massachusetts ($628).13 The maximum duration of benefits in most states
is 26 weeks.14
Thirty-seven states have a non-payable waiting period before benefits can be collected.15 While nearly
all states stop paying regular UI benefits after 26 weeks, the federal-state Extended Benefits (EB)
program provides for emergency extensions of benefits in states that have high unemployment.16
Typically EB costs are shared by federal and state governments, however, the ARRA extended the
length of benefits and provided 100 percent federal funding for the program.17 Under the most recent
extension, federally-funded EB benefits are available through November 30, 2010.18
C. Administration
		

1. Funding and State Agencies

The state UI programs are funded by a combination of state and federal employer payroll taxes. The
proceeds from the federal tax are allocated to each state to cover their administrative costs.19 State
payroll taxes, paid almost exclusively by employers, are used to fund program benefits.20 Unlike
the uniform federal tax, the rates and terms of the state taxes vary significantly.21 All states use an
“experience rating,” which creates a variable employer tax based on employment stability factors.22
For example, an employer that has historically laid off few employees will have a more favorable rate
than an employer with frequent layoffs.
While federal law sets numerous guidelines, the states have some latitude in how they administer
the programs.23 Each state maintains its own unique UI organization, usually within an executive
agency devoted to labor and employment issues. Due to the large inflow and outflow of money, these
organizations are often among the state’s largest agencies.
		

2. Benefit Application and Determination

UI applicants apply for unemployment in the state where they were employed, even if it is not
their state of residence.24 The application collects basic contact, citizenship, and employment
information.25 States may also ask for wage information, though this can be more reliably obtained
from the employer or from another state agency. The state agency reviews applications, contacts the
applicant’s last employer to request or verify wage and employment information, and makes an initial
eligibility determination.26
Each state has appeals procedures as required under the Social Security Act.27 Almost all states
have two levels of administrative appeals.28 The first level is usually the appellant’s only hearing
of right and is often conducted in person.29 In the second level of administrative appeals, review is
generally limited to the record and additional hearings are seldom held. Further appeals may be
made to the courts, though the level of initial jurisdiction varies.30 Both employee and employer may
appeal a benefits decision. The courts require that UI benefits continue during an appeal by the
employer.31
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All states require that UI recipients answer weekly or bi-weekly questionnaires to certify ongoing
eligibility and need for benefits.32 The recipient may also be required to provide information on the
progress of her search for new work.33
		

3. Benefit Payment and Termination

The Department of Labor tracks several measures of speed and efficiency of the state UI programs.
The DOL sets a goal that each state should pay 87 percent of first-time benefit recipients within 21
days.34
Recipients’ benefits are terminated automatically if they exhaust the statutory duration limits for UI
benefits. If a UI recipient regains full-time employment, some states simply ask that the recipient
cease to fill out the weekly certifications.35 In all states, the recipient’s weekly certification responses
may trigger termination. In many states, regaining partial employment does not disqualify someone
from receiving some benefits, assuming he or she continues to seek full-time or additional part-time
work.36

II. Temporary Disability Insurance
Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) is a state program or mandate providing for wage replacement
when an employee is unable to work due to a non-work-related temporary illness or injury. Currently,
five states and Puerto Rico provide TDI coverage.37 This section discusses the TDI systems currently
in place in California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.
All five state programs have been in place for decades. The oldest program, Rhode Island’s, was
enacted in 1942, and the youngest program, Hawaii’s, began in 1969. The lack of uniform federal
guidelines on benefits and administration has led to a wide range of approaches to providing TDI
coverage among the different states. Rhode Island relies solely on a state-run social insurance
system.38 New Jersey and California operate a hybrid system in which a public TDI plan operates
alongside approved voluntary plans purchased by employers that either meet or exceed the state’s
TDI requirements.39 Hawaii and New York use modified versions of a private mandate. These states
require that employers self-insure or purchase temporary disability insurance from private companies
or, in New York, from the state itself.40
A. Eligibility
Employees qualify for benefits if they work for a covered employer and meet defined employee
coverage requirements. While standards vary from state to state, most employers are covered.41
Applicants must demonstrate that they meet certain earnings and employment thresholds in addition
to being unable to work. These thresholds vary greatly. New York requires only that applicants
have worked four consecutive weeks (or 25 days for regular but non-daily employees).42 California
and Rhode Island use only earnings thresholds, though the threshold is calculated differently in
each state.43 New Jersey and Hawaii use both earnings and employment thresholds. As of 2010,
New Jersey requires applicants to have earned at least $145 a week for 20 weeks (translating into
20 hours a week for a minimum-wage worker) or $7,300 total in the base year.44 Hawaii requires
applicants to have worked for 20 hours a week for 14 weeks and earned at least $400 in the
previous year.45
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B. Benefits
Eligible applicants are entitled to a weekly benefit based on their past income, usually up to a
specified cap. The benefit duration in Hawaii, New Jersey, and New York is 26 weeks;46 Rhode Island
and California are more generous, offering 30 and 52 weeks respectively.47 As of 2010, the weekly
wage replacement rate, maximum benefit amount, and duration of these benefits range as follows:

k California: 55 percent wage replacement from $50/week minimum up to $987/week (150
k
k
k
k

percent of the state average weekly wage), for up to 52 weeks.48
Hawaii: 58 percent wage replacement up to $510/week (80.7 percent of the state average
weekly wage), for up to 26 weeks.49
New Jersey: 2/3 wage replacement up to $561/week (53 percent of the state average weekly
wage), for up to 26 weeks or until 1/3 total base period wages has been paid.50
New York: 50 percent wage replacement up to a $170/week statutory maximum, for up to 26
weeks.51
Rhode Island: 4.62 percent of total highest base period quarter wages, from $69/week
minimum up to $700/week (85 percent of the state average weekly wage), for up to 30
weeks or until 36 percent of total base period wages has been paid.52

All five states require a seven-day waiting period before an applicant can claim benefits.53 New Jersey
and Rhode Island plans will pay wage replacement for the waiting period retroactively if the disability
lasts long enough (21 days in New Jersey and 28 days in Rhode Island);54 Hawaii, New York, and
California plans do not reimburse applicants for lost wages during the waiting week.55
C. Administration
		

1. Funding and State Agencies

Most state TDI systems are financed by employee and employer contributions. New Jersey and
Hawaii require employers and employees to contribute a percentage of program costs.56 New York’s
low employee contribution cap (60 cents per week) forces employers to share program costs as
well.57 California and Rhode Island fund their TDI programs solely through employee payroll taxes.58
Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey have built their TDI system on their Unemployment
Insurance (UI) systems. In each state, the two programs share many of the same benefit appeal
resources.59
New York’s program is overseen by its Workers’ Compensation Board, but the Board does not
administer any plans. A self-sufficient quasi-public entity, the New York State Insurance Fund (NYSIF),
is the state’s largest competitive carrier.60 NYSIF was created to provide employers with workers’
compensation protection at the lowest possible cost. After New York passed its TDI law, the Fund
began offering temporary disability insurance as well.61
Hawaii’s TDI plans are purely private; an employer can provide coverage through a collective
bargaining agreement, an insurance provider, or its own insurance plan.62 All plans must meet a
baseline of coverage and be approved by either the Commissioner of Insurance or the Director of the
Department of Labor and Industry.63
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2. Benefit Application and Determination

All state plans and the private plans in Hawaii and New York use a state application form. The form
includes personal information completed by the applicant and a medical certification completed by
a licensed medical provider.64 New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii (the states where employers may
have private coverage) also require an employer statement.65 Some states reduce or refuse benefits
for claims filed too long after the date of disability.66
The estimated date of return to work on the medical certification forms the basis of the disability
claim.67 The TDI agencies in Rhode Island and California may challenge claims where the benefit
duration exceeds the state’s published medical guidelines on disability durations.68 In all states,
the state agency and (in states using private plans) the employer or insurance carrier may require
independent medical evaluations of the claim as often as weekly.69
Each state provides for an appeals process for denied claims. Rhode Island provides for an appeal
to an Appeal Tribunal appointed by the Board of Review and a second appeal by right to the Board
of Review itself.70 California provides for a re-review of any appealed claim, followed by appeal to an
ALJ in the Office of Appeals and then to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.71
Although New York does not have a state TDI plan, the state Worker’s Compensation Board provides
for appeals before an ALJ, followed by a discretionary appeal to a panel of three Board members.72
New Jersey maintains parallel appeals processes for its state and private plans. Appeals under
the state plan are heard by an Appeals Examiner;73 claimants may thereafter request review by the
Board of Review.74 Appeals of denials under private plans are heard by a Private Plan Officer, with
no further administrative appeal.75 Hawaii provides for agency review of private plan denials. The
state may of its own accord review any claim denial and request reconsideration where it believes
the denial is erroneous.76 The employee may also request the state agency to conduct a review when
her claim is denied as well as when her claim is accepted but the benefits are unsatisfactory.77 In
all states, denials may be appealed to the state courts when administrative remedies have been
exhausted.78
		

3. Benefit Payment and Termination

The time from filing a claim to receiving the first benefit check varies across the states; California and
New Jersey send out most initial checks within two to three weeks,79 while Rhode Island claimants
receive their first payment within three to four weeks.80 New York requires the insurer to pay the
claimant within the first 18 days of disability or within four days of the claim filing date, whichever is
later.81
Under all state plans, benefits automatically terminate once the claimant’s disability certification
expires, unless the claimant files new paperwork to show ongoing medical need.82 Claimants must
inform the state insurer if they return to work before estimated.83 The states maintain various
mechanisms designed to deter and detect fraud and duplication of benefits.84

III. Paid Family Leave
Paid family leave (PFL) provides wage replacement for workers who take time off work to care for a
loved one (including parental care for a new child and caregiving for ill or injured family members).
Only two states offer PFL programs: California’s Paid Family Leave (PFL) program enacted in 2002,85
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and New Jersey’s Family Leave Insurance (FLI) program enacted in 2008.86 (Washington State
passed a PFL law in 2007, but it has never been funded and will remain nonoperational until at
least 2012.)87 Both states’ programs function alongside the states’ TDI system, sharing many of
the statutory requirements.88 To date, the majority of claims filed in both programs have been for
parental care for a new child.89 For example, from July 2009 to June 2010, parental care constituted
88 percent of claims filed California and 78 percent in New Jersey.90
A. Eligibility
The eligibility requirements for FLI/PFL are basically identical to those used in the state TDI programs
— except that instead of requiring the claimant to be suffering a temporary disability, the FLI/PFL
programs require that the claimant be caring for a new child or ill family member.91 In addition, in
California, an individual may be ineligible for PFL benefits if another family member is “ready, willing,
able and available” to perform the caregiving functions during the same period and time of day.92
B. Benefits
Under PFL, recipients can collect approximately 55 percent of their highest base-period earnings up
to 150 percent of the state average weekly wage for six weeks in a 12-month period. 93 In 2010, the
weekly benefit cap is $987.94 Eligible individuals under FLI can obtain two-thirds wage replacement
up to 53 percent of the state average weekly wage for six weeks in a 12-month period.95 In 2010, the
weekly benefit cap was $561.96 A seven-day waiting period applies in both programs.97 As with their
state’s TDI programs, neither PFL nor FLI provide job protection.
New Jersey requires that newborn bonding leave be taken in consecutive weeks, unless the employer
agrees to intermittent leave;98 the state permits intermittent leave for family caregiving where
medically necessary.99 California permits recipients of both family caregiving and newborn bonding
benefits to take intermittent leave.100
California permits recipients to take intermittent leave in hourly, daily, or weekly intervals.101 New
Jersey, on the other hand, only allows intermittent leave to be taken in 24-hour blocks for caregiving
and seven-day periods for bonding.102
C. Administration
		

1. Funding and Agencies

Both PFL and FLI are administered through their states’ disability systems (State Disability Insurance
(SDI) in California and Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) in New Jersey) and are funded through
employee payroll taxes.103
		

2. Benefit Application and Determination

Applications for FLI/PFL benefits are obtained from the state agency; where an individual is already
receiving TDI benefits for pregnancy, a FLI/PFL application will automatically be mailed to her after
the child is born.104 Both states’ applications require personal information about the caregiver and
care recipient, a medical certification (completed by a doctor) or bonding certification (completed
by the applicant), and a HIPAA authorization.105 New Jersey includes a section completed by the
employer.106
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New Jersey requires that applicants provide employers with 30 days “prior notice” for bonding leave
and “reasonable” notice for other caregiving leave.107 In both states, employers may force employees
to exhaust up to two weeks of sick leave benefits before applying for FLI; New Jersey counts these
two weeks against the benefit limit, while California does not.108 As with TDI, the medical certification
for family caregiving leave must be completed by a Licensed Medical Provider and must include a
diagnosis and an estimated date of recovery for the ill or injured relative. The states may require the
relative to submit to one or more independent evaluations.109
Both states’ appeals processes for denied claims are identical to those used in their TDI programs.110
		

3. Benefit Payment and Termination

FLI/PFL claims in both states are paid in the same way as TDI claims,111 except that in both states
FLI/PFL benefits are taxable.112 As with the states’ TDI programs, benefits for family caregiving
terminate when the claim certification expires, benefits are exhausted, or the care recipient returns
to work or otherwise becomes ineligible for benefits. California, unlike New Jersey, will provide
benefits to persons who return to work on a reduced schedule. For newborn care, benefits terminate
12 months after the child’s birth, even if the six weeks have not been exhausted.113

IV. Social Security: Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Federal old-age insurance benefits date to the Social Security Act of 1935. Four years later,
lawmakers added benefits for spouses and children of retirees and deceased workers.114 Old Age
Insurance provides benefits to retiring workers and their relatives; Survivors Insurance provides
benefits to the relatives of deceased workers, similar to a life insurance plan.
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to impaired workers before they
reach retirement, was added to the Social Security program in 1954. The SSA also administers
a parallel program known as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) that pays benefits to disabled
workers who have not worked enough to qualify for SSDI. Unlike the relatively straightforward criteria
for old age insurance, SSDI employs a lengthy and complex process to decide the merits of disability
claims. In 2007, just over two million people applied for disability benefits.115
A. Eligibility
		

1. Old Age Insurance

People qualify for old-age insurance when they reach age 62 and have worked a sufficient amount
of time during their careers.116 Many wait until they reach “full retirement age” — which will increase
from 65 to 67 over the next two decades — to apply in order to maximize benefits.117 Relatives of
retirees (including spouses,118 dependent children under 18,119 and certain divorced spouses,120
stepchildren, and grandchildren)121 are eligible for benefits at one-half the value of the retiree’s
benefits.
Forty quarters of coverage (QCs) or “credits” are required for “full insurance.”122 The SSA will generally
count a minimum amount of money earned in each year as worthy of a QC.123 For example, in 2009,
$1,090 earns 1 QC.124 No one can earn more than four quarterly credits in a given year.125 SSA tracks
this information for every worker who pays the Social Security payroll tax.
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2. Survivors Insurance

Social Security provides survivors insurance only to the family members of deceased workers who
have worked a sufficient amount during their lives. The minimum requirement depends on the age
of death, though no one needs to work longer than 10 years.126 Several different types of relatives
qualify to receive survivors insurance. Any widow or widower at full retirement age can garner full
benefits while those older than 60 but below full retirement can only obtain reduced checks right
away.127 A disabled widow or widower may qualify for full benefits as early as age 50.128 Similarly,
spouses who currently care for a deceased’s child (under age 16 or disabled), the unmarried
dependent children of the deceased under 18, and children who became disabled before they
turned 22 are also eligible for benefits immediately. 129 SSA will even pay out benefits to certain
stepchildren, grandchildren, or adopted children.130
		

3. Disability Insurance

To qualify for SSDI benefits a worker must be blind or have a disability that will result in death or
prevent them from performing most work for at least a year.131 The claimant must “prove” that she
meets these criteria to the DDS,132 but the agency has a duty to obtain, on its own, any relevant
medical reports and information from the preceding 12 months.133 The worker must also have earned
a certain number of work credits under the Old Age Insurance system.134
B. Benefits
		

1. Old Age Insurance

If the SSA confirms at some point that a person meets eligibility criteria, it will calculate her monthly
benefit using a complicated formula set forward in the Social Security Act.135 The average retired
beneficiary received $1,153 a month in 2009.136
Old Age benefits continue until a beneficiary dies or an individual’s yearly income exceeds the
set earning ceilings. The law applies an earnings test to the time between when a person begins
receiving old-age benefits and the time she reaches full retirement age,137 but no such limits exist
after that date. For the years leading up to the time an individual reaches full retirement age, the law
removes one dollar of benefits for every two dollars earned above $14,160 (the 2010 cap).138
		

2. Survivors Insurance

Survivors receive a proportion of the benefits the deceased would have received. Widows above
retirement age receive full benefits, widows over the age of 60 but below retirement age receive 7199 percent, widows of any age with children younger than 16 receive 75 percent, and children receive
75 percent.139 Dependent parents may also receive benefits.140 A family cannot collect more than
150-180 percent of the deceased’s benefit amount.141 Widows or widowers also qualify for a lump
sum death payment of $255.142
		

3. Disability Insurance

SSDI beneficiaries receive an amount of money equal to what they would receive in old age benefits
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if they had turned age 62 on the day they became disabled.143 They therefore receive slightly less
than those who wait until full retirement age to collect.144 A five-month waiting period applies before
benefits may be collected.145
C. Administration – Old Age and Survivors Insurance
		

1. Funding and Agencies

OASI benefits are administered by the Social Security Administration. Today Social Security is the
single largest program in the federal budget.146 In 2007 the Social Security Administration (SSA)
handled roughly $624 billion in transfer payments for over 50 million people while spending a mere
1% on administrative costs.147 About half of that sum goes toward managing Old Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI).148 Funding for SSA programs including OASI comes entirely from
payroll taxes levied on both employers and employees under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA).149
		

2. Benefit Application and Determination

Eligible citizens can apply for old-age benefits online, by phone, or in person once they have reached
61 years and 9 months in age.150 Eligible citizens must apply at least four months before they wish to
begin receiving payments.151 At the initial stage, claimants must provide their Social Security number
along with personal, citizenship, and tax information.152 Claimants also provide bank information for
direct deposit. Once a representative confirms eligibility, SSA will notify the claimant in writing.
A survivor can claim benefits by providing the deceased’s proof of death; Social Security numbers of
the applicant, the deceased, and any dependent children; birth certificates of the applicant and any
dependent children; marriage certificate (for a widow or widower); divorce papers if applicable; W-2 or
tax return for the deceased; and direct deposit information.153
A dissatisfied applicant has 60 days to request reconsideration in writing.154 If the original decision is
upheld, applicants may request a hearing before an ALJ.155 Applicants can appeal an unfavorable ALJ
ruling to Social Security’s Appeals Council, which may dismiss a claim outright, issue a decision, or
remand the claim for further proceedings in front of the ALJ.156 Upon receiving a dismissal or denial, a
claimant has 60 days to file suit in federal district court.157
		

3. Benefit Payment and Termination

Each month’s benefits are deposited on the following month. Though the law does not allow
individuals to collect retirement benefits for the month of their death, survivors can receive a
payment for this month.158 As benefits are subject to earnings ceilings, beneficiaries must report their
earnings so that benefits may be adjusted accordingly.159
D. Administration – Disability Insurance
		

1. Funding and Agencies

Under the Social Security Act, responsibility for making disability determinations falls to the states’
Disability Determination Services (DDS) agencies.160 The use of state agencies dates back to the
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beginnings of SSDI.161 The SSA pays the state agencies’ costs, which totaled over $1.8 billion in FY
2008.162 Funding for SSDI, as with OASI, comes entirely from payroll taxes levied under the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).163
		

2. Benefit Application and Payment

SSDI applicants must first complete an application asking for basic information such as name,
gender, and social security number.164 If the applicant meets the non-medical eligibility requirements
she can file a Disability Report, which requires information about the applicant’s ailment, medical
records, and work and education history.165 The SSA field office then forwards the case to the state
DDS for evaluation. The DDS considers an applicant’s work status, severity of the medical condition,
and ability to work.166 The DDS may require an independent medical examination.167 Owing to complex
national standards, increased applications, and ongoing funding and personnel issues, there is a
substantial backlog; it took an average of 88 days to process a claim in 2007.168 In 2008 the SSA
implemented the Quick Disability Determination (QDD) process to speed the process for those who
easily qualify for benefits.169
As with OASI, a dissatisfied SSDI applicant may request reconsideration, then appeal in turn to
an ALJ, the Social Security Appeals Council, and federal district court. Roughly 62 percent of
submissions are denied by the state DDS at the initial stage.170 However, three-quarters of appellants
will eventually receive benefits, 171 most after appeals to the federal ALJ.172
		

3. Benefit Payment and Termination

The lengthy appeals process means that many applicants wait more than two years for a final
decision.173 Even with a favorable initial determination, a claimant may wait three to five months
after applying to receive their first payment. Beneficiaries receive monthly payments until they die,
reach retirement age,174 or no longer have a disability.175 Recipients must notify SSA if their condition
improves, if they successfully complete vocational therapy or training, if they return to work, or if their
earnings increase.176 Beneficiaries must report any earnings to SSA before April 15th of the following
year.177 The SSA regularly reviews cases to evaluate whether a participant still meets disability
criteria.178
The law incentivizes labor-market reentry. The SSA’s Ticket to Work program permits beneficiaries to
engage in trial work periods while maintaining, for a time, supplemental benefits.179 The program also
provides vouchers for public or private employment or vocational rehabilitation services.180 However,
take-up for the Ticket to Work program has been limited.181

V. Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ Compensation (WC) provides wage replacement and medical benefits to workers who have
suffered workplace injuries.182 All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government
have WC laws in place.183 These laws codify a fundamental exchange between employers and
employees: employees agree to forgo negligence claims in return for employer-provided insurance for
workplace injuries.184
Workers’ compensation is financed almost exclusively by employers through self-insurance, private
carriers, or payments into state funds. In 2008, workers’ compensation covered 130,643,000
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workers.185 The total wages of the covered workers amounted to $5.9 trillion.186 Workers’
compensation plans paid out $29.1 billion in medical benefits and $28.6 billion in cash benefits
in 2008.187 Employers paid an additional $21.3 billion in administrative costs (if self-insured) or
premiums (if purchasers of insurance), bringing the total cost to employers to $78.9 billion in 2008.188
Benefits and costs have declined in recent years since peaking in the early 1990s.189
A. Eligibility
Forty-nine states mandate that almost all private employers have workers’ compensation coverage
(under a state or a private insurance scheme as required by the state’s laws).190 Many states exempt
small employers or certain other categories of employers from coverage.191 Federal employees and
their dependents are covered under the federal workers’ compensation law.192
Texas is the only state where workers’ compensation coverage is voluntary; however, the employer
must provide notice to the state if electing no coverage.193 As of 2008, 33 percent of Texas private
employers representing 25 percent of the state’s workforce did not have workers’ compensation
coverage.194 Non-subscribing employers reported higher satisfaction overall and higher satisfaction
as to the adequacy/equity of occupational benefits paid to workers than subscribing employers.195 In
Texas, employers electing not to subscribe to coverage are not protected from tort suits.196
Unlike the other programs discussed here, workers’ compensation has no monetary or nonmonetary
eligibility requirements beyond sustaining an injury in the course of one’s employment; there are no
earnings or hours thresholds for benefit eligibility, so coverage starts on an employee’s first day of
work.197
B. Benefits
Generally, workers’ compensation pays for immediate medical care and provides cash benefits after
a three to seven day waiting period.198 In 2008, medical-only cases accounted for 77 percent of all
cases, but only 8 percent of benefits paid out. 199 Wage replacement benefits for lost work are only
paid in 23 percent of cases, but account for 92 percent of all benefits paid out.200
Wage replacement benefits vary based on the duration and severity of the injury. Temporary
disability benefit cases are the most common type, representing 63 percent of cash-benefit cases
and 16 percent of benefit payments.201 Temporary partial disability benefits cover situations where
the worker returns to work before her full medical recovery with reduced responsibilities and pay.202
Temporary total disability benefits are paid where the worker is unable to work while recovering.203
Permanent disability benefit cases are less common but more costly. Permanent partial disability
benefits, which represent 36 percent of cases but 67 percent of benefit payments, are paid for
permanent impairments that do not completely limit the worker’s ability to work.204 Permanent total
disability benefits, which represent only 1 percent of all cases but 17 percent of benefit payments,
cover very significant impairments judged to be permanent.205
Benefit amounts and durations may vary widely depending on the state and the type of disability.
For temporary total disability, most states allow the worker to recover two-thirds of her weekly
wage subject to a maximum benefit correlated with the state’s average weekly wage.206 Forty-four
jurisdictions use a schedule — a list of body parts that are covered — to determine the duration
and amount of permanent partial disability benefits for certain injuries.207 For unscheduled injuries,
states may use several different approaches to evaluate the disability and assign compensation.208
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Some states, such as California, provide for upward or downward modification of benefits where an
injured worker is not offered, or refuses to accept, modified or alternative work.209 Cash benefits for
permanent injuries often have a limited duration.210
C. Administration
		

1. Funding and Agencies

States require employers to obtain insurance or prove their financial ability to carry the risk (selfinsure). Private insurers are the largest source of workers’ compensation benefits — in 2007, private
carriers paid 52.3 percent of benefits.211 North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming rely on a
state-run monopoly.212 Twenty-two states, including California and New York, maintain state-run funds
that compete with private carriers.213 The rest, including Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas, rely entirely
on private insurance carriers.
		

2. Benefit Application and Determination

States commonly place a limit on how long after an injury a worker may apply for benefits.214
Applications usually include an employer’s certification of workplace accidents and a medical
certification of the injuries and disability.
Private insurers are often mandated to process a claim within a set amount of time, with penalties
for delay.215 In California, the claims administrator must authorize medical treatment up to $10,000
within one working day after the injured worker files a claim form with their employer, even while
the claim is being investigated.216 New York, on the other hand, grants insurers a longer time period
to determine whether to accept or deny a claim and to pay benefits.217 Also, New York insurers may
delay payments for a lack of medical evidence, which they are not required to obtain on their own.218
In contrast, other states require insurers to obtain the medical information and do not accept “lack of
medical evidence” as a reason to delay payment of benefits.219
Each state maintains an appeals process, including states that have no public plan. In North Dakota,
the first level is a request for reconsideration by the state agency.220 In Massachusetts and Texas,
which have no state plans, the first level is an informal meeting with the worker and insurer aimed
at reaching a voluntary agreement.221 All states provide at some point for a formal hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ) or similar official, followed in most states by appeal to a governing
board.222 After administrative remedies are exhausted, parties in all states may file suit in state court.
		

3. Benefit Payment and Termination

As with other wage replacement programs, workers’ compensation benefits come in a regular
disbursement, often with a significant lag time between application and payment.223 Benefits may be
terminated when the state’s maximum benefit duration is reached or when the worker is no longer
medically eligible. A worker is no longer medically eligible when she recovers or reaches a state of
maximum medical improvement, a point at which her condition is not expected to further improve.224
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SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.
The FUTA currently imposes a 6.2% payroll tax on all employers. Companies in states with UI programs that meet minimum
federal requirements can credit state UI payroll taxes against the federal rate (a process that creates an effective federal tax of
0.8%). Companies in states without approved UI plans are forced to pay the full amount. States without approved UI programs
are also ineligible for federal grants that cover administrative costs associated with operating a UI program. FUTA, 26 U.S.C. §§
3301, 3306(b); SSA, 42 USC § 501-504; see also Office of Workforce Security, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment
Laws 2-1 (2009), available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/comparison2009.asp [hereinafter
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws];Kathleen Romig & Julie Whittaker, U.S. Cong. Research Service,The Unemployment Trust Fund
(UTF): State Insolvency and Federal Loans to States 1 (2009), available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/crs/RS22954.pdf; 26 U.S.C. §
3302; 42 U.S.C §§ 501-02.
3
This section aims, wherever possible, to describe generally applicable features of the UI system. However, in order to avoid
citing to all 50 state laws, the programs in Arkansas, California, New Jersey, and Wisconsin are used to illustrate a handful of
points.
4
26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1). Because FUTA has unique tax exemptions for certain organizations (including nonprofits, state
governments, and Indian tribes), subsequent amendments to FUTA have created affirmative requirements for states to cover
these groups. Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 1-2.
5
26 U.S.C. §§ 3306(A)(2)-(3).
6
California, for instance, eschews the higher coverage threshold for the agricultural industry, effectively including small farms
and other agricultural units in the standard employer definition. Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 1-2 to 1-3.
7
For example, California only requires an entity to pay over $100 in a quarter to be an “employer” for UI purposes. Cal. Unemp.
Ins. Code § 675.
8
The ABC test defines employee as any worker other than those who: (A) are free from control or direction in the performance
of the work; (B) conduct work outside the usual course of the company’s business and off the premises of the business; and (C)
are customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business. Id. at 1-5. See also Nat’l Employment Law
Project, Use the Broad “ABC” Test to Define Employer-Employee Relationships, available at
http://nelp.bluestatedigital.com/page/-/UI/cwce_book/Employer-EmployeeRelationships.pdf
9
For example, in California an applicant must have earned $1,300 in at least one of the past four quarters or earned at least
$900 in her highest quarter and at least $1,125 total in the past four quarters. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1281(a). The New Jersey
formula instead uses “average base weeks.” New Jersey applicants must have earned at least $143 (the current average
base week amount) in 20 weeks during the past year or earned 1,000 times the minimum wage total in the past year. N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 43:21-4(e)(4); N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., What is Needed to Qualify? Did I Earn Enough?, http://lwd.dol.
state.nj.us/labor/ui/calc/needqualify.html. See also Office of Workforce Security, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Significant Provisions of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws (2009), available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/sigpros/2000-2009/July2009.
pdf [hereinafter Significant Provisions].
10
See e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507; Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1253; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-4; Wis. Stat. § 108.04(2).
11
See Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 5-2; Nat’l Employment Law Project, Federal Stimulus Funding Produces
Unprecedented
Wave of State Unemployment Insurance Reforms 2,7 (2009), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/UI/UIMA.Roundup.June.09.
pdf?nocdn=1.
12
Nat’l Employment Law Project, supra note 11, at 7.
13
The “highest maximum” does not include dependency benefits, which Massachusetts and several other high paying states
have. Massachusetts also has the highest maximum when dependency benefits are considered. See Significant Provisions,
supra note 9.
14
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-504; Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1281(b); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-3(d)(2); Wis. Stat. § 108.06(1). See also
Significant Provisions, supra note 9.
15
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(4); Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1253(d).
16
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 4-1.
17
Nat’l Employment Law Project, supra note 11, at 1; see American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 §§
2001, 2002, 2005, 123 Stat. 115;
18
Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-205, 124 Stat. 2236.
19
42 U.S.C. §§ 501-02. See also Office of Workforce Security, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Unemployment Compensation Federal-State Partnership
16 (2009), available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/partnership.pdf; Julie M. Whittaker & Christine Scott,
U.S. Cong. Research Office, Unemployment Compensation (UC) and the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF): Funding UC Benefits 6 (2008),
available at http://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RS22077.pdf
20
Three states, Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, also require a minimal employee tax. Office of Workforce Security, supra
note 19, at 12.
21
See generally Significant Provisions, supra note 9.
22
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 2-6; Significant Provisions, supra note 9. The use of state experience
ratings is allowed under FUTA. 26 U.S.C. § 3303(a).
1

2

119

See 42 U.S.C. § 503 (explaining the state UI requirements).
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 1-7.
25
See Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t, Information You Need to File an Unemployment Claim, available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_
pub_ctr/de2326.pdf; Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t, Before You Start: Information You Need to Apply for UI, http://www.edd.ca.gov/
Unemployment/Before_you_Start.htm; N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., What Do You Need To File Your Unemployment Claim
Over the Internet?, https://njsuccess.dol.state.nj.us/njsuccess/html/fileAClaimHome.htm; Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., What
Information Do I Need to Apply?, http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/uiben/information_needed.htm; Ark. Dep’t of Workforce Services,
Application for Unemployment Insurance Benefits, available at http://www.dws.arkansas.gov/UI/PDF/PDF501_BLANK.pdf
26
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-521(b), -522; Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 1327-29; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-6; Wis. Stat. § 108-03.
27
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3); Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 7-1.
28
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 7-1.
29
See,e.g.,Ark.Dep’tofWorkforceServices,AppealingaUIDetermination,HearingDates/Times/LocationsandNotices,http://www.state.
ar.us/esd/Programs/Appeals/AppealGuide.htm
30
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 7-4.
31
Cal. Dep’t of Human Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
32
See, e.g., Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t, A Guide to Benefits and Employment Services 13, available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_
ctr/de1275a.pdf
33
Id. at 13, 24.
34
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 23-10 (letter from Jane Oates, Assistant Sec. of Labor, to State Workforce Agencies) 5
(Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL23-10acc.pdf. Compliance varies: fourteen states
achieved the goal for every month in 2009, while six states and the District of Columbia missed the goal every month. Office
of Workforce Security, Dep’t of Labor, Benefits Timeliness and Quality (BTQ) Reports of State Workforce Agencies, available at http://
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/btq.asp.
35
Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t, FAQ, How Do I End My Claim?, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Unemployment/FAQ_-_Collecting_Benefits.
htm#HowdoIendmyclaim; Ark. DWS, Your Unemployment Insurance Information Handbook 12 (2009), available at http://www.state.
ar.us/esd/ARClaimHelp/500%20BOOKLET%20(2009).pdf.
36
See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., Requirements For Payment Report Part Time Earnings, http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/
labor/ui/claim/ptwages.html
37
See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 2601 - 3306 (2005); Haw. Rev.Stat. § 392 (2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-25 to 43:21-65 (2005); N.Y.
Workers’ Comp. Law §§ 200 - 242 (2005); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, §§ 201 - 212 (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-39-1 to 28-41-33 (2005).
38
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-39-1, 28-41-33 (2005).
39
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 2601 - 3306 (2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-25, 43:21-71 (2005). New Jersey only requires that private
plans meet state requirements while California requires that they must exceed the public benefits in at least one category.
40
While NY state law requires employers to buy TDI insurance, NY allows its State Insurance Fund, a quasi-public entity
created to offer worker’s compensation insurance, to offer TDI coverage as well. Hawaii, on the other hand, imposes a truly
private mandate: the state issues guidelines on basic TDI coverage requirements, but offers no public or quasi-public TDI plan.
Employers can select from a list of approved private insurers or choose to self-insure. N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law §§ 200 - 242
(2005); Haw. Rev.Stat. § 392 (2005)
41
California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island use the same definitions as for their UI programs, with some exceptions. Cal.
Unemp. Ins. Code § 2606; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-27(a); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-39-2(12), 28-42-3(15). Hawaii and New York include all
individuals or organizations employing one or more person, though New York excludes part-time domestic services. Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 392-3; N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 202.
42
N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 203.
43
California requires that applicants have earned at least $300 in the base period preceding disability (typically 5-17 months
based on the month the claim begins). Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 2652. Rhode Island requires applicants to have either (A) $8,880
in earnings during the base period (the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters or the last four completed
quarters) OR (B) $1,480 earnings in one base period quarter, and total base period earnings of at least 1.5 times the highest
quarter earnings or $2,960, whichever is higher. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-41-11 (setting earnings requirements as a function of
the state hourly minimum wage, which is currently $7.40)
44
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-41; N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., Wage Requirements— State Plan, http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/
tdi/content/sp_wage_requirements.html (noting current eligibility requirement dollar amounts); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. §43:2132 (noting that private plans must have eligibility requirements at least as liberal as state plans).
45
The 14 weeks need not be consecutive nor with a single employer. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 392-6, -25.
46
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 392-23; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-38; N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 205;
47
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 2653; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-41-7.
48
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 2653, 2655; Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t., Disability Insurance Benefits, http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/
DI_Benefit_Amounts.htm (noting 2010 weekly benefit range)
49
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 392-22 to 392-23; Haw. Dep’t of Labor and Ind. Relations, Frequently Asked Questions, http://hawaii.gov/labor/
dcd/dcd-links/frequently-asked-questions (noting 2009 weekly benefit range)
50
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 43:21-38 to 43:21-40; N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., Benefit Calculations—State Plan Employer, http://
lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/tdi/employer/state/sp_emp_benefit_calculations.html (noting 2010 weekly benefit maximum)
23

24
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N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 204.
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-41-5, 28-41-7; R.I. Dep’t of Labor and Training, Temporary Disability Insurance Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.dlt.ri.gov/tdi/tdifaqs.htm (noting 2010 weekly benefit range)
53
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 2627(b); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 392-24; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-38; N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 204(1); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 28-41-12.
54
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-39; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-41-12.
55
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 2627(b); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 392-24; N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 204(1).
56
In Hawaii, employers must contribute at least 50% of program costs; employees provide up to 50% of program costs, but their
contributions are capped at 0.5% of average weekly earnings. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 392-43. New Jersey is one of the few states to
directly tax employers for the TDI program. Employers pay between 0.1% and 0.75% of the first $29,700 of annual earnings
for their employees. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-7(e). New Jersey employees pay 0.5% on their first $29,700 in annual earnings. Id.
§ 43:21-7(d)(1)(G)(i). See also N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., State Disability Benefits—Cost to the Worker: State Plan, http://
lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/tdi/worker/state/sp_cost.html; Sedgwick CMS, SDI Chart 2010, available at http://www.vpaweb.com/
about/pdf/SDI.pdf.
57
See id. (noting that all contributions beyond employee limits come from employers); N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 209
58
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 2901; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-40-1.
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Appendix B

Key Characteristics of Social Insurance Programs

Eligibility: Workforce Attachment Requirements

Unemployment
Insurance

Individuals must earn a certain amount of wages and/or work a certain
period of time during the “base period,” (BP) defined as the first four of
the last five completed calendar quarters in most states. 16 Workers must
generally have earnings in more than one quarter within the BP. 17 The
minimum amount of wages an eligible individual must earn during the base
period ranges from $130 in Hawaii to $4,455 in North Carolina.18

Social Security
Disability Insurance

Individuals must earn a specified number of work credits.19 In 2009, $1,090
in income equals one credit; $4,360 equals the maximum four credits an
individual can earn per year.20 The maximum number of required credits is
40. Younger workers may qualify with fewer credits:
1) Before age 24, six credits are required.
2) Between ages 24 and 31, individuals must have credit for working
half the time between age 21 and the year they became disabled.
3) For workers aged 31 or older, the number of credits required
increases with age. Of the credits required, 20 must have been
earned in the previous 10 years (ending in the year in which the
individual became disabled).21

Eligibility: Qualifying Events
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Unemployment
Insurance (UI)

Individuals must have lost their job through no fault of their own and be
unemployed as a result.1

Social Security
Disability Insurance
(SSDI)

Individuals must be blind or meet Social Security’s definition of disability.2

Social Security
Survivors Insurance

Individuals become eligible for partial benefits upon reaching age 62
and having earned the requisite number of work credits (generally 40).3
Individuals are not eligible for full benefits until they reach “full retirement
age” — a number that varies from 65 to 67 based upon birth year.4

Social Security
Survivors Insurance

Certain surviving family members become eligible upon the death of a worker
who has earned Social Security credits.5

California Paid
Family Leave

An individual must be bonding with a new child during the first year after the
birth or adoption of the child or caring for a seriously ill child, parent, spouse,
or domestic partner.6

Social Security
Retirement
Benefits

Individuals born after 1929 need 40 work credits, calculated in the
same manner as SSDI, to qualify for Social Security retirement benefits
(equivalent to 10 full years of work).22

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

An individual must be bonding with a new child during the first year after the
birth or adoption of the child or caring for a child, spouse, domestic partner,
civil union partner, or parent who has a serious health condition.7

Social Security
Survivors Benefits

California State
Disability Insurance

A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual
to be unable to work.8

Eligibility depends on the decedent’s work credits.23 The maximum number
of credits required is 40.24 Younger workers may qualify with fewer credits.25
If a decedent earned at least six credits in the three years before his or her
death, surviving children and any spouse taking care of the children can
receive benefits.26

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual
to be unable to work.9

California Paid
Family Leave

Individuals must have $300 in wages during the 12-month period
approximately five to 17 months prior to the date of application for paid
family leave (the base period) and must be currently employed or actively
seeking work.27

New York State
Disability Insurance

A non work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual
to be unable to work.10

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual
to be unable to work.11

Individuals must be currently employed (or have been unemployed for
less than two weeks)28 and must have earned at least $145 in at least 20
calendar weeks or have earned at least 1,000 times the minimum wage
(currently $7,300) during the 52 weeks immediately prior to the week in
which the family leave claim begins.29
Same as California Paid Family Leave

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual
to be unable to work.12

California State
Disability Insurance

Same as New Jersey Family Leave Insurance

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual
to be unable to work.13

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits
New York State
Disability Insurance

Workers’
Compensation14

Worker-related injury or illness suffered on the job or arising in the course of
employment.15

Individuals must be employed for four or more consecutive weeks.30
Individuals continue to be eligible for four weeks after the termination of
covered employment.31
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Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance
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An individual may be eligible if he or she has earned at least 1,200
times the minimum wage during the base period (currently $8,880).32
Alternatively, individuals must have been paid at least 200 times the
minimum hourly wage (currently $1,480) in any quarter during the first four
of the five most recent completed calendar quarters (the base period) and
must have total base period earnings that are at least 1.5 times the amount
paid in the quarter of highest earnings, provided that the minimum amount
of total base period wages is at least 400 times the minimum hourly wage
(currently $2,960).33
An employee must have been employed for at least 20 hours per week for
at least 14 weeks and have earned at least $400 in the 52 weeks prior to
the disability.34 The 14 weeks need not be consecutive nor with only one
employer. The employee must be currently employed or have incurred
the injury or illness not more than two weeks from the last day of covered
employment.35

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

ndividuals must have received wages of at least $150 in a covered
employment during the first four of the last five consecutive calendar
quarters which immediately precede the date of filing the application for
benefits (the “base year”).36

Workers’
Compensation

Coverage generally starts on the employee’s first day of employment in all
states.37

Eligibility: Workforce Attachment Requirements (CONTINUED)

Unemployment
Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.38 Self-employed individuals are excluded.

Social Security
Disability Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.39

Social Security
Retirement
Insurance

Same as SSDI.

Social Security
Survivors Insurance

Same as SSDI.

California Paid
Family Leave

All, with limited exceptions.40
Self-employed individuals may elect coverage.41

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.42
Self-employed individuals are excluded.

California State
Disability Insurance

Same as California Paid Family Leave.

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Same as New Jersey Family Leave Insurance.

New York State
Disability Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.43 Self-employed individuals are excluded.

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.44 Self-employed individuals are excluded.

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.45 Self-employed individuals are excluded.

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

All, with limited exceptions.46 Self-employed individuals are excluded.

Workers’
Compensation

Every state except Texas requires almost all private employers to provide
workers’ compensation coverage.47 In Texas, coverage is voluntary, but
employers not providing coverage are not shielded from tort liability as
employers in other states are.48 Some states also exempt very small
businesses – for example, employers employing fewer than five people are
not required to cover their employees in 13 states.49

129

Benefits: Duration

130

Benefits: Waiting Time

Unemployment
Insurance

Most states offer benefits for a maximum of 26 weeks.

Unemployment
Insurance

Most states require a one-week waiting period before benefits are paid.66

Social Security
Disability Insurance

SSDI recipients will continue to receive benefits for as long as they continue
to be disabled and unable to participate in substantial gainful activities.51

Social Security
Disability Insurance

Individuals must have been disabled for five consecutive months before
becoming eligible for benefits.67

Social Security
Retirement
Insurance

Retirement benefits last as long as the recipient is alive.52

Social Security
Retirement
Benefits

N/A

Social Security
Survivors Insurance

Benefits last until one of many terminating events occurs, including death
of the recipient, remarriage, or, in the case of a child receiving benefits,
reaching the age of majority.53

Social Security
Survivors Benefits

N/A

California Paid
Family Leave

Up to 6 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits.

California Paid
Family Leave

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven days before benefits are
paid; the waiting period may be served non-consecutively.68

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

Up to 6 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits.55

California State
Disability Insurance

Up to 52 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter.56

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter.57

New York State
Disability Insurance

Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter.58

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Up to 30 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter. 59

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter. 60

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter. 61

Workers’
Compensation

For temporary total disability benefits, more than half of states allow
benefits to be paid as long as the disability lasts.62 The remaining states
have a total maximum duration ranging from 104 weeks to 700 weeks.63
Permanent total disability benefits generally last until a set retirement
age or for life, although some states impose a total maximum benefit
cap (e.g. $318,000 in Indiana).64 Permanent partial disability benefits are
subject to a total maximum duration in the majority of states, ranging from
approximately 200 weeks to 520 weeks.65

50

54

If the period of family leave immediately follows an eligible period of
temporary disability for the individual’s own illness, such as pregnancy
disability, there is no waiting period for the Paid Family Leave claim. 69

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven days before benefits are
paid; if the period of family leave lasts three weeks or more, retroactive
benefits may be paid for the waiting period.70
If the period of family leave immediately follows an eligible period of
temporary disability for the individual’s own illness, such as pregnancy
disability, there is no waiting period for the Family Leave Insurance claim.71

California State
Disability Insurance

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before
benefits are paid.72

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before
benefits are paid; if the period of family leave lasts three weeks or more,
retroactive benefits may be paid for the waiting period.73

New York State
Disability Insurance

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before
benefits are paid.74

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before
benefits are paid.75

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before
benefits are paid.76

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before
benefits are paid.77

Workers’
Compensation

Workers’ compensation pays for medical care immediately and pays cash
benefits for lost work time after a waiting period, which ranges by state from
three to seven days. 78
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Benefits: Wage Replacement Rate & Maximum Benefit Amount (CONTINUED)

Unemployment
Insurance

On average, states replace approximately 50 percent of an eligible
individual’s lost wages, up to a maximum benefit amount, which is usually
a percentage of the state average weekly wage.79 Benefit amounts are
calculated as a percentage of an individual’s earnings in a specified base
period, generally covering the most recent 12- to 18-month period.80

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

The wage replacement rate is 4.62 percent of the wages paid to an
individual in the calendar quarter of highest earnings within the base period
(translating into a weekly wage replacement rate of ~51 percent); the
maximum benefit is 85 percent of the state average weekly wage.95 As of
July 1, 2010, the maximum benefit was $700.96

Social Security
Disability Insurance

Two “bend points” (calculated based on the national average wage index)
are used to create three earnings brackets.81 Earnings up to the first bend
point are replaced at 90 percent, earnings between the first and second
bend points are replaced at 32 percent, and earnings beyond the second
bend point are replaced at 15 percent (up to the federal maximum, which
is updated annually).82 In 2009, the bend points result in the following
calculation:
· 90 percent of the first $744 of average-indexed monthly
earnings (AIME), plus
· 32 percent of the next $3,739 of AIME, plus
· 15 percent of AIME over $4,483.83

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

Except for individuals with very low earnings, the wage replacement rate
is 58 percent of an individual’s average weekly wage in the week before
filing a claim for disability; the maximum benefit cannot exceed 121 percent
the state average weekly wage.97 As of 2009, the maximum weekly benefit
amount was $510.98

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

The benefit amount is approximately 65 percent of the average weekly
wage (computed using the quarter of highest earnings during the base
year). 99 For nonagricultural workers, the weekly benefit amount ranges
from $12 - $113.100 For workers who earn at least 50 percent of their
income as agricultural workers, the weekly benefit amount is calculated
using a schedule based on total wages during the base year. 101 The weekly
benefit amount for agricultural workers ranges from $12 to $55.102

Workers’
Compensation

Most states pay weekly benefits for temporary total disability that replace
two-thirds (66 percent) of a worker’s pre-injury wages, although wage
replacement rates vary from a national low of 60 percent in New Hampshire
to a high of 80 percent in Alaska, Iowa, Maine and Michigan.103 Maximum
benefits, which are usually indexed to a state’s average weekly wage, vary
between states.104 As of 2010, maximum weekly benefits ranged from a
low of $351 in Mississippi to a high of $1,173 in Illinois and Iowa.105

Social Security
Retirement
Benefits

Same as SSDI. Benefit amount is reduced if benefits are received before
full retirement age.84

Social Security
Survivors Benefits

Benefit payments are equal to a proportion of the primary insurance
amount (PIA) of the deceased.85 The proportion of the PIA depends on the
individual’s relationship to the deceased.86 Widows or widowers may also
be entitled to a lump sum payment of $255 upon the death of a deceased
spouse.87

California Paid
Family Leave

The wage replacement rate is 55 percent of an individual’s weekly wages
during a specified base period.88 The maximum benefit amount, which is
updated annually, is indexed to the state average weekly wage and cannot
exceed the maximum benefit amount for workers’ compensation temporary
disability benefits, which is set at 150 percent the state average weekly
wage).89 In 2010, the maximum weekly benefit amount was $987.90

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

The wage replacement rate is 66 percent of an individual’s weekly wages
during a specified base period. 91 The maximum benefit amount, which is
updated annually, is 53 percent of the state’s average weekly wage.92 In
2010, the maximum weekly benefit amount was $561.93

California State
Disability Insurance

Same as California Paid Family Leave.

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Same as New Jersey Family Leave Insurance.

New York State
Disability Insurance

The wage replacement rate is 50 percent of an individual’s average weekly
wage during the last eight weeks of employment; the maximum benefit is
statutorily set at $170 per week.94
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Financing

Unemployment
Insurance

Unemployment benefits are subject to income tax. Federal law requires
states to offer workers the opportunity to voluntarily have Federal income
tax withheld from unemployment benefits at the rate of 10 percent.107
Federal law also permits states to withhold state and local income tax from
unemployment benefits.108

Social Security
Disability Insurance

Some recipients are required to pay federal income taxes on their Social
Security benefits if they have another source of substantial income in
addition to Social Security benefits, such as wages, self-employment,
interest, dividends and other taxable income.110 No Social Security recipient
pays federal income tax on more than 85 percent of his or her Social
Security benefits.111

106

Unemployment
Insurance (UI)

Generally 100 percent employer financing. UI is funded by federal and
state taxes. The federal tax rate, set by the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act (FUTA), is 6.2 percent of taxable wages and pays for administration of
the program.127 Federal law only imposes FUTA tax on the first $7,000 of
earnings, but most states have increased their taxable wage bases above
the minimum.128 Employers who pay state unemployment tax on a timely
basis receive an offset credit of up to 5.4 percent regardless of the rate of
tax they pay the state.129 Therefore, the net FUTA tax rate is generally 0.8
percent (6.2% - 5.4%), for a maximum FUTA tax of $56.00 per employee, per
year (.008 X $7,000. = $56.00).130

Social Security
Disability Insurance
(SSDI)

Shared employer and employee financing; equal contributions
of 6.2% from each.132 Self-employed individuals pay both the employer and
employee contribution (12.4%).133 The earnings cap for the OASDI payroll
tax is based on a formula set by law; the taxable wage base only adjusts if
a cost of living increase becomes effective.134 In 2010, the taxable earnings
cap was $106,800.135

Social Security
Retirement
Insurance

Same as SSDI.

Social Security
Survivors Insurance

Same as SSDI.

California Paid
Family Leave

100% employee financing. The 2010 tax rate is 1.1% percent of taxable
wages per employee, per year; with a taxable wage base capped at
$93,916.136 The taxable wage base adjusts with changes in the state
average weekly wage.137

Social Security
Retirement
Benefits

Same as SSDI.

Social Security
Survivors Benefits

Same as SSDI.

California Paid
Family Leave

Benefits in excess of contributions to the program are subject to federal
income taxes, but not state income taxes.112

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

Benefits in excess of contributions to the program are subject to federal
income taxes, but not state income taxes.113

California State
Disability Insurance

With limited exceptions, benefits are not considered federal taxable income
because the program is employee-funded.114 Benefits are exempt from
state income tax.115

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income
tax.116 Benefits are exempt from state income tax.117

New York State
Disability Insurance

Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income
tax.118 Benefits are likely exempt from state income tax.119

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

100% employee financing. The 2010 tax rate is .12% of taxable wages per
employee; the taxable earnings cap is equal to the earnings cap for state
unemployment insurance benefits: in 2010, the cap was $29,700.139

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

With limited exceptions, benefits are not considered federal taxable income
because the program is employee funded.120 Benefits are exempt from state
income tax.121

California State
Disability Insurance

Same as California PFL.

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income
tax.122 The statute does not specify whether benefits are exempt from state
income tax.123

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income
tax.124 Benefits are likely exempt from state income tax. 125

Shared employer and employee financing.140 As of 2010, the employee
tax rate was .5% with a taxable earnings cap of $29,700.141 Employers
covered by the state fund pay a basic rate of .5% on the same taxable wage
base as employees, but employers are subject to experience rating.142 An
employer’s rate may decrease to .1% or increase to 1.1% on the basis of the
employer’s reserve ratio, length of employment, and the status of the fund
as a whole.143

Workers’
Compensation

Workers’ compensation benefits are not subject to federal or state income
taxes.126

Self-employed individuals who elect coverage pay both the employer and
employee contribution up to the same taxable wage base cap as non-self
employed individuals.138
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Administration

New York State
Disability Insurance

Primarily employer financed. Employers can require employee contributions
up to a cap of .5% on the first $120 of weekly wages (not more than 60
cents per week).144

Unemployment
Insurance

Federal-State Partnership. Federal government provides funding and
sets national standard on some processes; state employment agencies
physically handle claims and dispense benefits.149

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

100% employee financing. The 2010 tax rate is 1.2% of taxable wage per
employee, per year with an taxable earnings cap of $57,000.145

Social Security
Disability Insurance

Federal-State Partnership. The Social Security Administration accepts
applications, handles appeals, and determines benefits; state disability
determination services, which are funded by the federal government, make
initial eligibility decisions.150

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

Primarily employer financed, employee contributions are limited to half
the cost of providing benefits but not more than 0.5% of weekly earnings
up to the annually adjusted maximum weekly taxable wage base ($877 in
2009).146

Social Security
Retirement
Insurance

Federal Administration. Operated by the Social Security Administration.151

Social Security
Survivors Insurance

Federal Administration. Operated by the Social Security Administration.152

California Paid
Family Leave

State Administration. Operated by the California Employment Development
Department as a part of the state disability insurance program. The EDD
also administers unemployment insurance for California.153

New Jersey Family
Leave Insurance

State Administration. Operated by the New Jersey Department of Labor
and Workforce Development as a part of the state temporary disability
insurance program. The department also administers unemployment
insurance for New Jersey.154

California State
Disability Insurance

Same as PFL.155

New Jersey State
Disability Benefits

Same as FLI.156

New York State
Disability Insurance

State Administration. State law mandates that employers purchase
temporary disability insurance or self-insure. The New York State Worker’s
Compensation Board oversees the operation of these plans.157

Rhode Island
Temporary
Disability Insurance

State Administration. Operated by the Rhode Island Department of Labor
and Training. The DLT also oversees Rhode Island’s workers’ compensation
law and administers unemployment insurance.158

Hawaii Temporary
Disability Insurance

State Administration. State law mandates that employers purchase
temporary disability insurance or self-insure. The Hawaii Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations, which also oversees the operation of the
state workers’ compensation law and unemployment insurance, monitors
the operation of these plans.159

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

State Administration. Operated by the Commonwealth Department of Labor
and Human Resources. The department also administers unemployment
insurance for Puerto Rico.160

Workers’
Compensation

State Administration. Most state laws mandate that employers carry
workers’ compensation insurance. A Workers’ Compensation Commission/
Board within a state Department of Labor and Industries or Employment
Security will generally oversee the operation of the law.161

Puerto Rico
Temporary
Disability Insurance

Shared employer and employee financing; equal contributions of .5% from
each; earnings cap was $9,000 in 2010.147

Workers’
Compensation

100% employer financing. Contributions are experience-rated.148
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Appendix C

Historical Background on Maternity Leave Insurance and
Temporary Disability Insurance in the United States

A. The Early Years
In this appendix, we outline some of the critical historical and legislative developments surrounding
maternity leave insurance and temporary disability insurance in the United States.1
The idea that the government should offer wage replacement for time taken off work to care for a
new child or a person’s own illness through social insurance is not entirely new.
As early as the 1916, labor and progressive party advocates pressed for maternity leave insurance
programs for female workers.2 In 1919, New York State even came close to passing a comprehensive
health insurance proposal that included maternity leave insurance and temporary disability benefits.3
Staunch opposition from the medical and insurance communities prevented these proposals from
advancing.4
These issues reappeared during the deliberations of the US Committee on Economic Security in
the 1930’s. President Roosevelt created the Committee in 1934 and tasked it with developing
recommendations on old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and a “unified social insurance
system affording protection against all major personal hazards which lead to poverty and
dependency.”5 Though their reports on old-age assistance and unemployment garnered the most
attention—and ultimately led to the creation of our Social Security system—the Committee studied,
and issued proposals, on a range of economic issues, including health security. The health report
contained four key recommendations:
1) Aid to local medical facilities and services.
2) Temporary disability insurance in the form of cash benefits.
3) Further study for a system of permanent disability insurance.
4) A cooperative federal-state system for medical insurance in which a State would receive a
specified federal subsidy if it met certain basic federal safeguards. 6
The Committee saw temporary disability insurance (TDI) as a natural corollary to medical insurance.
When a person fell ill, medical insurance would provide assistance with hospital costs while TDI
covered lost wages.7 Temporary disability, in turn, would supply a person with cash-benefits and
thereby help them avoid the double blow of increased medical costs and decreased income.
American Medical Association (AMA) opposition to any form of national medical insurance effectively
prevented the Committee’s health security report from receiving consideration in Congress.8 In
fact, the Committee and the President did all they could to ensure that the health report went
largely unnoticed. The Administration and leading Committee members were concerned that AMA
opposition could ultimately undermine passage of the more limited Social Security Act, which
covered the Committee’s recommendations on old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and
federal assistance grants for the elderly and families with dependent children, then moving through
Congress.9
Maternity leave insurance benefits were notably absent from the Committee’s health insurance
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report. The Committee did recommend grants to states for maternal and child health benefits
and aid for dependent children as part of an enhanced public assistance program, but it did not
specifically propose a maternity leave insurance program for working mothers.10
The failure to address maternity leave insurance for working women was likely the result of the
Committee’s focus on alleviating unemployment among male breadwinners.11 At the time, maternity
leave insurance benefits were seen by many as an incentive for men to send their wives into the
workforce. 12 Given the already tight labor market of the 1930’s and the general stigma against
working mothers, it is not surprising that the Committee decided not to include maternity leave
insurance.13 This mode of thinking slowly dissipated as middle-class women began to re-enter the
workforce in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but, in the 1930’s and 40’s, it remained a major barrier to the
consideration of the issues facing women in the workplace.
The failure to incorporate TDI into the original Social Security Act did not dissuade the Roosevelt,
and later, the Truman Administration, from pursuing its inclusion in subsequent expansions of
Social Security. In the run-up to the 1939 Social Security Amendments, for instance, both the Social
Security Board and Roosevelt’s Interdepartmental Committee on the Coordination of Health and
Welfare Activities recommended the establishment of a national TDI program.14
The Interdepartmental Committee (IC) report, which the Social Security Board largely echoed, was
essentially a continuation of the Committee on Economic Security’s original health security study. The
IC’s recommendations on TDI were, like the Committee on Economic Security’s, made in the context
of a National Health Program that included incentives for the creation of public medical insurance
systems.15 As in 1935, this association with health care ensured that TDI received little serious
consideration during the deliberations about modifying Social Security.16
In 1946, the Truman Administration won a small victory for national TDI when it successfully
advocated for a modification to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) that allowed UI funds
gathered through taxes on employees to be used for the operation of state TDI systems.17 Two of the
nine states eligible for this provision18—California and New Jersey —19responded by creating state TDI
programs.20 New York also created a TDI program shortly after the FUTA Amendments, but the state
chose to model its system on the state Workers’ Compensation Law.21 As a result, the new allowance
provided no benefit to New York.
An aggressive campaign to transform Social Security into a true “cradle to grave” social insurance
program followed the passage of the FUTA Amendments. Anticipating a debate on retirement
and survivor’s benefit levels, Truman’s Social Security Administration issued a remarkable report
on the need to move beyond the current system and adopt a “Single National Program” of social
insurance.22 The proposed national program included enhanced coverage and benefits for Old-Age
and Survivor’s Insurance, centralized UI, national health insurance, maternity leave insurance, and
permanent and temporary disability insurance benefits.23 With the full backing of the Administration,
the proposal was submitted to Congress in the form of H.R. 2893.24
The House and Ways and Means Committee spent over a month taking testimony from witnesses—
including a five-day appearance by Dr. Arthur J. Altmeyer, the director of the SSA.25 The Committee’s
questions covered a range of TDI and maternity leave insurance related topics and issues, but
primarily focused on fraud prevention and concerns about the ability of employees to “work the
system.” 26 Outside of the Committee, concerns were also voiced about the costs of the new
programs and the possibility that they would crowd out state programs and charitable efforts. 27
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Recognizing a lack of support, Rep. Doughton pulled H.R. 2893 in the summer of 1949 and replaced
it with H.R. 6000—a new package of Amendments that retained the benefit and coverage expansions
of H.R. 2893, but dropped the “weekly benefit programs,” which included TDI and maternity leave
insurance.28 H.R. 6000 ultimately formed the basis for the Social Security Amendments of 1950.29

B. From the 1950’s to the Present
After the defeat of H.R. 2893, there was little movement in the TDI and maternity leave insurance
fields at the national level. The SSA stopped calling for an expanded social safety net and the push
to pass TDI at the local level stalled. In 1956, permanent and total disability insurance was added
to the Social Security program, sapping much of the urgency surrounding the establishment of a
national program for temporary disability.30
The conversation slowly began to shift as more women began to return the workforce in the 1960’s
and 1970’s. Maternity leave insurance benefits, and their exclusion from most private and public
TDI plans, became a major rallying point for women concerned with workplace discrimination and
societal stigmas against working women. Like many of the issues associated with the campaign
for women’s rights, the 1963 release of the final report of President Kennedy’s Commission on the
Status of Women played an important role in bringing awareness to this issue.31 Among a number of
findings and policy recommendations, the Commission noted the importance of maternity benefits
and urged the federal government to take the lead in providing cash benefits to mothers out on
maternity leave.32
A second milestone came in 1964 when “discrimination on the basis of sex” was added to title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.33 That provision was subsequently used by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing the Civil Rights Act, as the basis for
guidelines on pregnancy discrimination that, among other things, specifically prohibited the exclusion
of pregnancy related illnesses and disabilities from public and private TDI plans.34 The Supreme
Court ultimately overturned the guidelines as inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act, but Congress
moved quickly to authorize EEOC and private civil law suits in this field by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). 35
The PDA explicitly prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy by amending the definition of
“on the basis of sex” to include “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”36 For public and
private TDI plans, this legislative change made it illegal for pregnancy to be excluded from the list of
illnesses that prevented work. Overnight, maternity leave insurance became a required component
of public and private TDI plans.37
The movement for greater protections continued in 1985 with the introduction of the first versions of
the FMLA.38 These initial drafts provided unpaid, job protected leave for temporary disabilities and
maternity/paternity leave.39 By 1987, the bills had expanded to include coverage for family caregiving
leave and, as the bill neared passage, funding for a study on the costs of creating a federal paid
leave program.40
The FMLA first passed Congress in 1991 but was not signed into law until President Clinton
took office in 1993.41 As enacted, the FMLA provides employees working in mid-size and large
organizations with 12 weeks of job-protected but unpaid time off, with continuing employer-based
health coverage, to bond with a new child, care for a family member, or treat personal illness.42 The
funding to commission a study on a federal paid leave program was ultimately removed.
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Despite these major gains in job protection for workers at medium and large businesses, there
remained a persisting lack of momentum in advancing a national system of wage replacement for
family and medical leave.
The late 1990’s saw the Clinton Administration’s Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation
initiative (BAA-UC).43 The program allowed states to use their Unemployment Insurance funds to
provide wage replacement for leave taken to care for a newly born or adopted child by adding birth
and adoption to the list of exceptions for the “able and available to work” requirement.44 The Bush
Administration ultimately repealed BAA-UC in 2003 on the grounds that it would overwhelm the
Unemployment Compensation Trust Funds.45
In 2002 and 2008, California and New Jersey, respectively, became the first states to create Paid
Family Leave Insurance systems. Both states added these benefits by expanding their existing
Temporary Disability Insurance programs.46 Washington State became the first state to pass a standalone paid paternity and maternity leave insurance program in 2007, but, as of the writing of this
document, the program remains unfunded.47

m
This appendix has reviewed the history of maternity leave insurance and temporary disability
insurance programs in the United States. It highlights the lengthy discussion that we, as a society,
have had over the establishment of these kinds of programs and underscores the need to move
away from a public and private patchwork of time off benefits and create a truly comprehensive
system of parental care, caregiving, and temporary disability insurance.
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Appendix D

Legislative Proposals on Paid Time Off
The need for some form of temporary wage-replacement for employees unable to work due to their
own disability or their need to care or bond with a family member has been the subject of much
debate on Capitol Hill and in state legislatures. In this appendix, we offer brief summaries of the
major federal proposals on time off for health and family reasons and recent activity at the state
level.

A. The FIRST Act – H.R. 2339
The grant approach—embodied by Rep. Woolsey’s Family Income to Respond to Significant
Transitions Act 1 (otherwise known as the FIRST Act)—seeks to encourage the establishment of TDI
and PFL programs at the state level by providing federal grants for their design and implementation.2
Under the FIRST Act, grants would last a maximum of three years and would be available to fund
administration, implementation, development, and educational outreach.3 States with and without
TDI and PFL would be eligible for funding, but the states without those programs would be given
priority.4 The bill only permits one or two three-year grants per state.5 This one-off approach differs
significantly from existing federal-state partnerships such as UI, for which the federal government
subsidizes states’ administrative costs on an ongoing basis. Moreover, unlike the UI system, the
grant approach in the FIRST Act does not provide payroll tax breaks or similar incentives to employers
in participating states.
Rep. Woolsey’s (D-CA) and other members of Congress have introduced this legislation in various
forms over the past six years, but it has gained little traction.6 The sole hearing on the bill came in
front of Rep. Woolsey’s own Education and Labor Workforce Protections Subcommittee in June of
2009.7

B. Social Security Cares
In March of 2009, the Center for American Progress released a report by economist Heather Boushey
titled “Helping Breadwinners When It Can’t Wait: A Progressive Program for Family Leave Insurance.”8
In that report, Boushey advocates for the inclusion of a Family Leave Insurance program within the
Social Security system.9
She argues that Social Security’s nationwide scope presents an opportunity to enact consistent,
effective, and broadly popular legislation on the issue. Moreover, she argues that using the eligibility
requirements developed as part of the Social Security program would ensure that the new program
covers nearly all American workers.10
The Social Security Cares program would operate as either a traditional social insurance program,
funded through an increase in the Social Security payroll tax and/or an increase in the wage cap, or,
alternatively, it would be financed through a unique “time-lending” system that would allow Social
Security recipients to trade future benefits for family and medical leave benefits.11
To date, the Social Security Cares program has not been introduced as an actual piece of legislation.
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C. The Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009 – H.R. 1723
A hybrid approach, Rep. Pete Stark’s (D-CA) Family Leave Insurance Act,12 would establish a national
family leave insurance program operated through federal-state partnerships and/or the Social
Security Administration.
Under the federal-state partnerships, the Secretary of Labor would be given the authority to enter
into administrative agreements with individual states.13 Those agreements would allow the Secretary
to provide funding for the operation of a PFL/TDI system if the state promised to administer the
benefits.14 Interestingly, this approach would not allow the state to create a new agency for the
purpose of administering family leave insurance. States could only qualify for funds if the new PFL/
TDI benefit was run through an existing program such as UI or WC.15
If a state were not willing to administer the benefit through an existing agency, the bill would
authorize the Commissioner of Social Security, at the request of the state’s Governor, to establish
a family and medical insurance program within the state.16 Program funding would come entirely
from the federal government, and benefits, presumably, would be distributed through existing Social
Security offices and resources in the state.17
All options would be funded by the federal government through a 0.1 or 0.2 percent increase
(depending on whether the person works for a large or small employer) in the Social Security payroll
tax. The tax would be called the “Family and Medical Leave Premium.”18
In order to be eligible for benefits under the Stark proposal, an employee must have worked for
his or her employer for at least the previous six months, and must have worked 625 hours for
that employer in those six months (thus excluding many part-time workers from eligibility).19 Small
employers, defined as those employing fewer than 20 persons,20 would be exempt from mandatory
participation.21
Rep. Stark has introduced this bill in various forms over the past 5 years.22 It is currently awaiting
action in the Workforce Protections Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor.

D. The Family Leave Insurance Act of 2007 – S. 1681
The bipartisan Family Leave Insurance Act, introduced in the 110th Congress by Senators Christopher
Dodd (D-CT) and Ted Stevens (R-AK), took the rather unique approach of using employers as the
benefit delivery vehicle for a national insurance program.
The bill, like the Stark proposal, would pay for a family leave insurance program by levying a “Family
and Medical Leave Premium” on eligible employers and employees.23 The proceeds from these
premiums would then be placed in a special “Family and Medical Leave Insurance Fund” controlled
by a Board of Trustees.24 Employers would make the initial payments to their employees and then
seek reimbursement from the insurance fund.25 In this way, the government plays absolutely no role
in the distribution of benefits. The employers bear the entire administrative load, including handling
applications and making initial eligibility determinations.26
Sec. 103(f)(4) describes limitations on payments, specifically that no amount may be paid greater
than that which is remaining in the Insurance Fund. In the same section, there is also a provision for
a “notice of insufficient funds,” which relieves employers of the requirement to pay benefits as long
as the notice is in effect.
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As with the proposals mentioned above, the Dodd-Stevens bill did not receive much legislative
attention. The bill was introduced in June of 2007 and referred to the Senate Finance Committee.
No major action was taken on the bill during the 110th Congress and Sen. Dodd has yet to reintroduce
it in the 111th Congress.

E. The Obama Administration’s State Paid Leave Fund
The President’s FY2011 budget proposal for the Department of Labor included a 50 million dollar
“State Paid Leave Fund.”27 The fund is designed to offer grants to states to assist them with the initial
start up costs associated with paid leave programs.
The Senate Appropriations Committee included a scaled down version of the fund—10 million instead
of 50 million dollars—in its Labor, Health, and Human Services appropriations for FY2011.28 The
House Appropriations subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, however, did not include
similar language in its version of the FY2011 appropriations bill.29 As of this writing, the fate of the
fund is uncertain.

F. State Activity
State legislative activity on paid family leave tends to fall into two broad categories.30 First, a handful
of states are considering legislation that would either establish a comprehensive wage-replacement
program for temporary disability, caregiving, and parental care for a new child or would add
caregiving and parental care benefits to existing TDI programs. Legislative proposals currently active
in New York, Hawaii, Illinois, and Massachusetts fit this description.
Second, a slightly larger group of state legislatures are debating programs that would only provide
wage-replacement for time off to care for a new child or a family member with a serious health
condition. Arizona, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont fall into this
category.31
The specifics of the proposed programs in both categories vary widely. Benefits range from
$250 a week in Arizona,32 Hawaii 33 and New Hampshire 34 to $750 a week in one proposed bill
in Massachusetts.35 Several of the bills would also impose caps based on the state average
weekly wage.36 Benefit durations range from four weeks in Hawaii37 and Missouri,38 to 12 weeks in
Massachusetts39 and Pennsylvania.40
The proposed methods for funding these programs are similarly varied. Arizona would require
employers to pay a small premium into a statewide insurance fund. 41 Vermont’s proposal,42 as well
as the one pending in the Massachusetts House,43 would establish a payroll tax. Missouri would
require employers to pay the wage replacement.44 A bill in New Hampshire45 would even make the
plan contingent on the receipt of federal funds.
These proposals have met with mixed responses. The New York bill has been approved by the
Legislative Assembly several times but has failed to garner equal support in the State Senate. In
New Hampshire, an official legislative study was commissioned in 2010 and the House Committee
on Commerce and Consumer Affairs recommended the bill for consideration in the 2011 session. In
most states, no official action has been taken. 46
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44
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46
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Leave Bill in 2008); Time to Care New York, Paid Leave for New York Families: We Need Time to Care available at http://www.
timetocareny.org/About.htm (noting that a Paid Family Leave Bill passed the New York Assembly in 2005); New Hampshire
General Court, Docket of HB 661 available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/Bill_docket.aspx?lsr=744&sy=2010&
sortoption=&txtsessionyear=2010&txtbillnumber=HB661
42

H.R. 2339, 111th Cong. (introduced by Rep. Lynn Woolsey on May 7, 2009).
Id. § 3.
3
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4
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5
States with an existing program can obtain one three-year grant, while states without a pre-existing paid family leave system
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6
See H.R. 2363, 108th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Rosa DeLauro on June 5, 2003), H.R. 5625, 109th Cong. (Introduced by Rep.
Carolyn Maloney on June 15, 2006), H.R. 1369, 110th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Carolyn Maloney on March 7, 2007).
7
Hearing on H.R. 2339, the Family Income to Respond to Significant Transitions Act and H.R. 2460, the Healthy Families
Act before the H. Sub. Comm. on Workforce Protections, 110th Cong. (June 11, 2009) available at http://edlabor.house.gov/
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8
Heather Boushey, Center for American Progress, Helping Breadwinners When it Can’t Wait: A Progressive Program for Family Leave
Insurance (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/fmla.pdf.
9
Id. at 1.
10
Id. at 13.
11
Id. at 2.
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H.R. 1723, 111th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Pete Stark on March 25, 2009).
13
Id. §102(b)(1)(a).
14
Id. §102(b)(1)(b).
15
Id. §102(b)(1)(a) (stating that “State agrees to establish, or expand a State program in effect at the date of the enactment of
this Act”)(emphasis added).
16
Id. §102(b)(2)(a).
17
Id. §102(b)(2)(b).
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Id. §306.
19
Id. § 101(1)(A).
20
Id. § 101(2)(C).
21
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22
See H.R. 3192, 109th Cong (Introduced by Rep. Pete Stark on May 1, 2006), H.R. 5873, 110th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Pete
Stark on April 22, 2008).
23
S. 1681 §306, 110th Cong. (Introduced by Sen. Chris Dodd on June 21, 2007).
24
Id. §§ 301-02
25
Id. § 102.
26
Id. § 103(d)
27
President’s Proposed Budget for the Department of Labor, FY 2011, pg. 797 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
Overview/.
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Appendix E

Family Security
Insurance

Comparison of FSI Proposal to Similar Paid Time Off Proposals
Family Security
Insurance

Family Leave
Insurance Act of
2009, H.R. 1723
(111th Congress),
introduced by
Rep. Stark1

Family Leave and
Insurance Act of
2007, S. 1681,
(110th Congress),
introduced by
Senators Dodd
and Stevens2

Social Security
Cares3

Qualifying
Event

k Parental Care for
a New Child (PCNC):
birth or placement of
a new child.

k TDI: same as FSI.

k TDI: same as FSI.

k TDI: same as FSI.

k PCNC: same as
FSI.

k PCNC: same as
FSI.

k PCNC: same as
FSI.

k Caregiving:
FMLA-covered
family members and
domestic partners.

k Caregiving: limited
to FMLA-covered
family members.

k Caregiving:
limited to FMLAcovered family
members;
recommends an
amendment to FMLA
to cover more family
members, such as
domestic partners.

k Caregiving
Insurance (CI):
serious health
condition of a family
member, broadly
defined.

Workforce
Attachment
Requirements

Minimum of 950
hours worked over
a base period,
which is defined
as the last 4 or 5
quarters preceding
an application for
benefits. Hours
can be served at
multiple employers.
Self-employed
individuals’ eligibility
is determined based
on earnings.

Employee must be
eligible under FMLA
(1,250 hours of
work at a particular
employer and a yearin-service at that
employer). Employee
must have also
earned wages with
a covered employer
for 12 of the last 18
months prior to filing
an application for
benefits.

Social Security
Cares3

between age 21
and the leave date
(i.e. 2 years of work
required if leave
is taken at 25 and
4 ½ years of work
required if taken at
age 30);
k At age 31 or older,
workers need at least
20 credits (i.e. 5
years of work) in the
10 years immediately
before
the leave date.

Workforce
Attachment
Requirements

Hours can be
served at multiple
employers.
All.

625 hours of service
with one employer
during the previous 6
months.

Family Leave and
Insurance Act of
2007, S. 1681,
(110th Congress),
introduced by
Senators Dodd
and Stevens2

EL I G I BI L I T Y

E LIGIBILIT Y
k Temporary
Disability Insurance
(TDI): applicant’s
serious health
condition (includes
pregnancy).

Family Leave
Insurance Act of
2009, H.R. 1723
(111th Congress),
introduced by
Rep. Stark1

Based on Social
Security credit
model. All
employees, including
those who are selfemployed, earn
one credit for each
$1,090 in earnings,
up to a maximum of
four credits per year.
k Before age 24,
workers will need
1½ years of work (six
credits) in the three
years prior to the
leave date;

Covered
Employers

Employers with
20+ employees.
Employers may optout if they adopt
a voluntary plan
approved by the
agency administering
the program.
Self-employed
individuals and
employers with
between 2 and 19
employees may elect
to participate.

All employers
covered under
the FMLA (50+
employees).
Employers may optout if they adopt
a voluntary plan
approved by the
agency administering
the program.

All.

Self-employed
individuals and
employers with
between 2 and 49
employees may elect
to participate.

k Between ages 24
through 30, workers
will need credits for
half of the time
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Family Security
Insurance

Family Leave
Insurance Act of
2009, H.R. 1723
(111th Congress),
introduced by
Rep. Stark1

Family Leave and
Insurance Act of
2007, S. 1681,
(110th Congress),
introduced by
Senators Dodd
and Stevens2

Family Security
Insurance

Social Security
Cares3

Duration

Same as FMLA: 12
weeks per year for all
qualifying events.

8 weeks per year for
all qualifying events.

Same as FMLA: 12
weeks per year for all
qualifying events.

Taxation

k PCNC: 12 weeks
per parent, must
be taken within 12
months of child’s
birth or placement;
no total maximum
duration.

Waiting period

k CI: depends on
length of caregiving
need; maximum
annual duration
of 12 weeks, total
maximum duration of
26 weeks.
k TDI and CI: 80%
of weekly wages up
to maximum of 150%
the national average
weekly wage.

Wage
Replacement
Rate &
Maximum
Benefit Amount

k PCNC: 90% of
weekly wages up to
maximum of 150%
the national average
weekly wage.

Social Security
Cares3

Benefits are treated
as taxable wages for
income and payroll
tax purposes.

Does not specify.

Does not specify.

Does not specify;
presumably benefits
would be subject
to tax in the same
manner as other
Social Security
benefits: if a
recipient has another
substantial source of
income, benefits may
be partially taxed.

k TDI: 5 workdays
per year, per serious
health condition.

5 workdays per year.

5 workdays per year.

Does not specify.

Minimum increment
of one day.

Minimum increment
of one day.

Does not specify.

k PCNC: None.
k CI: 5 workdays
per year, per serious
health condition of
the person being
cared for.

Less than $20,000*:
100%
$20,000-$30,000:
75%
$30,000-$60,000:
55%
$60,000-$97,000:
40%
Above $97,000: 40%
of $97,000.
*Income categories
indexed to the
national average
weekly wage index.

156

Family Leave and
Insurance Act of
2007, S. 1681,
(110th Congress),
introduced by
Senators Dodd
and Stevens2

BEN EFI TS

BE NE FITS
k TDI: depends
on length of an
individual’s serious
health condition;
maximum annual
duration of 26
weeks; no total
maximum duration.

Family Leave
Insurance Act of
2009, H.R. 1723
(111th Congress),
introduced by
Rep. Stark1

Same as H.R. 1723.

Follows current
benefit schedule
in Social Security
Disability Insurance.
Two “bend points”
(calculated based on
the national average
wage index) are
used to create three
earnings brackets.
Earnings up to the
first bend point
are replaced at 90
percent, earnings
between the first
and second bend
points are replaced
at 32 percent, and
earnings beyond the
second bend point
are replaced at 15
percent up to the
annually-updated
federal maximum.

Allowable
increments of
benefits

5 days or more.
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Family Security
Insurance

Family Leave
Insurance Act of
2009, H.R. 1723
(111th Congress),
introduced by
Rep. Stark1

Family Leave and
Insurance Act of
2007, S. 1681,
(110th Congress),
introduced by
Senators Dodd
and Stevens2

Family Security
Insurance

Social Security
Cares3

FINANCING

Method of
financing

Payroll tax,
contributions made
on a pre-tax basis.

None.

Payroll tax
earnings cap
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Payroll tax.

Family Leave
Insurance Act of
2009, H.R. 1723
(111th Congress),
introduced by
Rep. Stark1

Family Leave and
Insurance Act of
2007, S. 1681,
(110th Congress),
introduced by
Senators Dodd
and Stevens2

Social Security
Cares3

AD MI N I STRATI O N
Payroll tax.

k Large employers
(20+ employees):
Equal contributions
from employer and
employee at a tax
rate of .2% each.

k Large employers
(20+ employees):
Equal contributions
from employer and
employee at a tax
rate of .2% each.

k Opt-in small
employers (less
than 20): Equal
contributions from
employer and
employee at a tax
rate of .1% each.

k Opt-in small
employers (less
than 20): Equal
contributions from
employer and
employee at a tax
rate of .1% each.

k Self-employed:
Self-employed
individuals who elect
to participate are
required to contribute
at a tax rate of .4%.

k Self-employed:
Self-employed
individuals who elect
to participate are
required to contribute
at a tax rate of .2%

3 financing options:
1) Increase in the
Social Security payroll
tax, which imposes
equal contributions
from employers and
employees;
2) Lifting the earnings
cap on which payroll
taxes are assessed
beyond its current
level;
3) Allowing workers
to trade future Social
Security benefits
for paid family
and medical leave
benefits.
Based on Social
Security. Equal
contributions from
employees and
employers. Selfemployed individuals
cover employer
and employee
contribution.

Administration
vehicle

Either a single
federal agency
or a federal-state
partnership.

Either a federalstate partnership
or, at the request
of a state governor,
administration by
Social Security
offices.

Employers distribute
and administer
benefits and receive
reimbursement
from Family Leave
Insurance Fund.

Social Security.

J O B P ROTEC TI O N o r AN TI -RETAL I ATI O N P ROVIS IO N S
Job protection

Anti-retaliation
provision

No. Recommends
an expansion of
the FMLA to cover
employers with 15+
employees.

No.

No.

No. Recommends
an expansion of the
FMLA to cover more
employers, but does
not recommend a
specific threshold.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Does not specify.

Same as Social
Security earnings cap
(currently $106,800).
Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009, H.R. 1723,111th Cong. (2009).
Family Leave and Insurance Act of 2007, S.1681,110th Cong. (2007).
3
Heather Boushey, Helping Breadwinners When It Can’t Wait, A Progressive Program for Family Leave Insurance (Center for American
Progress 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/fmla.pdf.
4
Some recipients are required to pay federal income taxes on their Social Security benefits if they have another source of
substantial income in addition to Social Security benefits, such as wages, self-employment, interest, dividends and other
taxable income. No Social Security recipient pays federal income tax on more than 85 percent of his or her Social Security
benefits. IRS Publication 915, Social Security and Equivalent Railroad Retirement Benefits(2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p915.
pdf.
1

2

159

Appendix F

Other Policy Models for Achieving Wage Replacement for
Temporary Disability, Parental Care, and Caregiving
We explored a number of possible policy models to increase access to paid time off for health and
caregiving needs. In this section, we discuss the wage replacement models we explored in detail and
the advantages and disadvantages of each.

1. Employer-Based Models
One way to increase the number of employers that offer paid time off to employees is through
favorable tax incentives. For example, some members of Congress and federal policy experts have
proposed establishing a new tax credit for employers who provide paid family and medical leave to
their employees.1,2 The goal of employer tax incentives is to tip the financial bottom line in favor of a
particular behavior. An employer tax credit for offering paid time off might increase the number of
businesses providing such benefits by making it affordable to do so. Offering such benefits might
then increase employee retention and productivity, which would provide another financial boost to
businesses.3
There is ample precedent for using federal tax policy to incentivize employers to adopt policies that
help families manage caregiving obligations. For instance, employers receive a federal tax credit of
up to $150,000 when they provide child care facilities and resources to their employees.4 Employers
also benefit from reduced payroll taxes when they offer Health Care or Dependent Care Flexible
Savings Accounts (HSAs and DCFSAs), which allow reimbursement for health care, childcare, and
some elder care expenses with pre-tax dollars.5
Tax incentives to employers that provide paid family and medical leave would be a relatively
efficient way for government to facilitate paid time off because employers would be responsible
for administering the program. The federal government could condition incentives on whether an
employer meets broad, minimum standards (such as requiring that an employer provide extended
time off for an FMLA-qualifying reason). Beyond basic standards, employers could be allowed to
innovate with various ways to provide additional paid time off. This room for innovation might help
an employer adapt a paid time off policy to meet the specific needs of its business, such as offering
higher wage replacement or expanding the reasons employees can take extended time off work (for
example, a sabbatical or time off for additional job training). Ideally, this innovation would spur “best
practices” models that could be replicated in other workplaces.
The primary disadvantage with relying solely on employer tax incentives to increase workers’ access
to wage replacement is that coverage is likely to be far from universal. Evidence suggests that many
employer tax credits tend to reward employers who are already inclined towards the behavior the tax
credit is designed to incentivize rather than encouraging new behavior.6 Further, large employers are
far more likely than small employers to offer work-family benefits like child care facilities and DCAPs.7
While it is difficult to predict how many employers would decide to offer new paid time off programs
as a result of a new tax credit, similar tax incentives have not shifted employer behavior to the point
of achieving anywhere near universal coverage.8 In order to incentivize the vast majority of employers
to take advantage of a paid time off tax credit, the credit itself would need to be fairly large, which
would have a negative impact on federal revenue streams. Also, the current economic recession has
meant that other employer tax credits targeted directly at economic recovery, such as those provided
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under the HIRE Act and the first-time home buyer’s tax credit, have received higher priority.9
Another option that locates responsibility for paid extended time off on employers is to directly
mandate that employers provide paid time off for health and caregiving reasons. For instance, the
FMLA could be expanded to require that leave taken under the FMLA be paid by employers (but this
would still mean that only about half of workers would receive benefits, unless FMLA were expanded
to all businesses). There are a number of examples of direct employer mandates, including the
Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage requirements, civil rights laws prohibiting employment
discrimination, the FMLA’s job protection mandate, and an employer participation requirement under
the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).10 Also, legislation currently pending in
Congress—the Healthy Families Act—would require employers to provide a certain number of annual
paid sick days to workers.11 Similarly, eight states have laws, known as “kin care” laws requiring
employers who provide sick days to allow employees to use those days to care for family members.12
Assuming a mandate applied across the board to small and large employers, it could be an effective
way of securing private provision of paid time off for health and caregiving reasons. Yet, the political
reality of direct mandates has often meant that these laws are not evenly applied to small and large
employers.13
Some scholars have also expressed concern that employer mandates for paid time off could lead
to job discrimination against individuals who might be perceived as being more likely to use the
benefits. For example, while take-up rates of unpaid FMLA tend to be relatively equal between
men and women, there still might be a perception that women are more likely to use paid time off,
particularly maternity and parental leave benefits.14 This perception could lead to disparities in labor
market outcomes for women, including pay and hiring discrimination.15
The risks of cost-shifting to likely users of paid time off inherent in a mandate nominally financed
by employers argues in favor of a scheme that severs the direct link between leave-taking by
individual employees and the tax imposed on employers to finance the leaves. A social insurance
scheme financed by a tax spread across employers and/or workers—and not “experience-rated” so
that employers who have more leave-takers would not pay higher taxes—would help ameliorate this
problem.16
Finally, a direct mandate tying responsibility for the expense and administration of benefits to
particular employers may not meet the reality of today’s highly mobile workforce.17 With a direct
mandate, employers might reasonably demand a policy requiring significant pre- and post- leave
work history with that employer as a condition of eligibility. While we believe workers need to
have a significant level of workforce attachment to qualify for wage replacement benefits and we
support policies that encourage loyalty to the workforce after taking leave, onerous single-employer
attachment requirements could prove too restrictive, and are not reflective of workforce realities.18
We believe a social insurance approach, as described in our proposal, provides better protection to
persons who must hold multiple jobs (such as low-wage workers with one or more part-time positions)
or those who regularly change employers.
A similar, but less aggressive approach to a broad employer mandate for paid time off is using the
government’s regulatory powers to incentivize businesses to provide paid time off for health and
caregiving reasons.
For example, the Society for Human Resource Management has proposed giving businesses a “safe
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harbor” compliance exemption from federal, state, and local leave laws if they provide paid time
off benefits.19 However, exemptions from leave laws—like the FMLA’s job protection mandate—in
exchange for wage replacement benefits are problematic because workers are less likely to take paid
time off if they do not have a job to return to after their leave is over.20
Another approach involves using the federal government’s regulation of federal contracts and
grants to incentivize employers to offer paid family and medical leave benefits. For example, some
policy experts have proposed using the government’s significant purchasing power to take into
consideration employer work-family policies when awarding federal contracts or grants, including
whether contractors or grantees provide paid family leave to their workers.21 However, even though
the federal contracting workforce is large (it represents nearly 25% of the American workforce),22
government purchasing power alone will not secure universal access to wage replacement benefits
for all workers.

2. Employee-based models
Rather than focusing on employer provision of paid time off, government could encourage workers to
finance their own time off by incentivizing and supporting dedicated personal savings.
For example, the government could allow tax-preferred savings accounts similar to Health Care or
Dependent Care Flexible Savings Accounts (HSAs and DCFSAs).23 The money set aside would be pretax, so workers could reduce their adjusted gross income and pay for paid family and medical leave
with untaxed dollars.24
Another approach is for the government to subsidize private savings. Several countries have
adopted a savings account model to assist families when they have children, although it is important
to note that these models are a supplement—not an alternative—to other work-family policies, such
as social insurance programs for maternity and parental leave.25
An individual account model could be an administratively inexpensive way for government to
facilitate wage replacement for time off for health and caregiving reasons because a private entity
would likely administer the accounts. Individual accounts also have the advantage of being portable
and flexible. Workers could access funds even if they have changed jobs, and workers would have
the flexibility to decide what proportion of their earnings to set aside based on their own individual
situation. Some workers might be able to save enough to fully account for lost wages instead of
relying on a social insurance program that caps benefits above a certain income level and does not
replace wages at 100 percent.
While the individual account model has many attractive features, it is not feasible to rely solely on
this model to ensure coverage for most workers, particularly workers facing the most economic
insecurity. Evidence from similar individual savings account models—such as DCFSAs and HSAs—
shows that a large number of employers do not offer such accounts26 and of those who do, takeup rates among employees tend to be low. 27 Assuming no change in the voluntary nature of the
individual savings account model, we believe it is unlikely to generate adequate savings to support
current needs, especially the needs of low-wage workers, but also early-career workers of all income
levels.
Individual accounts are also often subject to annual contribution caps, which limits the tax-preferred
advantage of this type of savings vehicle. For example, the capped savings rate for DCFSAs, which
can be used to offset the cost of childcare, is $5,000 per year.28 This amount does not come close to
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covering the actual costs of high-quality childcare for most families.29 It is unlikely that the tax code
could financially bear a high enough savings cap needed to help most families achieve sufficient
wage replacement for time off for health and caregiving reasons.
Even if an individual account model was adopted, it would likely need to be designed to allow
workers to roll over their savings from year to year, as with 401(k) accounts, rather than the annual
“use it or lose it” approach that has been adopted for health savings accounts. Note that Health
Reimbursement Accounts (HRAs), which are set up and funded by employers, roll-over unused funds
from one year to the next.30
Yet, even with roll-overs, higher contribution caps and individual foresight, we anticipate
disadvantages with the individual account model. Many workers with new children are relatively new
entrants to the workforce and will not have had enough time in the labor market or surplus earnings
to save for parental care or other unexpected events or situations. Others won’t be able to afford to.
Another employee-centered policy model is to require that workers carry insurance that would
provide wage replacement during time off for temporary disability, parental care, or caregiving. This
model is similar to the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
and the many state laws that require vehicle owners to carry liability insurance. As with the PPACA,
an individual mandate could be coupled with government subsidies and tax credits to ensure that
mandated coverage is affordable for low and moderate income families. The PPACA’s individual
mandate is also supported by an employer participation requirement; a similar requirement could
reduce the risk that employers who currently provide paid time off would stop doing so.
By mandating universal participation in an insurance pool, the government forces a broader
spreading of risks than a private insurance market.31 Spreading risks broadly could reduce the cost
of insurance and facilitate inclusion of workers who would be excluded from private insurance and
for whom saving privately for individual coverage would be prohibitively difficult, particularly women
and low to middle-income workers.32
Without some degree of government subsidy, an individual mandate to insure for health and
caregiving needs will be unaffordable for most workers. Even families with the resources to set aside
funds for a rainy day may have competing out of pocket expenses. Moreover, there are separate
public policy reasons to encourage individuals to save for competing life events, such as college and
retirement, rather than make mandatory payments for paid time off insurance. Finally, unlike health
or auto insurance, there is virtually no functioning private market for “family and medical leave
insurance” because caregiving needs do not easily fit into the actuarial parameters necessary to
sustain a private insurance market.33 Given that caregiving obligations are a universal concern, and
healthy childrearing is a social good, a social insurance program that allows for some shared costs is
a preferable alternative to precluding access to extended time off for those who need it most, such
as chronically disabled individuals or childbearing women.

3. State-Based Models
An alternative to focusing on a national policy solution is working towards incremental progress in the
states. The federal government could still play a role by providing grants to states who wish to start
their own TDI and PFL programs, such as those that currently exist in California and New Jersey.
The grants approach has been proposed in Rep. Lynn Woolsey’s Family Income to Respond to
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Significant Transitions Act34 and the Administration’s FY 2011 Budget for the Department of Labor.35
Both proposals seek to encourage the establishment of TDI and PFL programs at the state level by
providing federal grants for the design and implementation of such programs.36
While grants to states to implement TDI and PFL programs certainly have the potential to increase
access to these benefits, we believe the need is of such magnitude that we cannot wait for all 50
states to act. In addition, we believe it would be unfair and confusing to have a disparity in benefits
simply based on where one lives. A state-by-state approach could also result in a race to the bottom
effect where states provide minimal benefits to keep the employer contribution low.37 As discussed
in our proposal, we believe a federal-state partnership would be a viable way to administer a paid
time off program for health and caregiving reasons. Federal standards would be put in place
to ensure that benefits are equal across jurisdictions, but states would be allowed flexibility in
administering the program.

m
We believe that some of the models discussed above, such as pre-tax savings accounts and
employer tax credits, could supplement a national social insurance scheme by encouraging employer
innovation and by incentivizing personal savings by workers to finance their own health and
caregiving needs.
Until a national scheme is adopted, these incentive plans might be a valuable first step. However,
incentives alone are unlikely to achieve the full coverage we favor. For this reason, we favor a
national social insurance program, which has the practical advantage of risk-pooling, and recognizes
the collective nature of social risks and responsibilities.38 As outlined in our proposal, we believe
there are compelling economic, public health, and equity reasons to treat the support of workers with
temporary disabilities or caregiving obligations as a collective obligationwhose costs are shared.
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